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Proceedings ArticleDOI

Encrypted key exchange: password-based protocols secure against dictionary attacks

04 May 1992-pp 72-84
TL;DR: A combination of asymmetric (public-key) and symmetric (secret- key) cryptography that allow two parties sharing a common password to exchange confidential and authenticated information over an insecure network is introduced.
Abstract: Classic cryptographic protocols based on user-chosen keys allow an attacker to mount password-guessing attacks. A combination of asymmetric (public-key) and symmetric (secret-key) cryptography that allow two parties sharing a common password to exchange confidential and authenticated information over an insecure network is introduced. In particular, a protocol relying on the counter-intuitive motion of using a secret key to encrypt a public key is presented. Such protocols are secure against active attacks, and have the property that the password is protected against offline dictionary attacks. >

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Citations
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
20 Mar 2007
TL;DR: A model for access control for XML documents with three key features, which considers units smaller than the XML element as a protection unit since the text content of an element can be composed of parts of text from different sources.
Abstract: XML is a widely used standard for information storage and exchange in today's IT systems. Therefore, it is essential to protect XML documents from unauthorized access. For this purpose, we present a model for access control for XML documents with three key features. First, we record the effects of the operations on the documents in a history, depending on which we can grant or deny access. Second, we use the history information to define permissions for the operations of our model including the transfer of document parts. Third, since the text content of an element can be composed of parts of text from different sources, we consider units smaller than the XML element as a protection unit. Therefore, we keep track of these parts and allow to define access to them individually.

9 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
28 Mar 1999
TL;DR: The paper describes three projects aimed at practical secure operating systems based on smart cards: smartcard integration with Kerberos V5, a UNIX file system for smartcards, and Internet Protocol on smartcards.
Abstract: Secure hardware is a useful tool for enhancing computer system security. Traditionally, researchers have attempted to build secure operating systems by creating secure hardware and developing on top of it. Our approach is to integrate commodity secure hardware, i.e., smartcards, into existing operating systems. The paper describes three projects aimed at practical secure operating systems based on smartcards: smartcard integration with Kerberos V5, a UNIX file system for smartcards, and Internet Protocol on smartcards. The first two are implemented and indicate satisfactory performance, while the last is under development.

9 citations


Cites methods from "Encrypted key exchange: password-ba..."

  • ...In combination with a PIN-based authentication protocol, e.g., EKE[ 3 ], we can establish a secure connection to a smartcard over the Internet....

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DOI
01 Jan 2017
TL;DR: This thesis introduces Catena – the memory-demanding password-scrambling framework that allows a password-independent memory-access pattern for resistance to the aforementioned attacks and introduces the so-called j-IV-Collision Attack, allowing to obtain an upper bound for an adversary that is provided with a successful forgery.
Abstract: During the previous decades, the upcoming demand for security in the digital world, e.g., the Internet, lead to numerous groundbreaking research topics in the field of cryptography. This thesis focuses on the design and analysis of cryptographic primitives and schemes to be used for authentication of data and communication endpoints, i.e., users. It is structured into three parts, where we present the first freely scalable multi-block-length block-cipher-based compression function (Counter-bDM) in the first part. The presented design is accompanied by a thorough security analysis regarding its preimage and collision security. The second and major part is devoted to password hashing. It is motivated by the large amount of leaked password during the last years and our discovery of side-channel attacks on scrypt – the first modern password scrambler that allowed to parameterize the amount of memory required to compute a password hash. After summarizing which properties we expect from a modern password scrambler, we (1) describe a cache-timing attack on scrypt based on its password-dependent memory-access pattern and (2) outline an additional attack vector – garbage-collector attacks – that exploits optimization which may disregard to overwrite the internally used memory. Based on our observations, we introduce Catena – the first memory-demanding password-scrambling framework that allows a password-independent memory-access pattern for resistance to the aforementioned attacks. Catena was submitted to the Password Hashing Competition (PHC) and, after two years of rigorous analysis, ended up as a finalist gaining special recognition for its agile framework approach and side-channel resistance. We provide six instances of Catena suitable for a variety of applications. We close the second part of this thesis with an overview of modern password scramblers regarding their functional, security, and general properties; supported by a brief analysis of their resistance to garbage-collector attacks. The third part of this thesis is dedicated to the integrity (authenticity of data) of nonce-based authenticated encryption schemes (NAE). We introduce the so-called j-IV-Collision Attack, allowing to obtain an upper bound for an adversary that is provided with a first successful forgery and tries to efficiently compute j additional forgeries for a particular NAE scheme (in short: reforgeability). Additionally, we introduce the corresponding security notion j-INT-CTXT and provide a comparative analysis (regarding j-INT-CTXT security) of the third-round submission to the CAESAR competition and the four classical and widely used NAE schemes CWC, CCM, EAX, and GCM.

9 citations


Cites background from "Encrypted key exchange: password-ba..."

  • ..., dedicated cryptographic protocols defeating “off-line” password guessing [43], we focus on password scramblers (resp....

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Proceedings ArticleDOI
23 Oct 2009
TL;DR: Initial feasibility implementation and testing of the micropayments system on both desktop and handheld device clients is presented, and preliminary studies indicate the practical feasibility of integrating it within an operational MMORPG architecture.
Abstract: An Innovative micropayment solution is proposed which incorporates both distributed security and social networking features. This has significant potential to impact on both the provision of new services and community features in online massive multiplayer online role-playing gaming (MMORPG) worlds. Initial feasibility implementation and testing of the micropayments system on both desktop and handheld device clients is presented. The system is well suited to gaming applications and our preliminary studies indicate the practical feasibility of integrating it within an operational MMORPG architecture.

