Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Inventory Considerations: Research Overview, Current Practices, and Future Directions
TL;DR: In this paper, a review of the literature and current practices in dynamic pricing is presented, where the focus is on dynamic (intertemporal) pricing in the presence of inventory considerations.
Abstract: The benefits of dynamic pricing methods have long been known in industries, such as airlines, hotels, and electric utilities, where the capacity is fixed in the short-term and perishable. In recent years, there has been an increasing adoption of dynamic pricing policies in retail and other industries, where the sellers have the ability to store inventory. Three factors contributed to this phenomenon: (1) the increased availability of demand data, (2) the ease of changing prices due to new technologies, and (3) the availability of decision-support tools for analyzing demand data and for dynamic pricing. This paper constitutes a review of the literature and current practices in dynamic pricing. Given its applicability in most markets and its increasing adoption in practice, our focus is on dynamic (intertemporal) pricing in the presence of inventory considerations.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a review of various quantitative models for managing supply chain risks and relate various supply chain risk management strategies examined in the research literature with actual practices, highlighting the gap between theory and practice, and motivate researchers to develop new models for mitigating supply chain disruptions.
2,085 citations
Proceedings Article•
08 Jun 2009
TL;DR: It is argued that the process of searching the literature must be comprehensibly described and readers assess the exhaustiveness of the review and other scholars in the field can more confidently (re)use the results in their own research.
Abstract: Science is a cumulative endeavour as new knowledge is often created in the process of interpreting and combining existing knowledge. This is why literature reviews have long played a decisive role in scholarship. The quality of literature reviews is particularly determined by the literature search process. As Sir Isaac Newton eminently put it: If I can see further, it is because I am standing on the shoulders of giants. Drawing on this metaphor, the goal of writing a literature review is to reconstruct the giant of accumulated knowledge in a specific domain. And in doing so, a literature search represents the fundamental first step that makes up the giant's skeleton and largely determines its reconstruction in the subsequent literature analysis. In this paper, we argue that the process of searching the literature must be comprehensibly described. Only then can readers assess the exhaustiveness of the review and other scholars in the field can more confidently (re)use the results in their own research. We set out to explore the methodological rigour of literature review articles published in ten major information systems (IS) journals and show that many of these reviews do not thoroughly document the process of literature search. The results drawn from our analysis lead us to call for more rigour in documenting the literature search process and to present guidelines for crafting a literature review and search in the IS domain.
1,383 citations
TL;DR: This publication contains reprint articles for which IEEE does not hold copyright and which are likely to be copyrighted.
Abstract: In this paper, we examine the research and results of dynamic pricing policies and their relation to revenue management. The survey is based on a generic revenue management problem in which a perishable and nonrenewable set of resources satisfy stochastic price sensitive demand processes over a finite period of time. In this class of problems, the owner (or the seller) of these resources uses them to produce and offer a menu of final products to the end customers. Within this context, we formulate the stochastic control problem of capacity that the seller faces: How to dynamically set the menu and the quantity of products and their corresponding prices to maximize the total revenue over the selling horizon.
749 citations
TL;DR: It is found that the seller cannot avoid the adverse impact of strategic consumer behavior even under low levels of initial inventory, and while the seller expects customers to be more concerned about product availability at discount time, he cannot use high-price “betting” strategies as he would in the case of low inventory and myopic customers.
Abstract: We study the optimal pricing of a finite quantity of a fashion-like seasonal good in the presence of forward-looking (strategic) customers. We distinguish between two classes of pricing strategies: contingent and announced fixed-discount. In both cases, the seller acts as a Stackelberg leader announcing his pricing strategy, while consumers act as followers taking the seller's strategy as given and determining their purchasing behavior. In each case, we identify a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium and show that given the seller's strategy, the equilibrium in the consumer subgame is unique and consists of symmetric threshold purchasing policies. For both cases, we develop a benchmark model in which customers are nonstrategic (myopic). We conduct a comprehensive numerical study to explore the impact of strategic consumer behavior on pricing policies and expected revenue performance. We show that strategic customer behavior suppresses the benefits of price segmentation, particularly under medium-to-high values of heterogeneity and modest rates of decline in valuations. However, when the level of consumer heterogeneity is small, the rate of decline is medium-to-high, and the seller can optimally choose the time of discount in advance, segmentation can be used quite effectively even with strategic consumers. We find that the seller cannot avoid the adverse impact of strategic consumer behavior even under low levels of initial inventory. We argue that while the seller expects customers to be more concerned about product availability at discount time, he cannot use high-price “betting” strategies as he would in the case of low inventory and myopic customers. Under certain qualifications, announced fixed-discount strategies perform essentially the same as contingent pricing policies in the case of myopic consumers. However, under strategic consumer behavior, announced pricing policies can be advantageous to the seller, compared to contingent pricing schemes. Interestingly, those cases that announced discount strategies offer a significant advantage compared to contingent pricing policies. They appear to offer only a minimal advantage in comparison to fixed-pricing policies. Finally, when the seller incorrectly assumes that strategic customers are myopic in their purchasing decisions, it can be quite costly, reaching potential revenue losses of about 20%.
669 citations
TL;DR: This paper develops a model of dynamic pricing with endogenous intertemporal demand and finds that strategic waiting by customers may sometimes benefit the seller: when low-value customers wait, they compete for availability with high- Value customers and thus increase their willingness to pay.
