Equality of Opportunity

doi:10.1016/B0-08-043076-7/01877-5

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Equality of Opportunity

Book Chapter•DOI•

Equality of Opportunity

A.F. Heath¹•Institutions (1)

University of Oxford¹

01 Jan 2001-pp 4722-4724

TL;DR: The authors explored the concept of equality of opportunity, particularly as it has been frequently used in the sociology of education, and used it as an explanatory concept when discussing class differences in access to privileged educational institutions.

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Abstract: This article explores the concept of equality of opportunity, particularly as it has been frequently used in the sociology of education. As well as equality being a normative ideal, inequality of opportunity has also often been used as an explanatory concept, e.g., when discussing class differences in access to privileged educational institutions.

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Journal Article•DOI•

Anarchy, state, and utopia

[...]

G. W. Smith¹•Institutions (1)

Lancaster University¹

01 May 1976-Philosophical Books

1,991 citations

Journal Article•DOI•

Gender and the Career Choice Process: The Role of Biased Self-Assessments

[...]

Shelley J. Correll

01 May 2001-American Journal of Sociology

TL;DR: The authors developed a supply-side mechanism about how cultural beliefs about gender differentially influence the early career-relevant decisions of men and women, which leads to gender differences in decisions to persist on a path toward a career in science, math, or engineering.

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Abstract: This article develops a supply‐side mechanism about how cultural beliefs about gender differentially influence the early career‐relevant decisions of men and women Cultural beliefs about gender are argued to bias individuals' perceptions of their competence at various career‐relevant tasks, controlling for actual ability To the extent that individuals then act on gender‐differentiated perceptions when making career decisions, cultural beliefs about gender channel men and women in substantially different career directions The hypotheses are evaluated by considering how gendered beliefs about mathematics impact individuals' assessments of their own mathematical competence, which, in turn, leads to gender differences in decisions to persist on a path toward a career in science, math, or engineering

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1,130 citations

Book•

Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization

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Branko Milanovic

11 Apr 2016

TL;DR: Milanovic et al. as discussed by the authors presented a new account of the dynamics that drive inequality on a global scale, drawing on vast data sets and cutting-edge research, and explained the benign and malign forces that make inequality rise and fall within and among nations.

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Abstract: One of the world s leading economists of inequality, Branko Milanovic presents a bold new account of the dynamics that drive inequality on a global scale. Drawing on vast data sets and cutting-edge research, he explains the benign and malign forces that make inequality rise and fall within and among nations. He also reveals who has been helped the most by globalization, who has been held back, and what policies might tilt the balance toward economic justice."Global Inequality" takes us back hundreds of years, and as far around the world as data allow, to show that inequality moves in cycles, fueled by war and disease, technological disruption, access to education, and redistribution. The recent surge of inequality in the West has been driven by the revolution in technology, just as the Industrial Revolution drove inequality 150 years ago. But even as inequality has soared "within" nations, it has fallen dramatically "among" nations, as middle-class incomes in China and India have drawn closer to the stagnating incomes of the middle classes in the developed world. A more open migration policy would reduce global inequality even further.Both American and Chinese inequality seems well entrenched and self-reproducing, though it is difficult to predict if current trends will be derailed by emerging plutocracy, populism, or war. For those who want to understand how we got where we are, where we may be heading, and what policies might help reverse that course, Milanovic s compelling explanation is the ideal place to start."

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829 citations

Journal Article•DOI•

Why Doesn't the United States Have a European-Style Welfare State?

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Alberto Alesina, Edward L. Glaeser, Bruce Sacerdote

22 Sep 2001

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider economic, political, and behavioral explanations for the differences between the United States and Europe and conclude that most of these theories cannot explain the observed differences.

