Does a long-term orientation create value? Evidence from a regression discontinuity
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine shareholder proposals on long-term executive compensation that pass or fail by a small margin of votes and find that the adoption of such proposals leads to an increase in firm value and operating performance.
Abstract: Research summary: In this paper, we theorize and empirically investigate how a long-term orientation impacts firm value. To study this relationship, we exploit exogenous changes in executives' long-term incentives. Specifically, we examine shareholder proposals on long-term executive compensation that pass or fail by a small margin of votes. The passage of such “close call” proposals is akin to a random assignment of long-term incentives and hence provides a clean causal estimate. We find that the adoption of such proposals leads to (1) an increase in firm value and operating performance—suggesting that a long-term orientation is beneficial to companies—and (2) an increase in firms' investments in long-term strategies such as innovation and stakeholder relationships. Overall, our results are consistent with a “time-based” agency conflict between shareholders and managers.
Managerial summary: This paper shows that corporate short-termism is hampering business success. We show clear, causal evidence that imposing long-term incentives on executives—in the form of long-term executive compensation—improves business performance. Long-term executive compensation includes restricted stocks, restricted stock options, and long-term incentive plans. Firms that adopted shareholder resolutions on long-term compensation experienced a significant increase in their stock price. This stock price increase foreshadowed an increase in operating profits that materialized after two years. We unpack the reasons for these improvements in performance, and find that firms that adopted these shareholder resolutions made more investments in R&D and stakeholder engagement, especially pertaining to employees and the natural environment. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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TL;DR: In this article, a quasi-natural experiment provided by the enactment of state level constituency statutes, which allow directors to consider stakeholders' interests when making business decisions, was used to examine whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) improves firms' competitiveness in the market for government procurement contracts.
Abstract: Research Summary: This study examines whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) improves firms’ competitiveness in the market for government procurement contracts To obtain exogenous variation in firms’ social engagement, I exploit a quasi‐natural experiment provided by the enactment of state‐level constituency statutes, which allow directors to consider stakeholders’ interests when making business decisions Using constituency statutes as instrumental variable (IV) for CSR, I find that companies with higher CSR receive more procurement contracts The effect is stronger for more complex contracts and in the early years of the government‐company relationship, suggesting that CSR helps mitigate information asymmetries by signaling trustworthiness Moreover, the effect is stronger in competitive industries, indicating that CSR can serve as a differentiation strategy to compete against other bidders Managerial Summary: This study examines how companies can strategically improve their competitiveness in the market for government procurement contracts—a market of economic importance (15–20% of GDP) It shows that companies with higher social and environmental performance (CSR) receive more procurement contracts This effect is stronger for more complex contracts, in the early years of the government–company relationship, and in more competitive industries These findings indicate that firms’ CSR can serve as a signaling and differentiation strategy that influences the purchasing decision of government agencies Accordingly, managers operating in the business‐to‐government (B2G) sector could benefit from integrating social and environmental considerations into their strategic decision making
188 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the integration of corporate social responsibility (CSR) criteria in executive compensation, a relatively recent practice in corporate governance, was examined, and the authors found that CSR contracting helps direct management's attention to stakeholders that are less salient but financially material to the firm in the long run, thereby enhancing corporate governance.
Abstract: Research Summary This study examines the integration of corporate social responsibility (CSR) criteria in executive compensation, a relatively recent practice in corporate governance. We construct a novel database of CSR contracting and document that CSR contracting has become more prevalent over time. We further find that the adoption of CSR contracting leads to (a) an increase in long‐term orientation; (b) an increase in firm value; (c) an increase in social and environmental initiatives; (d) a reduction in emissions; and (e) an increase in green innovations. These findings are consistent with our theoretical arguments predicting that CSR contracting helps direct management's attention to stakeholders that are less salient but financially material to the firm in the long run, thereby enhancing corporate governance. Managerial Summary This paper examines the effectiveness and implications of integrating environmental and social performance criteria in executive compensation (CSR contracting)—a recent practice in corporate governance that is becoming more and more prevalent. We show that CSR contracting mitigates corporate short‐termism and improves business performance. Firms that adopt CSR contracting experience a significant increase in firm value, which foreshadows an increase in long‐term operating profits. Furthermore, firms that adopt CSR contracting improve their environmental and social performance, especially with respect to the environment and local communities. Overall, our findings suggest that CSR contracting directs management's attention to stakeholders that are less salient but financially material to the firm in the long run, thereby improving a firm's governance and its impact on society and the natural environment.
177 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors conducted an inductive research on three supply networks in the automotive, electronics, and consumer product/pharmaceutical industries and collected data on three leading sustainable MNCs and a subset of 9 tier-one suppliers and 22 lower-tier suppliers and complemented that information with data on several NGOs and industry organizations.
145 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors link the CEO's concerns for the current stock price to reductions in real investment, and suggest that vesting-induced equity sales also increase the likelihood of meeting or marginally beating analyst earnings forecasts, and are associated with higher returns to earnings announcements.
Abstract: This paper links the CEO’s concerns for the current stock price to reductions in real investment. These concerns depend on the amount of equity he intends to sell in the short-term, but actual equity sales are an endogenous decision. We use the amount of stock and options scheduled to vest in a given year as an instrument for equity sales. Such vesting is determined by equity grants made several years prior, and thus unlikely driven by current investment opportunities. An interquartile increase in instrumented equity sales is associated with a decline of 0.25% in the growth of R&D/assets, 4.6% of the average R&D/assets ratio. Vesting-induced equity sales also increase the likelihood of meeting or marginally beating analyst earnings forecasts, and are associated with higher returns to earnings announcements. More broadly, by introducing a measure of incentives that is not driven by the current contracting environment – vesting-induced equity sales – our paper suggests that CEO contracts affect real outcomes.