Abstract: This paper develops a model of dynamic pricing with endogenous inter-temporal demand. In the model, there is a monopolist who sells a finite inventory over a finite time horizon. The seller adjusts prices dynamically in order to maximize revenue. Customers arrive continually over the duration of the selling season. At each point in time, customers may purchase the product at current prices, remain in the market at a cost in order to purchase later, or exit, and they wish to maximize individual utility. The customer population is heterogeneous along two dimensions: they may have different valuations for the product and different degrees of patience (waiting costs). We demonstrate that heterogeneity in both valuation and patience is important because they jointly determine the structure of optimal pricing policies. In particular, when high-value customers are proportionately less patient, markdown pricing policies are effective because the high-value customers would buy early at high prices while the low-value customers are willing to wait (i.e. they are not lost). On the other hand, when the high-value customers are more patient than the low-value customers, prices should increase over time in order to discourage inefficient waiting. Contrary to intuition, we find that strategic waiting by customers may sometimes benefit the seller: when low-value customers wait, they compete for availability with high-value customers and thus increase their willingness to pay. Our results also shed light on how the composition of the customer population affects optimal revenue, consumer surplus, and social welfare. Finally, we consider the long run problem of selecting the optimal initial stocking quantity.
518 citations
References
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Book•
01 Jan 1920
TL;DR: Aslanbeigui et al. as mentioned in this paper discussed the relationship between the national dividend and economic and total welfare, and the size of the dividend to the allocation of resources in the economy and the institutional structure governing labor market operations.
Abstract: The Economics of Welfare occupies a privileged position in economics. It contributed to the professionalization of economics, a goal aggressively and effectively pursued by Pigou's predecessor and teacher Alfred Marshall. The Economics of Welfare also may be credited with establishing welfare economics, by systematically analyzing market departures and their potential remedies. In writing The Economics of Welfare, Pigou built a bridge between the old and the new economics at Cambridge and in Britain. Much of the book remains relevant for contemporary economics. The list of his analyses that continues to play an important role in economics is impressive. Some of the more important include: public goods and externalities, welfare criteria, index number problems, price discrimination, the theory of the firm, the structure of relief programs for the poor, and public finance. Pigou's discussion of the institutional structure governing labor-market operations in his Wealth and Welfare prompted Schumpeter to call the work "the greatest venture in labor economics ever undertaken by a man who was primarily a theorist." The Economics of Welfare established welfare economics as a field of study. The first part analyzes the relationship between the national dividend and economic and total welfare. Parts II and III link the size of the dividend to the allocation of resources in the economy and the institutional structure governing labor-market operations. Part IV explores the relationship between the national dividend and its distribution. In her new introduction, Nahid Aslanbeigui discusses the life of Pigou and the history of The Economics of Welfare. She also discusses Pigou's theories as expressed in this volume and some of the criticisms those theories have met as well as the impact of those criticisms. The Economics of Welfare is a classic that repays careful study.
5,145 citations
TL;DR: A growth model for the timing of initial purchase of new products is developed and tested empirically against data for eleven consumer durables, and a long-range forecast is developed for the sales of color television sets.
Abstract: (This article originally appeared in Management Science, January 1969, Volume 15, Number 5, pp. 215-227, published by The Institute of Management Sciences.)
A growth model for the timing of initial purchase of new products is developed and tested empirically against data for eleven consumer durables. The basic assumption of the model is that the timing of a consumer's initial purchase is related to the number of previous buyers. A behavioral rationale for the model is offered in terms of innovative and imitative behavior. The model yields good predictions of the sales peak and the timing of the peak when applied to historical data. A long-range forecast is developed for the sales of color television sets.
4,734 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a growth model for the timing of initial purchase of new products is proposed, and a behavioral rationale for the model is offered in terms of innovative and imitative behavior.
Abstract: A growth model for the timing of initial purchase of new products. The basic assumption of the model is that the timing of a consumer’s initial purchase is related to the number of previous buyers. A behavioral rationale for the model is offered in terms of innovative and imitative behavior. The model yields good predictions of the sales peak and the timing of the peak when applied to historical data. A long-range forecast is developed for the sales of color television sets.
4,408 citations
Posted Content•
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TL;DR: Hayek as mentioned in this paper argued that the problem of rational economic order is determined by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess.
Abstract: ONE PARTY TO AN EXCHANGE often knows something relevant to the transaction that the other party does not know. Such asymmetries of information are pervasive in economic activity: for example, in the relationship between employer and employee when the employee's effort cannot be monitored perfectly; between the stockholders and the manager of a firm; between insurer and insured; between a regulated firm and the regulatory agency; between the supplier and the consumers of a public good; between a socialist firm and the central planner; or (as is the subject of this paper) between buyer and seller when the value of the item is uncertain. Forty years ago, F. A. Hayek criticized theories that purport to describe the price system but start from the assumption that individuals have symmetric information: The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate "given" resources-if "given" is taken to mean given to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem set by these "data." It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality. (Hayek 1945, p. 519)
2,518 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the nature of cartel self-enforcement in the presence of demand uncertainty and present a model of a non-cooperatively supported cartel, and the aspects of industry structure which would make such a cartel viable.
Abstract: Recent work in game theory has shown that, in principle, it may be possible for firms in an industry to form a self-policing cartel to maximize their joint profits. This paper examines the nature of cartel self-enforcement in the presence of demand uncertainty. A model of a noncooperatively supported cartel is presented, and the aspects of industry structure which would make such a cartel viable are discussed.
2,024 citations