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Abstract: EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS REDISTRIBUTE income among their citizens on a much larger scale than does the U.S. government. European social programs are more generous and reach a larger share of citizens. European tax systems are more progressive. European regulations designed to protect the poor are more intrusive. In this paper we try to understand why. The literature on the size of government is rich and varied. However, here we do not focus on the size of government as such, but rather on the redistributive side of government policies. Thus our goal is in one sense narrower than answering the question, "What explains the size of government?" since we focus on a single, but increasingly important, role of fiscal policy. Yet in another sense our focus is broader, because redistributive policies go beyond the government budget--think, for instance, of labor market policies. We consider economic, political, and behavioral explanations for these differences between the United States and Europe. Economic explanations focus on the variance of income and the skewness of the income distribution before taxes and transfers, the social costs of taxation, the volatility of income, and expected changes in income for the median voter. We conclude that most of these theories cannot explain the observed differences. Before-tax income in the United States has both a higher variance and a more skewed distribution. There is no evidence that the deadweight losses from taxation are lower in Europe. And the volatility of income appears to be lower in Europe than in the United States. However, there is some possibility that middle-class households in the United States have a greater chance of moving up in the income distribution, which would make the median voter more averse to redistribution. Political explanations for the observed level of redistribution focus on institutions that prevent minorities from gaining political power or that strictly protect individuals' private property. Cross-country comparisons indicate the importance of these institutions in limiting redistribution. For instance, at the federal level, the United States does not have proportional representation, which played an important role in facilitating the growth of socialist parties in many European countries. America has strong courts that have routinely rejected popular attempts at redistribution, such as the income tax or labor regulation. The European equivalents of these courts were swept away as democracy replaced monarchy and aristocracy. The federal structure of the United States may have also contributed to constraining the role of the central government in redistribution. These political institutions result from particular features of U.S. history and geography. The formation of the United States as a federation of independent territories led to a structure that often creates obstacles to centralized redistributive policies. The relative political stability of the United States over more than two centuries means that it is still governed by an eighteenth-century constitution designed to protect property. As world war and revolution uprooted the old European monarchies, the twentieth-century constitutions that replaced them were more oriented toward majority rule, and less toward protection of private property. Moreover, the spatial organization of the United States--in particular, its low population density--meant that the U.S. government was much less threatened by socialist revolution. In contrast, many of Europe's institutions were established either by revolutionary groups directly or by elites in response to the threat of violence. Finally, we discuss reciprocal altruism as a possible behavioral explanation for redistribution. Reciprocal altruism implies that voters will dislike giving money to the poor if, as in the United States, the poor are perceived as lazy. In contrast, Europeans overwhelmingly believe that the poor are poor because they have been unfortunate. …

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804 citations

Journal Article•DOI•

Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories

[...]

James Konow

01 Nov 2003-Journal of Economic Literature

TL;DR: In this article, the authors evaluate various positive and normative theories of justice in terms of how accurately they describe the impartial fairness preferences of real people, and they propose and defend an integrated justice theory based on preferences over four distinct and sometimes conflicting forces.

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Abstract: This paper evaluates numerous positive and normative theories of justice in positive terms, i.e., in terms of how accurately they describe the impartial fairness preferences of real people. In addition, the paper proposes and defends an integrated justice theory based on preferences over four distinct and sometimes conflicting forces. These forces frame the analysis of the individual theories and inspire four corresponding theoretical classes: equality and need, utilitarianism and welfare economics, equity and desert, and context. This synthesis enables one to treat justice rigorously and to reconcile results that often appear contradictory or at odds with alternative theories.

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798 citations

Cites result from "Equality of Opportunity"

...Comparing his results to those of Roth et al., Cameron (1999), and Hoffman et al....
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References

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Open Access

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Journal Article•DOI•

Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model

[...]

Amos Tversky¹, Daniel Kahneman²•Institutions (2)

Stanford University¹, University of California, Berkeley²

01 Nov 1991-Quarterly Journal of Economics

TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a reference-dependent theory of consumer choice, which explains such effects by a deformation of indifference curves about the reference point, in which losses and disadvantages have greater impact on preferences than gains and advantages.

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Abstract: Much experimental evidence indicates that choice depends on the status quo or reference level: changes of reference point often lead to reversals of preference. We present a reference-dependent theory of consumer choice, which explains such effects by a deformation of indifference curves about the reference point. The central assumption of the theory is that losses and disadvantages have greater impact on preferences than gains and advantages. Implications of loss aversion for economic behavior are considered. The standard models of decision making assume that preferences do not depend on current assets. This assumption greatly simplifies the analysis of individual choice and the prediction of trades: indifference curves are drawn without reference to current holdings, and the Coase theorem asserts that, except for transaction costs, initial entitlements do not affect final allocations. The facts of the matter are more complex. There is substantial evidence that initial entitlements do matter and that the rate of exchange between goods can be quite different depending on which is acquired and which is given up, even in the absence of transaction costs or income effects. In accord with a psychological analysis of value, reference levels play a large role in determining preferences. In the present paper we review the evidence for this proposition and offer a theory that generalizes the standard model by introducing a reference state. The present analysis of riskless choice extends our treatment of choice under uncertainty [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1984; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991], in which the outcomes of risky prospects are evaluated by a value function that has three essential characteristics. Reference dependence: the carriers of value are gains and losses defined relative to a reference point. Loss aversion: the function is steeper in the negative than in the positive domain; losses loom larger than corresponding gains. Diminishing sensitivity: the marginal value of both gains and losses decreases with their

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5,864 citations

Journal Article•DOI•

What Is the Point of Equality

[...]

