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Journal ArticleDOI

Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games

Donald M. Topkis
- 01 Nov 1979 - 
- Vol. 17, Iss: 6, pp 773-787
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TLDR
Submodular games as mentioned in this paper are finite non-cooperative games in which the set of feasible joint decisions is a sublattice and the cost function of each player has properties of submodularity and antitone differences.
Abstract
A submodular game is a finite noncooperative game in which the set of feasible joint decisions is a sublattice and the cost function of each player has properties of submodularity and antitone differences. Examples of submodular games include 1) a game version of a system with complementary products; 2) an extension of the minimum cut problem to a situation where players choose from different sets of nodes and perceive different capacities, with special cases being a game with players choosing whether or not to participate in available economic activities and a game version of the selection problem; 3) the pricing problem of competitors producing substitute products; 4) a game version of the facility location problem; and 5) a game with players determining their optimal usage of available products. A fixed point approach establishes the existence of a pure equilibrium point for certain submodular games. Two algorithms which correspond to fictitious play in dynamic games generate sequences of feasible join...

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Journal ArticleDOI

Complementarities and fit strategy, structure, and organizational change in manufacturing

TL;DR: The theories of supermodular optimization and games provide a framework for the analysis of systems marked by complementarity and are used to analyze the characteristic features of the Lincoln Electric Company's strategy and structure.
Journal ArticleDOI

Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities

Paul Milgrom, +1 more
- 01 Nov 1990 - 
TL;DR: In this article, a rich class of non-cooperative games, including models of oligopoly competition, macroeconomic coordination failures, arms races, bank runs, technology adoption and diffusion, R&D competition, pretrial bargaining, coordination in teams, and many others, are studied.
Journal ArticleDOI

Monotone comparative statics

Paul Milgrom, +1 more
- 01 Jan 1994 - 
TL;DR: In this article, the authors derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the solution set of an optimization problem to be monotonic in the parameters of the problem, and develop practical methods for checking the condition.
Journal ArticleDOI

Efficient power control via pricing in wireless data networks

TL;DR: This work introduces pricing of transmit powers in order to obtain Pareto improvement of the noncooperative power control game, i.e., to obtain improvements in user utilities relative to the case with no pricing.
Journal ArticleDOI

A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality)

TL;DR: In this paper, a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations is presented, where the authors show that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone, and derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt.