Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading
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TLDR
In this article, the seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation for a single object are assumed to be independent random variables, and each individual's valuation is unknown to the other.About:
This article is published in Journal of Economic Theory.The article was published on 1983-04-01 and is currently open access. It has received 2435 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem & Valuation (finance).read more
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Rationalist explanations for war
TL;DR: The authors show that there will exist negotiated settlements that rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight under very broad conditions, under the assumption that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it.
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Two-sided markets: a progress report
Jean-Charles Rochet,Jean Tirole +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a road map to the burgeoning literature on two-sided markets and present new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end-users.
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Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations
Yoav Shoham,Kevin Leyton-Brown +1 more
TL;DR: This exciting and pioneering new overview of multiagent systems, which are online systems composed of multiple interacting intelligent agents, i.e., online trading, offers a newly seen computer science perspective on multi agent systems, while integrating ideas from operations research, game theory, economics, logic, and even philosophy and linguistics.
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Algorithmic Game Theory
TL;DR: A new era of theoretical computer science addresses fundamental problems about auctions, networks, and human behavior in a bid to solve the challenges of 21st Century finance.
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Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness
TL;DR: This article developed a new model of the way that wage stickiness affects unemployment and showed that stickiness arises in an economic equilibrium and satisfies the condition that no worker-employer pair has an unexploited opportunity for mutual improvement.
References
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Optimal Auction Design
TL;DR: Optimal auctions are derived for a wide class of auction design problems when the seller has imperfect information about how much the buyers might be willing to pay for the object.
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Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem
TL;DR: In this article, the generalized Nash solution proposed by Harsanyi and Selten is applied to this set to define a bargaining solution for Bayesian collective choice problems, and it is shown that the set of expected utility allocations which are feasible with incentive-compatible mechanisms is compact and convex.
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Incentives and incomplete information
TL;DR: In this article, the problem of correct revelation in a collective decision model is presented as a game with incomplete information, and two approaches to incomplete information are used, a first where the individual beliefs are not introduced and a second where they are.