In this paper, the authors study pairwise trading in the presence of one-sided or two-sided private information and limited commitment, and show that when one trader's information is relevant for the other trader's value of the asset, optimal trading arrangements may necessarily conceal the traders' information.
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This article is published in Review of Economic Dynamics.The article was published on 2019-07-01 and is currently open access. It has received 3 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Trading turret & Electronic trading.
TL;DR: In this paper, a model of over-the-counter markets is proposed, where some asset buyers are informed in that they can identify high quality assets, and heterogeneous sellers with private information choose what type of buyers they want to trade with.
TL;DR: A research method of high-frequency information transmission in smart grids based on the CNN-LSTM model is proposed, which effectively combines the superiority of the CNN algorithm for high- frequencies information feature extraction and the learning ability of the LSTM algorithm for global features of high -frequency information.
TL;DR: In this paper, the competitive equilibrium outcome in decentralized asset markets when both search friction and adverse selection play roles was studied and it was shown that adverse selection leads to the downward distortion of equilibrium market liquidity.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study trading dynamics in an asset market where the quality of assets is private information and finding a counterparty takes time, and the optimal policy is centred around an announcement effect where trading starts already before the intervention.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore price formation in environments with multidimensional private information and find a simple condition under which a continuum of such equilibria exist, in which case there is also an equilibrium with no trade.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs in bargaining with interdependent values when the informed party makes all offers, as discounting vanishes, and derive an upper bound, using mechanism design with limited commitment.
TL;DR: In this paper, a patient trader should be able to make his trading partners compete to reveal whatever information is relevant to their transactions with him, and this possibility is examined in the context of a model resembling that of Gale (1986).
The authors study pairwise trading mechanisms in the presence of private information and limited commitment, whereby either trader can walk away from a proposed trade when he learns the trading price. The authors show that when one trader 's information is relevant for the other trader 's value of the asset, optimal trading arrangements may necessarily conceal the traders ' information.
Q2. What are the future works in this paper?
Studying such extensions is an interesting avenue for future research.