133 citations
24 Oct 2020
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze the involvement that large Spanish companies have shown during the toughest moments of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and determine the objectives these companies have pursued with them.
Abstract: The health, economic, and social consequences of the SARS-CoV-2 virus have highlighted the need for collaboration among all agents to face a scenario that we have not before seen. The aims of this paper are to analyze the involvement that large Spanish companies have shown during the toughest moments of the epidemic and to determine the objectives these companies have pursued with them. The results show that several firms have shown a great commitment with society, developing actions that alleviate the consequences of the COVID-19 like others have developed several strategies with different objectives. More concretely, three clusters of responsibility have been identified: (i) protecting only the interests of shareholders and investors; (ii) favoring the wellbeing of the Spanish society in general and vulnerable groups in particular; and (iii) combining the previous altruistic actions with commercial interests.
124 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the relation between the exploration of new possibilities and the exploitation of old certainties in organizational learning and examine some complications in allocating resources between the two, particularly those introduced by the distribution of costs and benefits across time and space.
Abstract: This paper considers the relation between the exploration of new possibilities and the exploitation of old certainties in organizational learning. It examines some complications in allocating resources between the two, particularly those introduced by the distribution of costs and benefits across time and space, and the effects of ecological interaction. Two general situations involving the development and use of knowledge in organizations are modeled. The first is the case of mutual learning between members of an organization and an organizational code. The second is the case of learning and competitive advantage in competition for primacy. The paper develops an argument that adaptive processes, by refining exploitation more rapidly than exploration, are likely to become effective in the short run but self-destructive in the long run. The possibility that certain common organizational practices ameliorate that tendency is assessed.
16,377 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, the benefits of debt in reducing agency costs of free cash flows, how debt can substitute for dividends, why diversification programs are more likely to generate losses than takeovers or expansion in the same line of business or liquidationmotivated takeovers, and why the factors generating takeover activity in such diverse activities as broadcasting and tobacco are similar to those in oil.
Abstract: The interests and incentives of managers and shareholders conflict over such issues as the optimal size of the firm and the payment of cash to shareholders. These conflicts are especially severe in firms with large free cash flows—more cash than profitable investment opportunities. The theory developed here explains 1) the benefits of debt in reducing agency costs of free cash flows, 2) how debt can substitute for dividends, 3) why “diversification” programs are more likely to generate losses than takeovers or expansion in the same line of business or liquidationmotivated takeovers, 4) why the factors generating takeover activity in such diverse activities as broadcasting and tobacco are similar to those in oil, and 5) why bidders and some targets tend to perform abnormally well prior to takeover.
14,368 citations
TL;DR: Using a sample free of survivor bias, this paper showed that common factors in stock returns and investment expenses almost completely explain persistence in equity mutual fund's mean and risk-adjusted returns.
Abstract: Using a sample free of survivor bias, I demonstrate that common factors in stock returns and investment expenses almost completely explain persistence in equity mutual funds' mean and risk-adjusted returns Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser's (1993) "hot hands" result is mostly driven by the one-year momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), but individual funds do not earn higher returns from following the momentum strategy in stocks The only significant persistence not explained is concentrated in strong underperformance by the worst-return mutual funds The results do not support the existence of skilled or informed mutual fund portfolio managers PERSISTENCE IN MUTUAL FUND performance does not reflect superior stock-picking skill Rather, common factors in stock returns and persistent differences in mutual fund expenses and transaction costs explain almost all of the predictability in mutual fund returns Only the strong, persistent underperformance by the worst-return mutual funds remains anomalous Mutual fund persistence is well documented in the finance literature, but not well explained Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), and Wermers (1996) find evidence of persistence in mutual fund performance over short-term horizons of one to three years, and attribute the persistence to "hot hands" or common investment strategies Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Elton, Gruber, Das, and Hlavka (1993), and Elton, Gruber, Das, and Blake (1996) document mutual fund return predictability over longer horizons of five to ten years, and attribute this to manager differential information or stock-picking talent Contrary evidence comes from Jensen (1969), who does not find that good subsequent performance follows good past performance Carhart (1992) shows that persistence in expense ratios drives much of the long-term persistence in mutual fund performance My analysis indicates that Jegadeesh and Titman's (1993) one-year momentum in stock returns accounts for Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser's (1993) hot hands effect in mutual fund performance However, funds that earn higher
13,218 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of stakeholder identification and saliency based on stakeholders possessing one or more of three relationship attributes (power, legitimacy, and urgency) is proposed, and a typology of stakeholders, propositions concerning their saliency to managers of the firm, and research and management implications.
Abstract: Stakeholder theory has been a popular heuristic for describing the management environment for years, but it has not attained full theoretical status. Our aim in this article is to contribute to a theory of stakeholder identification and salience based on stakeholders possessing one or more of three relationship attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. By combining these attributes, we generate a typology of stakeholders, propositions concerning their salience to managers of the firm, and research and management implications.
10,630 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the role of imperfect information in a principal-agent relationship subject to moral hazard is considered, and a necessary and sufficient condition for imperfect information to improve on contracts based on the payoff alone is derived.
Abstract: The role of imperfect information in a principal-agent relationship subject to moral hazard is considered. A necessary and sufficient condition for imperfect information to improve on contracts based on the payoff alone is derived, and a characterization of the optimal use of such information is given.
7,964 citations