9 citations


Cites background from "Encrypted key exchange: password-ba..."

  • ...Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) [21] that was introduced in 1992 combines both asymmetric and symmetric cryptography findings....

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper shows that Lee et al.'s scheme is not only incomplete, but also vulnerable to an off-line dictionary attack, and suggests a simple counter-measure to overcome the problems.

9 citations


Cites background from "Encrypted key exchange: password-ba..."

  • ...157 (2004) 729–733] is vulnerable to an off-line dictionary attack and proposed an improved scheme....

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References
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper suggests ways to solve currently open problems in cryptography, and discusses how the theories of communication and computation are beginning to provide the tools to solve cryptographic problems of long standing.
Abstract: Two kinds of contemporary developments in cryptography are examined. Widening applications of teleprocessing have given rise to a need for new types of cryptographic systems, which minimize the need for secure key distribution channels and supply the equivalent of a written signature. This paper suggests ways to solve these currently open problems. It also discusses how the theories of communication and computation are beginning to provide the tools to solve cryptographic problems of long standing.

14,980 citations


"Encrypted key exchange: password-ba..." refers background or methods in this paper

  • ...ElGamal’s algorithm is derived from the DiffieHellman exponential key exchange protocol[2]; accordingly, we will review the latter first....

    [...]

  • ...And even this risk is minimal if B performs certain checks to guard against easily-solvable choices: that β is indeed prime, that it is large enough (and hence not susceptible to precalculation of tables), that β − 1 have at least one large prime factor (to guard against Pohlig and Hellman’s algorithm[13]), and that α is a primitive root of GF (β)....

    [...]

  • ...The use given above for asymmetric encryption — simply using it to pass a key for a symmetric encryption system — is an example of what Diffie and Hellman[2] call a public key distribution system....

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  • ...It works especially well with exponential key exchange [2]....

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: An encryption method is presented with the novel property that publicly revealing an encryption key does not thereby reveal the corresponding decryption key.
Abstract: An encryption method is presented with the novel property that publicly revealing an encryption key does not thereby reveal the corresponding decryption key. This has two important consequences: (1) Couriers or other secure means are not needed to transmit keys, since a message can be enciphered using an encryption key publicly revealed by the intented recipient. Only he can decipher the message, since only he knows the corresponding decryption key. (2) A message can be “signed” using a privately held decryption key. Anyone can verify this signature using the corresponding publicly revealed encryption key. Signatures cannot be forged, and a signer cannot later deny the validity of his signature. This has obvious applications in “electronic mail” and “electronic funds transfer” systems. A message is encrypted by representing it as a number M, raising M to a publicly specified power e, and then taking the remainder when the result is divided by the publicly specified product, n, of two large secret primer numbers p and q. Decryption is similar; only a different, secret, power d is used, where e * d ≡ 1(mod (p - 1) * (q - 1)). The security of the system rests in part on the difficulty of factoring the published divisor, n.

14,659 citations


"Encrypted key exchange: password-ba..." refers methods in this paper

  • ...Section 2 describes the asymmetric cryptosystem variant and implementations using RSA[ 3 ] and ElGamal[4]....

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  • ...We will use RSA[ 3 ] to illustrate the difficulties....

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Journal ArticleDOI
Taher Elgamal1
23 Aug 1985
TL;DR: A new signature scheme is proposed, together with an implementation of the Diffie-Hellman key distribution scheme that achieves a public key cryptosystem that relies on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms over finite fields.
Abstract: A new signature scheme is proposed, together with an implementation of the Diffie-Hellman key distribution scheme that achieves a public key cryptosystem. The security of both systems relies on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms over finite fields.

7,514 citations

Book ChapterDOI
Taher Elgamal1
19 Aug 1984
TL;DR: In this article, a new signature scheme is proposed together with an implementation of the Diffie-Hellman key distribution scheme that achieves a public key cryptosystem and the security of both systems relies on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms over finite fields.
Abstract: A new signature scheme is proposed together with an implementation of the Diffie - Hellman key distribution scheme that achieves a public key cryptosystem. The security of both systems relies on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms over finite fields.

2,351 citations

Book
01 Jan 1982
TL;DR: The goal of this book is to introduce the mathematical principles of data security and to show how these principles apply to operating systems, database systems, and computer networks.
Abstract: From the Preface (See Front Matter for full Preface) Electronic computers have evolved from exiguous experimental enterprises in the 1940s to prolific practical data processing systems in the 1980s. As we have come to rely on these systems to process and store data, we have also come to wonder about their ability to protect valuable data. Data security is the science and study of methods of protecting data in computer and communication systems from unauthorized disclosure and modification. The goal of this book is to introduce the mathematical principles of data security and to show how these principles apply to operating systems, database systems, and computer networks. The book is for students and professionals seeking an introduction to these principles. There are many references for those who would like to study specific topics further. Data security has evolved rapidly since 1975. We have seen exciting developments in cryptography: public-key encryption, digital signatures, the Data Encryption Standard (DES), key safeguarding schemes, and key distribution protocols. We have developed techniques for verifying that programs do not leak confidential data, or transmit classified data to users with lower security clearances. We have found new controls for protecting data in statistical databases--and new methods of attacking these databases. We have come to a better understanding of the theoretical and practical limitations to security.

1,937 citations


"Encrypted key exchange: password-ba..." refers background in this paper

  • ...Can such a random odd number less than a known n be distinguished from a valid public key e? Assume that p and q are chosen to be of the form 2p′ + 1 and 2q′ + 1, where p′ and q′ are primes, a choice that is recommended for other reasons [9]....

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