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Estimating the Impact of Trade and Offshoring on American Workers Using the Current Population Surveys
TL;DR: This paper found that occupational exposure to globalization is associated with larger wage effects than industry exposure and that reallocation of workers across sectors and occupations was associated with a reallocated workforce across different occupations.
Abstract: The authors link industry-level data on trade and offshoring with individual-level worker data from the Current Population Surveys. They find that occupational exposure to globalization is associated with larger wage effects than industry exposure. This effect has been overlooked because it operates between rather than within sectors of the economy. The authors also find that globalization is associated with a reallocation of workers across sectors and occupations. They estimate wage losses of 2 to 4 percent among workers leaving manufacturing and 4 to 11 percent among workers who also switch occupations. These effects are most pronounced for workers who perform routine tasks.
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TL;DR: This paper analyzed the effect of Chinese import competition between 1990 and 2007 on US local labor markets, exploiting cross-market variation in import exposure stemming from initial diffe cerence to US labor markets.
Abstract: We analyze the effect of rising Chinese import competition between 1990 and 2007 on US local labor markets, exploiting cross-market variation in import exposure stemming from initial diffe...
2,818 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the pervasiveness of job polarization in 16 Western European countries over the period 1993-2010 was investigated and a framework was proposed to explain job polarization using routine-biased technological change and offshoring.
Abstract: This paper documents the pervasiveness of job polarization in 16 Western European countries over the period 1993-2010. It then develops and estimates a framework to explain job polarization using routine-biased technological change and offshoring. This model can explain much of both total job polarization and the split into within- industry and between-industry components.
1,252 citations
Book•
11 Apr 2016
TL;DR: Milanovic et al. as discussed by the authors presented a new account of the dynamics that drive inequality on a global scale, drawing on vast data sets and cutting-edge research, and explained the benign and malign forces that make inequality rise and fall within and among nations.
Abstract: One of the world s leading economists of inequality, Branko Milanovic presents a bold new account of the dynamics that drive inequality on a global scale. Drawing on vast data sets and cutting-edge research, he explains the benign and malign forces that make inequality rise and fall within and among nations. He also reveals who has been helped the most by globalization, who has been held back, and what policies might tilt the balance toward economic justice."Global Inequality" takes us back hundreds of years, and as far around the world as data allow, to show that inequality moves in cycles, fueled by war and disease, technological disruption, access to education, and redistribution. The recent surge of inequality in the West has been driven by the revolution in technology, just as the Industrial Revolution drove inequality 150 years ago. But even as inequality has soared "within" nations, it has fallen dramatically "among" nations, as middle-class incomes in China and India have drawn closer to the stagnating incomes of the middle classes in the developed world. A more open migration policy would reduce global inequality even further.Both American and Chinese inequality seems well entrenched and self-reproducing, though it is difficult to predict if current trends will be derailed by emerging plutocracy, populism, or war. For those who want to understand how we got where we are, where we may be heading, and what policies might help reverse that course, Milanovic s compelling explanation is the ideal place to start."
829 citations
TL;DR: This paper found that the adjustment in local labor markets is remarkably slow, with wages and labor-force participation rates remaining depressed and unemployment rates remaining elevated for at least a full decade after the China trade shock commences.
Abstract: China's emergence as a great economic power has induced an epochal shift in patterns of world trade. Simultaneously, it has challenged much of the received empirical wisdom about how labor markets adjust to trade shocks. Alongside the heralded consumer benefits of expanded trade are substantial adjustment costs and distributional consequences. These impacts are most visible in the local labor markets in which the industries exposed to foreign competition are concentrated. Adjustment in local labor markets is remarkably slow, with wages and labor-force participation rates remaining depressed and unemployment rates remaining elevated for at least a full decade after the China trade shock commences. Exposed workers experience greater job churning and reduced lifetime income. At the national level, employment has fallen in the US industries more exposed to import competition, as expected, but offsetting employment gains in other industries have yet to materialize. Better understanding when and where trade is ...
732 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors estimate that import competition from China, which surged after 2000, was a major force behind both recent reductions in US manufacturing employment and weak overall US job growth and suggest job losses from rising Chinese import competition over 1999-2011 in the range of 2.0-2.4 million.
Abstract: Even before the Great Recession, US employment growth was unimpressive. Between 2000 and 2007, the economy gave back the considerable employment gains achieved during the 1990s, with a historic contraction in manufacturing employment being a prime contributor to the slump. We estimate that import competition from China, which surged after 2000, was a major force behind both recent reductions in US manufacturing employment and—through input-output linkages and other general equilibrium channels—weak overall US job growth. Our central estimates suggest job losses from rising Chinese import competition over 1999–2011 in the range of 2.0–2.4 million.
634 citations
References
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TL;DR: This paper found that computer capital substitutes for workers in performing cognitive and manual tasks that can be accomplished by following explicit rules, and complements workers in non-routine problem-solving and complex communications tasks.
Abstract: We apply an understanding of what computers do to study how computerization alters job skill demands. We argue that computer capital (1) substitutes for workers in performing cognitive and manual tasks that can be accomplished by following explicit rules; and (2) complements workers in performing nonroutine problem-solving and complex communications tasks. Provided these tasks are imperfect substitutes, our model implies measurable changes in the composition of job tasks, which we explore using representative data on task input for 1960 to 1998. We find that within industries, occupations and education groups, computerization is associated with reduced labor input of routine manual and routine cognitive tasks and increased labor input of nonroutine cognitive tasks. Translating task shifts into education demand, the model can explain sixty percent of the estimated relative demand shift favoring college labor during 1970 to 1998. Task changes within nominally identical occupations account for almost half of this impact.