Elizabeth Anderson

01 Jan 1999-Ethics

TL;DR: The authors argues that the problems stem from a flawed understanding of the point of equality and argues that in focusing on correcting a supposed cosmic injustice, egalitarian writing has lost sight of the distinctively political aims of egalitarianism.

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Abstract: This chapter argues that the problems stem from a flawed understanding of the point of equality. It also argues that in focusing on correcting a supposed cosmic injustice, egalitarian writing has lost sight of the distinctively political aims of egalitarianism. The chapter presents a series of cases in which luck egalitarianism generates injustice. It shows that the reasons luck egalitarians offer for refusing to come to the aid of the victims of bad option luck express a failure to treat these unfortunates with equal respect and concern. The chapter suggests that the reasons luck egalitarians offer for coming to the aid of the victims of bad brute luck express disrespect for them. Where luck egalitarians tend to be either harsh or paternalistic toward the victims of bad option luck, they seem compassionate toward the victims of bad brute luck.

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2,022 citations

"Equality of Opportunity" refers background in this paper

...The debate is said to be about ‘equality of what,’ and the philosophical view is 23 sometimes called ‘luck egalitarianism,’ a term coined by Elizabeth Anderson (1999). 24 Economists (besides Sen) have been involved in this discussion from 1985 25 onwards. John Roemer (1993, 1998) proposed an algorithm for calculating policies that 26 would equalize opportunities for achievement of a given objective in a population. Marc 27 Fleurbaey and François Maniquet contributed economic proposals beginning in the 28 1990s, and recently summarized in Fleurbaey (2008). Other authors who have 29 contributed to the theory include Walter Bossert (1995, 1997), Vito Peragine (2004), and 30 Dirk Van de gaer ( 1993)....
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...This is 636 an important point, because some philosophers have falsely concluded that applying the 637 equal-opportunity approach will necessitate incursions into privacy, and making 638 distinctions among individuals in resource-allocation questions that are either difficult or 639 socially objectionable in some way (see Anderson (1999))....
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...The debate is said to be about ‘equality of what,’ and the philosophical view is 23 sometimes called ‘luck egalitarianism,’ a term coined by Elizabeth Anderson (1999). 24 Economists (besides Sen) have been involved in this discussion from 1985 25 onwards....
[...]
...The debate is said to be about ‘equality of what,’ and the philosophical view is 23 sometimes called ‘luck egalitarianism,’ a term coined by Elizabeth Anderson (1999). 24 Economists (besides Sen) have been involved in this discussion from 1985 25 onwards. John Roemer (1993, 1998) proposed an algorithm for calculating policies that 26 would equalize opportunities for achievement of a given objective in a population. Marc 27 Fleurbaey and François Maniquet contributed economic proposals beginning in the 28 1990s, and recently summarized in Fleurbaey (2008). Other authors who have 29 contributed to the theory include Walter Bossert (1995, 1997), Vito Peragine (2004), and 30 Dirk Van de gaer ( 1993). An empirical literature is rapidly developing, calculating the 31 extent to which opportunities for the acquisition of various objectives are unequal in 32 various countries, and whether people hold views of justice consonant with equality of 33 opportunity. 34 There are various ways of summarizing the significance of these developments 35 for the economics of inequality. Prior to the philosophical contributions that ignited the 36 economic literature that is our focus in this chapter, there was an earlier skirmish around 37 the practical import of equalizing opportunities. Just prior to the publication of Rawls’s 38 magnum opus (1971), contributions by Arthur Jensen (1969) and Richard Herrnstein 39 (1971) proposed that inequality was in the main due to differential intelligence (IQ), and 40 so generating a more equal income distribution by equalizing opportunities (for instance, 41 through compensatory education of under-privileged children) was a chimera. 42 Economists Samuel Bowles (1973) and John Conlisk (1974) disagreed; Bowles argued 43 that inequality of income was almost all due to unequal opportunities, not to the 44 heritability of IQ....
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...We 2709 mention the work of Scheffler (2003) and Anderson (1999), both of whom criticize what 2710 they call ‘luck egalitarianism’ as too focused upon individual choice: to this they oppose 2711 a view of ‘democratic equality’ which involves treating all persons with equal dignity and 2712 respect....
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Journal Article•DOI•

Anarchy, state, and utopia

[...]

G. W. Smith¹•Institutions (1)

Lancaster University¹

01 May 1976-Philosophical Books

1,991 citations

Journal Article•DOI•

On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice

[...]

