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Journal ArticleDOI

“Effective” Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe

01 Apr 1979-Comparative Political Studies (SAGE Publications)-Vol. 12, Iss: 1, pp 3-27
TL;DR: Laakso and Taagepera as discussed by the authors proposed a measure called effective number of parties (effective q) to measure the effect of parties' size on the stability of a political system.
Abstract: The qEffectiveq Number of Parties: qA Measure with Application to West Europeq Laakso, Markku;Taagepera, Rein Comparative Political Studies; Apr 1, 1979; 12, 1; Proouest pg. 3 “EFFECTIVE” NUMBER OF PARTIES A Measure with Application to West Europe MARKKU LAAKSO University of Helsinki REIN TAAGEPERA University of California, Irvine I s a large number of parties bound to destabilize a political system (Duverger, 1954) or is it not (e.g., Lijphart, 1968; Nilson, 1974)? Before this question can be answered, the number of parties must be operationally defined in a way that takes into account their relative size. Such a number is also needed if one wants to detect trends toward fewer or more numerous parties over time, or the effects of a proposed change in electoral rules. This article presents ways to calculate this important political variable, calculates it for I42 post-1944 elections in 15 West European countries, and analyzes its possible effect on stability. We often talk of two-party and multiparty systems. We further dis- tinguish three~ or four—party systems in some countries, and even talk (e. g., Blondel, 1969: 535) of a two-and-a-half-party system whenthere is a third party of marginal size. Mexico could be viewed as a one-and-a- half-party system because the PR1 is so much larger than all other parties. Rather than take the number of all existing parties, including even the very smallest, one visibly has a need for a number that takes into account their relative size. We will call this number the “effective number of parties,” using the word “effectiveq somewhat in the sense pressure group literature uses it when talking about “effective access” (Truman, 195]: 506), but even more in the operational sense physicists give it when they talk about effective current (Richards et al., 1960: 594), COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES. Vol. I2 No. I. April 1979 3-27 © I979 Sage Publications. Inc. Copyright (c) 2000 Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company Copyright (c) Sage Inc.

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Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
01 May 1970

1,935 citations

Book
21 Aug 1995
TL;DR: The Political Economy of Authoritarian Withdrawals25Ch. 3Surviving Crises, Withdrawing in Good Times75Ch. 4Comparing Authoritarian withdrawals109Ch. 5Democratic Transitions and Economic Reform151Ch. 6New Democracies and Economic Crisis183Ch. 7Economic Management in Non-crisis Democracies228Ch. 8Economic and Political Reform in Dominant-Party Systems: Mexico and Taiwan267Ch. 9Economic Reform and Democratic Consolidation309Ch. 10Institutions, Democratic consolidation, and sustainable growth335 Conclusion: Comparing
Abstract: List of Figures and TablesPreface and AcknowledgmentsIntroduction: The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions3Ch. 1The Political Economy of Authoritarian Withdrawals25Ch. 2Economic Crisis and Authoritarian Withdrawal45Ch. 3Surviving Crises, Withdrawing in Good Times75Ch. 4Comparing Authoritarian Withdrawals109Ch. 5Democratic Transitions and Economic Reform151Ch. 6New Democracies and Economic Crisis183Ch. 7Economic Management in Non-crisis Democracies228Ch. 8Economic and Political Reform in Dominant-Party Systems: Mexico and Taiwan267Ch. 9Economic Reform and Democratic Consolidation309Ch. 10Institutions, Democratic Consolidation, and Sustainable Growth335Conclusion: Comparing Democratic Transitions365Index381

1,475 citations

Book
Pippa Norris1
14 Feb 2011
TL;DR: In this article, Pippa Norris examines the symptoms by comparing system support in more than fifty societies worldwide, challenging the pervasive claim that most established democracies have experienced a steadily rising tide of political disaffection during the third-wave era.
Abstract: Many fear that democracies are suffering from a legitimacy crisis. This book focuses on 'democratic deficits', reflecting how far the perceived democratic performance of any state diverges from public expectations. Pippa Norris examines the symptoms by comparing system support in more than fifty societies worldwide, challenging the pervasive claim that most established democracies have experienced a steadily rising tide of political disaffection during the third-wave era. The book diagnoses the reasons behind the democratic deficit, including demand (rising public aspirations for democracy), information (negative news about government) and supply (the performance and structure of democratic regimes). Finally, Norris examines the consequences for active citizenship, for governance and, ultimately, for democratization. This book provides fresh insights into major issues at the heart of comparative politics, public opinion, political culture, political behavior, democratic governance, political psychology, political communications, public policymaking, comparative sociology, cross-national survey analysis and the dynamics of the democratization process.

