Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis
01 Mar 1972-Vol. 25, Iss: 1, pp 136
TL;DR: The second edition of the Essence of Decision as discussed by the authors was published in 2003 and is 78 pages longer than the original and is illustrated with up-to-date examples from the Clinton and Bush administrations.
Abstract: blockbuster. In the first 16 years (for which figures are available), more than 70,000 copies of Essence of Decision were sold; by its 25th anniversary, more than 1,600 journal articles referenced in the Social Science Citations Index had cited the work. It was a staple on the reading lists. As controversial as it was famous, critiquing Essence of Decision became a cottage industry. In the recent publication of the second edition of Essence of Decision, Allison is joined by co-author Philip Zelikow, director of the Miller Center for Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, former Bush administration official, and Allison's former Harvard colleague. The second edition is as fascinating and as frustrating as the original, and surely will remain in the canon of political science. It is 78 pages longer than the original and is illustrated with up-to-date examples from the Clinton and Bush administrations. The authors meticulously use newly available historic materials on the case, and the theory chapters draw from more recent academic scholarship.
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on the linkages between the industry analysis framework, the resource-based view of the firm, behavioral decision biases and organizational implementation issues, and connect the concept of Strategic Industry Factors at the market level with the notion of Strategic Assets at the firm level.
Abstract: We build on an emerging strategy literature that views the firm as a bundle of resources and capabilities, and examine conditions that contribute to the realization of sustainable economic rents. Because of (1) resource-market imperfections and (2) discretionary managerial decisions about resource development and deployment, we expect firms to differ (in and out of equilibrium) in the resources and capabilities they control. This asymmetry in turn can be a source of sustainable economic rent. The paper focuses on the linkages between the industry analysis framework, the resource-based view of the firm, behavioral decision biases and organizational implementation issues. It connects the concept of Strategic Industry Factors at the market level with the notion of Strategic Assets at the firm level. Organizational rent is shown to stem from imperfect and discretionary decisions to develop and deploy selected resources and capabilities, made by boundedly rational managers facing high uncertainty, complexity, and intrafirm conflict.
8,121 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a theory of ratification in the context of domestic political games and international political games, which is applicable to many other political phenomena, such as dependency, legislative committees, and multiparty coalitions.
Abstract: Domestic politics and international relations are often inextricably entangled, but existing theories (particularly “state-centric” theories) do not adequately account for these linkages. When national leaders must win ratification (formal or informal) from their constituents for an international agreement, their negotiating behavior reflects the simultaneous imperatives of both a domestic political game and an international game. Using illustrations from Western economic summitry, the Panama Canal and Versailles Treaty negotiations, IMF stabilization programs, the European Community, and many other diplomatic contexts, this article offers a theory of ratification. It addresses the role of domestic preferences and coalitions, domestic political institutions and practices, the strategies and tactics of negotiators, uncertainty, the domestic reverberation of international pressures, and the interests of the chief negotiator. This theory of “two-level games” may also be applicable to many other political phenomena, such as dependency, legislative committees, and multiparty coalitions.
6,155 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that norms evolve in a three-stage "life cycle" of emergence, cascades, and internalization, and that each stage is governed by different motives, mechanisms, and behavioral logics.
Abstract: Norms have never been absent from the study of international politics, but the sweeping “ideational turn” in the 1980s and 1990s brought them back as a central theoretical concern in the field. Much theorizing about norms has focused on how they create social structure, standards of appropriateness, and stability in international politics. Recent empirical research on norms, in contrast, has examined their role in creating political change, but change processes have been less well-theorized. We induce from this research a variety of theoretical arguments and testable hypotheses about the role of norms in political change. We argue that norms evolve in a three-stage “life cycle” of emergence, “norm cascades,” and internalization, and that each stage is governed by different motives, mechanisms, and behavioral logics. We also highlight the rational and strategic nature of many social construction processes and argue that theoretical progress will only be made by placing attention on the connections between norms and rationality rather than by opposing the two.
5,761 citations
TL;DR: It is argued that the strategy formation process is seriously limited, and that the process needs to be viewed from a wider perspective so that the variety of ways in which strategies actually take shape can be considered.
Abstract: How do strategies form in organizations? Research into the question is necessarily shaped by the underlying conception of the term. Since strategy has almost inevitably been conceived in terms of what the leaders of an organization ‘plan’ to do in the future, strategy formation has, not surprisingly, tended to be treated as an analytic process for establishing long-range goals and action plans for an organization; that is, as one of formulation followed by implementation. As important as this emphasis may be, we would argue that it is seriously limited, that the process needs to be viewed from a wider perspective so that the variety of ways in which strategies actually take shape can be considered.
4,414 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the case study method is defined as an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units, and it is argued that case studies rely on the same sort of covariational evidence utilized in non-case study research.
Abstract: This paper aims to clarify the meaning, and explain the utility, of the case study method, a method often practiced but little understood. A “case study,” I argue, is best defined as an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units. Case studies rely on the same sort of covariational evidence utilized in non-case study research. Thus, the case study method is correctly understood as a particular way of defining cases, not a way of analyzing cases or a way of modeling causal relations. I show that this understanding of the subject illuminates some of the persistent ambiguities of case study work, ambiguities that are, to some extent, intrinsic to the enterprise. The travails of the case study within the discipline of political science are also rooted in an insufficient appreciation of the methodological tradeoffs that this method calls forth. This paper presents the familiar contrast between case study and non-case study work as a series of characteristic strengths and weaknesses—affinities—rather than as antagonistic approaches to the empirical world. In the end, the perceived hostility between case study and non-case study research is largely unjustified and, perhaps, deserves to be regarded as a misconception. Indeed, the strongest conclusion to arise from this methodological examination concerns the complementarity of single-unit and cross-unit research designs.
2,752 citations
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01 Jan 1974TL;DR: The authors described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: representativeness, availability of instances or scenarios, and adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value is available.
Abstract: This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: (i) representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; (ii) availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and (iii) adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value is available. These heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead to systematic and predictable errors. A better understanding of these heuristics and of the biases to which they lead could improve judgements and decisions in situations of uncertainty.
31,082 citations