Gerald A. Cohen

01 Jul 1989-Ethics

TL;DR: In this article, the Tanner Lecture of 1979 called "Equality of What?" Amartya Sen asked what aspects of a person's condition should count in a fundamental way for egalitarians, and not merely as cause of or evidence of or proxy for what they regard as fundamental.

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Abstract: In his Tanner Lecture of 1979 called "Equality of What?" Amartya Sen asked what metric egalitarians should use to establish the extent to which their ideal is realized in a given society. What aspect(s) of a person's condition should count in a fundamental way for egalitarians, and not merely as cause of or evidence of or proxy for what they regard as fundamental? In this study I examine answers to that question, and discussions bearing on that question, in recent philosophical literature. I take for granted that there is something which justice requires people to have equal amounts of, not no matter what, but to whatever extent is allowed by values which compete with distributive equality; and I study what a number of authors who share that egalitarian view have said about the dimensions) or respect(s) in which people should be made more equal, when the price in other values of moving toward greater equality is not intolerable. I also advance an answer of my own to Sen's question. My answer is the product of an immanent critique of Ronald Dworkin, one, that is, which rejects Dworkin's declared position because it is not congruent with its own underlying motivation. My response to Dworkin has been influenced by Richard Arneson's work in advocacy of "equality of opportunity for welfare," but my answer to Sen's question is not that Arnesonian one, nor is my answer as well formulated as Arneson's is.' It needs much further refinement, but I nevertheless present it here, in a

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1,734 citations

"Equality of Opportunity" refers background in this paper

...Cohen (2009) has suggested that the 762 inequalities allowed by an equal-opportunity theory should, if they are large, be reduced 763 by appealing to the value of social unity (what he calls ‘community’), which will be 764 strained if outcome inequalities are too large. 765 Our agnostic view concerning the degree of reward that effort deserves contrasts 766 with that of Fleurbaey (2008), who advocates an axiom of ‘natural reward’ to calibrate 767 the rewards to effort, as will be discussed in section 5....
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...317 Slightly before Dworkin’s articles were published, Amartya Sen (1980) gave a 318 lecture in which he argued that Rawls’s focus on primary goods was misplaced....
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...Cohen (2009) has suggested that the 762 inequalities allowed by an equal-opportunity theory should, if they are large, be reduced 763 by appealing to the value of social unity (what he calls ‘community’), which will be 764 strained if outcome inequalities are too large....
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...Cohen’s (1989) phrase ‘access to advantage’, which he desires to 2014 equalize.) Dworkin and Fleurbaey represent the preference view, in which a person is 2015 held responsible for his choices, if they flow from preferences with which he identifies. 2016 Because almost all empirical studies (except Fleurbaey et al (2013) and Garcia-Gomez et 2017 al. (2012)) seem implicitly guided by the control view, the authors should explain in what 2018 sense the chosen variables are under the control of the individual. Jusot et al (2013) have 2019 argued that lifestyles in health (diet, exercise) are examples of variables under the control 2020 of the individual, and inequality of opportunity for achieving health status should be 2021 measured with this in mind....
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...Cohen’s (1989) phrase ‘access to advantage’, which he desires to 2014 equalize....
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Book Chapter•DOI•

What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources

[...]

Ronald Dworkin

08 May 2018-Philosophy & Public Affairs

TL;DR: This article argued that an equal division of resources presupposes an economic market of some form, mainly as an analytical device but also, to a certain extent, as an actual political institution.

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Abstract: This chapter considers the claims of equality of welfare as an interpretation of treating people as equals, and considers the competing claims of equality of resources. It argues that an equal division of resources presupposes an economic market of some form, mainly as an analytical device but also, to a certain extent, as an actual political institution. The market character of the auction is not simply a convenient or ad hoc device for resolving technical problems that arise for equality of resources in very simple exercises like our desert island case. Insurance, so far as it is available, provides a link between brute and option luck, because the decision to buy or reject catastrophe insurance is a calculated gamble. The premium of someone who barely earns the average coverage amount would be less than the premium the insurance market would have fixed on a flat-rate basis, though the premium of someone who earns much more would be much greater.

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1,450 citations

"Equality of Opportunity" refers background in this paper

...872 Fleurbaey (2008) represents the idea that persons should be held responsible for 873 their circumstances by various ‘principles of compensation;’ an example would be 874 ‘equal well-being for equal responsibility,’ meaning that if two individuals have the same 875 values of r, their outcomes should be the same (i....
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...First, the authors 1555 test the two principles of “full compensation” and “natural reward” which are at the heart 1556 of Fleurbaey’s approach. (Fleurbaey (1995) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996))....
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