1,096 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper showed that the electoral system plays a key role in the distribution of redistributions in the United States and Sweden, and that redistribution is much more prevalent in democracies than in non-democratic countries.
Abstract: Standard political economy models of redistribution, notably that of Meltzer and Richard (1981), fail to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across democracies. We develop a general model of redistribution that explains why some democratic governments are more prone to redistribute than others. We show that the electoral system plays a key role because it shapes the nature of political parties and the composition of governing coalitions, hence redistribution. Our argument implies (1) that center-left governments dominate under PR systems, whereas center-right governments dominate under majoritarian systems; and (2) that PR systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems. We test our argument on panel data for redistribution, government partisanship, and electoral system in advanced democracies. W hy do some countries redistribute more than others? Most work on the politics of redistribution starts from the premise that democratic institutions empower those who stand to benefit from redistribution. The basic logic is succinctly captured in the Meltzer‐Richard (1981) model, where the voter with the median income is also the decisive voter. With a typical right-skewed distribution of income, the median voter will push for redistributive spending up to the point where the benefit of such spending to the median voter is outweighed by the efficiency costs of distortionary taxation. This argument implies that redistibution is much greater in democracies than in nondemocracies (at least of the right-authoritarian variety), and that, among the latter, inegalitarian societies redistribute more than egalitarian ones. There is some evidence to supportthefirstimplication,althoughitisdisputed(see Ross 2005), but most of the variance in redistribution is probably within the same regime type. According to datafromtheLuxembourgIncomeStudy,forexample, the reduction in the poverty rate in United States as a result of taxation and transfers was 13% in 1994, whereas the comparable figure for Sweden was 82% (thepovertyrateisthepercentageofhouseholdsbelow 50% of the median income). To explain this variance, we have to look at political and economic differences

946 citations

Book
Pippa Norris1
01 Jan 2004
TL;DR: In this paper, the impact of electoral engineering on voting behavior is discussed. But the authors focus on the role of electoral rules and do not consider the effect of the rules on the behavior of voters.
Abstract: Part I. Introduction: 1. Do rules matter? 2. Classifying electoral systems 3. Evaluating electoral systems Part II. The Consequences for Voting Behavior: 4. Party systems 5. Social cleavages 6. Party loyalties 7. Turnout Part III. The Consequences for Political Representation: 8. Women 9. Ethnic minorities 10. Constituency service Part IV. Conclusions: 11. The impact of electoral engineering.

832 citations

References
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23,110 citations

Book
01 Jan 1961

20,079 citations

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01 Jan 1967

2,245 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The method of measuring power, based on a technique of the mathematical theory of games, is presented here to a number of illustrative cases, including the United States Congress, and is intended as a first step in the attack on these problems.
Abstract: In the following paper we offer a method for the a priori evaluation of the division of power among the various bodies and members of a legislature or committee system. The method is based on a technique of the mathematical theory of games, applied to what are known there as “simple games” and “weighted majority games.” We apply it here to a number of illustrative cases, including the United States Congress, and discuss some of its formal properties.The designing of the size and type of a legislative body is a process that may continue for many years, with frequent revisions and modifications aimed at reflecting changes in the social structure of the country; we may cite the role of the House of Lords in England as an example. The effect of a revision usually cannot be gauged in advance except in the roughest terms; it can easily happen that the mathematical structure of a voting system conceals a bias in power distribution unsuspected and unintended by the authors of the revision. How, for example, is one to predict the degree of protection which a proposed system affords to minority interests? Can a consistent criterion for “fair representation” be found? It is difficult even to describe the net effect of a double representation system such as is found in the U. S. Congress (i.e., by states and by population), without attempting to deduce it a priori. The method of measuring “power” which we present in this paper is intended as a first step in the attack on these problems.

2,043 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
01 May 1970

1,935 citations