2,843 citations
TL;DR: This paper found that the slowing of the growth of overall wage inequality in the 1990s hides a divergence in the paths of upper-tail (90/50) inequality and lower-tail inequality, even adjusting for changes in labor force composition.
Abstract: A recent “revisionist” literature characterizes the pronounced rise in U.S. wage inequality since 1980 as an “episodic” event of the first half of the 1980s driven by nonmarket factors (particularly a falling real minimum wage) and concludes that continued increases in wage inequality since the late 1980s substantially reflect the mechanical confounding effects of changes in labor force composition. Analyzing data from the Current Population Survey for 1963 to 2005, we find limited support for these claims. The slowing of the growth of overall wage inequality in the 1990s hides a divergence in the paths of upper-tail (90/50) inequality—which has increased steadily since 1980, even adjusting for changes in labor force composition—and lower-tail (50/10) inequality, which rose sharply in the first half of the 1980s and plateaued or contracted thereafter. Fluctuations in the real minimum wage are not a plausible explanation for these trends since the bulk of inequality growth occurs above the median ...
2,095 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: The authors examined the effect of technological change and other factors on the relative demand for workers with different education levels and on the recent growth of U.S. educational wage differentials and found that the increase in demand shifts for more-skilled workers in the 1970s and 1980s relative to the 1960s is entirely accounted for by an increase in within- industry changes in skill utilization rather than between-industry employment shifts.
Abstract: This paper examines the effect of technological change and other factors on the relative demand for workers with different education levels and on the recent growth of U.S. educational wage differentials. A simple supply-demand framework is used to interpret changes in the relative quantities, wages, and wage bill shares of workers by education in the aggregate U.S. labor market in each decade since 1940 and over the 1990 to 1995 period. The results suggest that the relative demand for college graduates grew more rapidly on average during the past 25 years (1970-95) than during the previous three decades (1940-70). The increased rate of growth of relative demand for college graduates beginning in the 1970s did not lead to an increase in the college/high school wage differential until the 1980s because the growth in the supply of college graduates increased even more sharply in the 1970s before returning to historical levels in the 1980s. The acceleration in demand shifts for more-skilled workers in the 1970s and 1980s relative to the 1960s is entirely accounted for by an increase in within- industry changes in skill utilization rather than between-industry employment shifts. Industries with large increases in the rate of skill upgrading in the 1970s and 1980s versus the 1960s are those with greater growth in employee computer usage, more computer capital per worker, and larger shares of computer investment as a share of total investment. The results suggest that the spread of computer technology may "explain" as much as 30 to 50 percent of the increase in the rate of growth of the relative demand for more-skilled workers since 1970.
1,943 citations
TL;DR: The authors empirically tested and rejected classical competitive theories of wage determination by examining differences in wages for equally skilled workers across industries, and found that the dispersion in wages across industries as measured by the standard deviation in industry wage differentials is substantial.
Abstract: This paper empirically tests and rejects classical competitive theories of wage determination by examining differences in wages for equally skilled workers across industries. Human capital earnings functions are estimated using cross-sectional and longitudinal data from the CPS and QES. The major finding is that the dispersion in wages across industries as measured by the standard deviation in industry wage differentials is substantial. Furthermore, F tests of the joint significance of industry dummy variables are decisively rejected. These differences are very difficult to link to unobserved differences in ability or to compensating differentials for working conditions. Fixed effects models are estimated using two longitudinal data sets to control for constant, unmeasured worker characteristics that might bias cross-sectional estimates. Because measurement error is a serious problem in looking at workers who report changing industries, we use estimates of industry classification error rates to adjust the longitudinal results. In the fixed effects analysis, the industry wage differentials are sizable and are very similar to the cross-sectional estimates. In addition, the fixed effects estimates are robust under a variety of assumptions about classification errors and are similar using both data sets. These findings cast doubt on explanations of industry wage differentials based on unmeasured ability. Additional analysis finds that the industry wage structure is highly correlated for workers in small and large firms, in different regions of the U.S., and with varying job tenures. Finally, evidence is presented demonstrating that turnover has a negative relationship with industry wage differentials. These findings suggest that workers in high wage industries receive noncompetitive rents.
1,715 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the relative influence of trade versus technology on wages in a "large country" setting, where technological change affects product prices is estimated, where trade is measured by the foreign outsourcing of intermediate inputs, while technological change is defined as expenditures on high-technology capital such as computers.
Abstract: We estimate the relative influence of trade versus technology on wages in a "large-country" setting, where technological change affects product prices. Trade is measured by the foreign outsourcing of intermediate inputs, while technological change is measured by expenditures on high-technology capital such as computers. The estimation procedure we develop, which modifies the conventional "price regression," is able to distinguish whether product price changes are due to factor-biased versus sector-biased technology shifts. In our base specification we find that computers explain about 35 percent of the increase in the relative wage of nonproduction workers, while outsourcing explains 15 percent; both of these effects are higher in other specifications.
1,596 citations