Do Speculators Drive Crude Oil Futures Prices
01 May 2011-The Energy Journal (International Association for Energy Economics)-Vol. 32, Iss: 2, pp 167-202
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors employ Granger Causality tests to analyze lead and lag relations between price and position data at daily and multiple day intervals, finding little evidence that hedge funds and other noncommercial (speculator) position changes Granger-cause price changes; the results instead suggest that price changes precede their position changes.
Abstract: The coincident rise in crude oil prices and increased number of financial participants in the crude oil futures market from 2000―2008 has led to allegations that "speculators" drive crude oil prices. As crude oil futures peaked at $147/ bbl in July 2008, the role of speculators came under heated debate. In this paper, we employ unique data from the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to test the relation between crude oil prices and the trading positions of various types of traders in the crude oil futures market. We employ Granger Causality tests to analyze lead and lag relations between price and position data at daily and multiple day intervals. We find little evidence that hedge funds and other non-commercial (speculator) position changes Granger-cause price changes; the results instead suggest that price changes precede their position changes.
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the links between price returns for 25 commodities and stocks over the period from January 2001 to November 2011, by paying a particular attention to energy raw materials.
460 citations
TL;DR: This article used a non-public dataset of individual trader positions in 17 U.S. commodity futures markets to provide novel evidence on those markets' financialization in the past decade and found that the correlation between the rates of return on commodities and equities rises with greater participation by speculators generally, hedge funds especially, and funds that trade in both equity and commodity markets in particular.
Abstract: We use a unique, non-public dataset of individual trader positions in 17 U.S. commodity futures markets to provide novel evidence on those markets’ financialization in the past decade. We then show that the correlation between the rates of return on commodities and equities rises amid greater participation by speculators generally, hedge funds especially, and funds that trade in both equity and commodity markets in particular. We find no such relationship for other kinds of commodity futures traders. The predictive power of hedge fund positions is weaker in periods of generalized financial market stress. Our results indicate that who trades helps predict the joint distribution of commodity and equity returns.
444 citations
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TL;DR: This article found that the existing evidence is not supportive of an important role of speculation in driving the spot price of oil after 2003, and there is strong evidence that the co-movement between spot and futures prices reflects common economic fundamentals rather than the financialization of oil futures markets.
Abstract: A popular view is that the surge in the price of oil during 2003-08 cannot be explained by economic fundamentals, but was caused by the increased financialization of oil futures markets, which in turn allowed speculation to become a major determinant of the spot price of oil. This interpretation has been driving policy efforts to regulate oil futures markets. This survey reviews the evidence supporting this view. We identify six strands in the literature corresponding to different empirical methodologies and discuss to what extent each approach sheds light on the role of speculation. We find that the existing evidence is not supportive of an important role of speculation in driving the spot price of oil after 2003. Instead, there is strong evidence that the co-movement between spot and futures prices reflects common economic fundamentals rather than the financialization of oil futures markets.
391 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that financialization has substantially changed commodity markets through risk sharing and information discovery in commodity markets, and they argue that the financialization can substantially change commodity markets by changing the mechanisms of risk sharing, information discovery, and information exchange.
371 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors use a non-public dataset of trader positions in 17 U.S. commodity futures markets to provide novel evidence on those markets' financialization in the past decade.
362 citations
References
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TL;DR: This article examined the use of autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models for the analysis of long-run relations when the underlying variables are I(1) and I(0) regressors.
Abstract: This paper examines the use of autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models for the analysis of long-run relations when the underlying variables are I(1). It shows that after appropriate augmentation of the order of the ARDL model, the OLS estimators of the short-run parameters are p T -consistent with the asymptotically singular covariance matrix, and the ARDL-based estimators of the long-run coe¢cients are super-consistent, and valid inferences on the long-run parameters can be made using standard normal asymptotic theory. The paper also examines the relationship between the ARDL procedure and the fully modi
ed OLS approach of Phillips and Hansen to estimation of cointegrating relations, and compares the small sample performance of these two approaches via Monte Carlo experiments. These results provide strong evidence in favour of a rehabilitation of the traditional ARDL approach to time series econometric modelling. The ARDL approach has the additional advantage of yielding consistent estimates of the long-run coe¢cients that are asymptotically normal irrespective of whether the underlying regressors are I(1) or I(0). JEL Classi
cations: C12, C13, C15, C22. Key Words: Autoregressive distributed lag model, Cointegration, I(1) and I(0) regressors, Model selection, Monte Carlo simulation. ¤This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Symposium at the Centennial of Ragnar Frisch, The Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters, Oslo, March 3-5, 1995. We are grateful to Peter Boswijk, Clive Granger, Alberto Holly, Kyung So Im, Brendan McCabe, Steve Satchell, Richard Smith, Ron Smith and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Partial
nancial support from the ESRC (Grant No. R000233608) and the Isaac Newton Trust of Trinity College, Cambridge is gratefully acknowledged.
