Energy Theft Identification in Smart Grid
01 Jan 2018-pp 9-15
TL;DR: This paper proposes a secure power management and theft identification in the smart grid, which requires sensing technologies, distributed communication, and pervasive computing frameworks to make the smartgrid more efficient and secure.
Abstract: Smart grid is a new generation of electrical grid communication with high management of power flow control, self-healing, energy efficiency, and security through the digital communication networks and technologies. To develop a smart grid from the existing power grid, we need to integrate ICT infrastructures with grid and management of grid has to be automated in the smart way, this requires sensing technologies, distributed communication, and pervasive computing frameworks to make the smart grid more efficient and secure. Theft identifying is one of the major issues faced by many service providers and this makes huge loss to the power management and the provider. This paper proposes a secure power management and theft identification in the smart grid.
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31 Aug 2019
TL;DR: A brief highlight and assessment of each of the identified challenges are presented, exposing the security and deployment related threats while suggesting ways of tackling these challenges with prominence to developing nations.
Abstract: Considerable efforts in huge investments are being made to achieve a resilient Smart Grids (SGs) deployment for the improvement of power delivery scheme. Unsurprisingly, many developing nations are making slow progress to the achievement of this feat which is set to revolutionize the power industry own to several deployment and security issues. Studying these challenges from both technical and non-technical view, this paper presents a highlight and assessment of each of the identified challenges. These challenges are assessed by exposing the security and deployment related threats while suggesting ways of tackling these challenges with prominence to developing nations. Although, a brief highlight, this review will help key actors in the region to identify the related challenges and it’s a guide to sustainable deployments of SGs in the region
5 citations
Cites background from "Energy Theft Identification in Smar..."
...a number of schemes have been presented for curbing electricity thefts in SGs environments [72-76]....
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Dissertation•
01 Jan 2019
Cites background from "Energy Theft Identification in Smar..."
...[2] Govinda et al. (2018) wrote about the integration of smart grid on the electricity power grid and ICT since it is sustainable, reliable and provides green electricity energy with advanced technologies and communication system....
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References
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09 Nov 2009
TL;DR: A new class of attacks, called false data injection attacks, against state estimation in electric power grids are presented, showing that an attacker can exploit the configuration of a power system to launch such attacks to successfully introduce arbitrary errors into certain state variables while bypassing existing techniques for bad measurement detection.
Abstract: A power grid is a complex system connecting electric power generators to consumers through power transmission and distribution networks across a large geographical area. System monitoring is necessary to ensure the reliable operation of power grids, and state estimation is used in system monitoring to best estimate the power grid state through analysis of meter measurements and power system models. Various techniques have been developed to detect and identify bad measurements, including the interacting bad measurements introduced by arbitrary, non-random causes. At first glance, it seems that these techniques can also defeat malicious measurements injected by attackers.In this paper, we present a new class of attacks, called false data injection attacks, against state estimation in electric power grids. We show that an attacker can exploit the configuration of a power system to launch such attacks to successfully introduce arbitrary errors into certain state variables while bypassing existing techniques for bad measurement detection. Moreover, we look at two realistic attack scenarios, in which the attacker is either constrained to some specific meters (due to the physical protection of the meters), or limited in the resources required to compromise meters. We show that the attacker can systematically and efficiently construct attack vectors in both scenarios, which can not only change the results of state estimation, but also modify the results in arbitrary ways. We demonstrate the success of these attacks through simulation using IEEE test systems. Our results indicate that security protection of the electric power grid must be revisited when there are potentially malicious attacks.
1,592 citations
TL;DR: The cyber security requirements and the possible vulnerabilities in smart grid communications are summarized and the current solutions on cyber security for smartgrid communications are surveyed.
Abstract: A smart grid is a new form of electricity network with high fidelity power-flow control, self-healing, and energy reliability and energy security using digital communications and control technology. To upgrade an existing power grid into a smart grid, it requires significant dependence on intelligent and secure communication infrastructures. It requires security frameworks for distributed communications, pervasive computing and sensing technologies in smart grid. However, as many of the communication technologies currently recommended to use by a smart grid is vulnerable in cyber security, it could lead to unreliable system operations, causing unnecessary expenditure, even consequential disaster to both utilities and consumers. In this paper, we summarize the cyber security requirements and the possible vulnerabilities in smart grid communications and survey the current solutions on cyber security for smart grid communications.
619 citations
TL;DR: The security issues and challenges on the IoT-based SG are investigated, and the major security services that should be considered when dealing with SG security are defined.
198 citations
25 Jul 2010
TL;DR: Impact on the physical system is estimated by magnitude of load-generation imbalance and frequency deviation after a successful attack on the Automatic Generation Control (AGC) loop.
Abstract: Cyber threats for critical infrastructures is an area of growing concern. Data integrity attacks (e.g., manipulating sensor or control signals) on the power system through the SCADA network could have severe effects as it misleads operators into making wrong decisions. However, for an integrity attack to be successful, the malicious data should be within an acceptable range. Hence, only an attacker with intelligence or an understanding of system functionality can cause an effective attack. This paper extends cyber security attack concepts to control systems in an electric power system. Impact on the physical system is estimated by magnitude of load-generation imbalance and frequency deviation after a successful attack on the Automatic Generation Control (AGC) loop. We conduct experiments creating integrity attacks from our attack template on a sample system and evaluate the impact. Our simulation studies show that an integrity attack plan can have severe effects.
151 citations
04 Nov 2010
TL;DR: The combination of commands that will cause meters to interrupt the supply, of applets and software upgrades that run in the meters, and of cryptographic keys that are used to authenticate these commands and software changes, create a new strategic vulnerability, which is discussed in this paper.
Abstract: We're about to acquire a significant new cyber- vulnerability. The world's energy utilities are starting to install hundreds of millions of 'smart meters' which contain a remote off switch. Its main purpose is to ensure that customers who default on their payments can be switched remotely to a prepay tariff; secondary purposes include supporting interruptible tariffs and implementing rolling power cuts at times of supply shortage. The off switch creates information security problems of a kind, and on a scale, that the energy companies have not had to face before. From the viewpoint of a cyber attacker - whether a hostile government agency, a terrorist organisation or even a militant environmental group - the ideal attack on a target country is to interrupt its citizens' electricity supply. This is the cyber equivalent of a nuclear strike; when electricity stops, then pretty soon everything else does too. Until now, the only plausible ways to do that involved attacks on critical generation, transmission and distribution assets, which are increasingly well defended. Smart meters change the game. The combination of commands that will cause meters to interrupt the supply, of applets and software upgrades that run in the meters, and of cryptographic keys that are used to authenticate these commands and software changes, create a new strategic vulnerability, which we discuss in this paper.
125 citations