4,711 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, a structural decomposition of the real price of crude oil in four components is proposed: oil supply shocks driven by political events in OPEC countries; other oil supply shock; aggregate shocks to the demand for industrial commodities; and demand shocks that are specific to the crude oil market.
Abstract: Using a newly developed measure of global real economic activity, a structural decomposition of the real price of crude oil in four components is proposed: oil supply shocks driven by political events in OPEC countries; other oil supply shocks; aggregate shocks to the demand for industrial commodities; and demand shocks that are specific to the crude oil market. The latter shock is designed to capture shifts in the price of oil driven by higher precautionary demand associated with concerns about the availability of future oil supplies. The paper quantifies the magnitude and timing of these shocks, their dynamic effects on the real price of oil and their relative importance in determining the real price of oil during 1975-2005. The analysis also sheds light on the origins of the major oil price shocks since 1979. Distinguishing between the sources of higher oil prices is shown to be crucial for assessing the effect of higher oil prices on U.S. real GDP and CPI inflation. It is shown that policies aimed at dealing with higher oil prices must take careful account of the origins of higher oil prices. The paper also quantifies the extent to which the macroeconomic performance of the U.S. since the mid-1970s has been determined by the external economic shocks driving the real price of oil as opposed to domestic economic factors and policies.
2,951 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a structural decomposition of the real price of crude oil is proposed, based on a newly developed measure of global real economic activity, and the authors estimate the dynamic effects of these shocks on the real prices of oil.
Abstract: Using a newly developed measure of global real economic activity, a structural decomposition of the real price of crude oil into three components is proposed: crude oil supply shocks; shocks to the global demand for all industrial commodities; and demand shocks that are specific to the crude oil market. The latter shock is designed to capture shifts in the price of oil driven by higher precautionary demand associated with concerns about future oil supply shortfalls. The paper estimates the dynamic effects of these shocks on the real price of oil. A historical decomposition sheds light on the causes of the major oil price shocks since 1975. The implications of higher oil prices for U.S. real GDP and CPI inflation are shown to depend on the cause of the oil price increase. Changes in the composition of shocks help explain why regressions of macroeconomic aggregates on oil prices tend to be unstable. Evidence that the recent increase in crude oil prices was driven primarily by global aggregate demand shocks helps explain why this oil price shock so far has failed to cause a major recession in the U.S.
2,670 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the role of rational speculators in financial markets was analyzed and it was shown that an increase in the number of forward-looking rational traders can lead to increased volatility of prices about fundamentals.
Abstract: Analyses of the role of rational speculators in financial markets usually presume that such investors dampen price fluctuations by trading against liquidity or noise traders This conclusion does not necessarily hold when noise traders follow positive-feedback investment strategies buy when prices rise and sell when prices fall In such cases, it may pay rational speculators to try to jump on the bandwagon early and to purchase ahead of noise trader demand If rational speculators' attempts to jump on the bandwagon early trigger positive-feedback investment strategies, then an increase in the number of forward-looking rational speculators can lead to increased volatility of prices about fundamentals
2,110 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a possibly empirically important exception to this argument, based on the prevalence of positive feedback investors in financial markets, who buy securities when prices rise and sell when prices fall.
Abstract: Analyses of rational speculation usually presume that it dampens fluctuations caused by "noise" traders. This is not necessarily the case if noise traders follow positivefeedback strategies-buy when prices rise and sell when prices fall. It may pay to jump on the bandwagon and purchase ahead of noise demand. If rational speculators' early buying triggers positive-feedback trading, then an increase in the number of forwardlooking speculators can increase volatility about fundamentals. This model is consistent with a number of empirical observations about the correlation of asset returns, the overreaction of prices to news, price bubbles, and expectations. WHAT EFFECT DO RATIONAL speculators have on asset prices? The standard answer, dating back at least to Friedman (1953), is that rational speculators must stabilize asset prices. Speculators who destabilize asset prices do so by, on average, buying when prices are high and selling when prices are low; such destabilizing speculators are quickly eliminated from the market. By contrast, speculators who earn positive profits do so by trading against the less rational investors who move prices away from fundamentals. Such speculators rationally counter the deviations of prices from fundamentals and so stabilize them. Recent work on noise trading and market efficiency has accepted this argument (Figlewski, 1979; Kyle, 1985; Campbell and Kyle, 1988; DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann, 1987). In this work, risk aversion keeps rational speculators from taking large arbitrage positions, so noise traders can affect prices. Nonetheless, the effect of rational speculators' trades is to move prices in the direction of, even if not all the way to, fundamentals. Rational speculators buck noisedriven price movements and so dampen, but do not eliminate, them. In this paper we present a possibly empirically important exception to this argument, based on the prevalence of positive feedback investors in financial markets. Positive feedback investors are those who buy securities when prices rise and sell when prices fall. Many forms of behavior common in financial markets can be described as positive feedback trading. It can result from extrapolative expectations about prices, or trend chasing. It can also result from stoploss orders, which effectively prompt selling in response to price declines. A
1,825 citations