European Patterns of Corporate Ownership: A Twelve-Country Study
01 Dec 1997-Journal of International Business Studies (Palgrave Macmillan UK)-Vol. 28, Iss: 4, pp 759-778
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a quantitative analysis of ownership structures among the hundred largest companies in twelve European countries and show that the existence of a highly significant nation effect is confirmed.
Abstract: A number of qualitative studies have shown striking international differences in corporate governance systems. This paper presents a quantitative analysis of ownership structures among the hundred largest companies in twelve European countries. The existence of a highly significant nation effect is confirmed. Further statistical analysis indicates that the nation effect is party explained by institutional differences.
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TL;DR: The authors developed a theoretical model to describe and explain variation in corporate governance among advanced capitalist economies, identifying the social relations and institutional arrangements that shape who controls corporations, what interests corporations serve, and the allocation of rights and responsibilities among corporate stakeholders.
Abstract: We develop a theoretical model to describe and explain variation in corporate governance among advanced capitalist economies, identifying the social relations and institutional arrangements that shape who controls corporations, what interests corporations serve, and the allocation of rights and responsibilities among corporate stakeholders. Our “actor-centered” institutional approach explains firm-level corporate governance practices in terms of institutional factors that shape how actors' interests are defined (“socially constructed”) and represented. Our model has strong implications for studying issues of international convergence.
1,827 citations
Cites background from "European Patterns of Corporate Owne..."
...What the salient national differences in corporate governance are and how they should best be conceptualized remain hotly debated (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998; O’Sullivan, 2000; Pedersen & Thomsen, 1997; Prowse, 1995; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000)....
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the impact of ownership structure on company economic performance in 435 of the largest European companies and found a positive effect of ownership concentration on shareholder value (market-to-book value of equity) and profitability (asset returns).
Abstract: The paper examines the impact of ownership structure on company economic performance in 435 of the largest European companies. Controlling for industry, capital structure and nation effects we find a positive effect of ownership concentration on shareholder value (market -to- book value of equity) and profitability (asset returns), but the effect levels off for high ownership shares. Furthermore we propose and support the hypothesis that the identity of large owners—family, bank, institutional investor, government, and other companies—has important implications for corporate strategy and performance. For example, compared to other owner identities, financial investor ownership is found to be associated with higher shareholder value and profitability, but lower sales growth. The effect of ownership concentration is also found to depend on owner identity.
1,252 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the effects of ownership on the firms' corporate social responsibility (CSR) have been examined in the Korean market and the results indicate a significant, positive relationship between CSR ratings and ownership by institutions and foreign investors.
Abstract: Relatively little research has examined the effects of ownership on the firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR). In addition, most of it has been conducted in the Western context such as the U.S. and Europe. Using a sample of 118 large Korean firms, we hypothesize that different types of shareholders will have distinct motivations toward the firm’s CSR engagement. We break down ownership into different groups of shareholders: institutional, managerial, and foreign ownerships. Results indicate a significant, positive relationship between CSR ratings and ownership by institutions and foreign investors. In contrast, shareholding by top managers is negatively associated with firm’s CSR rating while outside director ownership is not significant. We conclude that different owners have differential impacts on the firm’s CSR engagement.
531 citations
Cites background from "European Patterns of Corporate Owne..."
...Previous literature (Gedajlovic and Shapiro 1998; Pedersen and Thomsen 1997 ) found that the role of outside directors is limited for those companies in which there is lack of separation of ownership and control....
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the transactional characteristics of complementary local assets and model foreign market entry as the optimal assignment of equity between their owners and MNEs, and predict whether equity will be held by MNE or by local firms, or shared between them.
Abstract: Both Anderson and Gatignon and the Uppsala internationalization model see the initial mode of foreign market entry and subsequent modes of operation as unilaterally determined by multinational enterprises (MNEs) arbitraging control and risk and increasing their commitment as they gain experience in the target market. OLI and internalization models do recognize that foreign market entry requires the bundling of MNE and complementary local assets, which they call location or country-specific advantages, but implicitly assume that those assets are freely accessible to MNEs. In contrast to both of these MNE-centric views, I explicitly consider the transactional characteristics of complementary local assets and model foreign market entry as the optimal assignment of equity between their owners and MNEs. By looking at the relative efficiency of the different markets in which MNE and complementary local assets are traded, and at how these two categories of assets match, I am able to predict whether equity will be held by MNEs or by local firms, or shared between them, and whether MNEs will enter through greenfields, brownfields, or acquisitions. The bundling model I propose has interesting implications for the evolution of the MNE footprint in host countries, and for the reasons behind the emergence of Dragon MNEs.
517 citations
Cites background from "European Patterns of Corporate Owne..."
...In most countries there are structural barriers to acquisitions, such as family or government ownership, cross-shareholdings, and exceptions to the one share, one vote rule (Pedersen & Thomsen, 1997; Slangen & Hennart, 2007)....
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TL;DR: It is argued that the unique conditions of developing countries influence the internationalization ofDMNCs, creating a laboratory for extending theory, and some of the key theories and models of the multinational company are reviewed and explained how they can be extended with the study of DMNCs.
Abstract: I analyze how the study of developing country multinational companies (DMNCs) can help extend theory. The renewed interest in DMNCs has generated a ‘Goldilocks’ debate, with one camp arguing that the analysis of DMNCs is ‘hot’ and requires new theory, another camp arguing that it is ‘cold’ and no new theory is required, and a third camp arguing that it is ‘just right’ and it can be used to extend theory. I follow this third camp and argue that the unique conditions of developing countries influence the internationalization of DMNCs, creating a laboratory for extending theory. I illustrate this idea by reviewing some of the key theories and models of the multinational company and explaining how they can be extended with the study of DMNCs.
486 citations
References
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
49,666 citations
01 Jan 1973
TL;DR: In this paper, a six-step framework for organizing and discussing multivariate data analysis techniques with flowcharts for each is presented, focusing on the use of each technique, rather than its mathematical derivation.
Abstract: Offers an applications-oriented approach to multivariate data analysis, focusing on the use of each technique, rather than its mathematical derivation. The text introduces a six-step framework for organizing and discussing techniques with flowcharts for each.
Well-suited for the non-statistician, this applications-oriented introduction to multivariate analysis focuses on the fundamental concepts that affect the use of specific techniques rather than the mathematical derivation of the technique. Provides an overview of several techniques and approaches that are available to analysts today - e.g., data warehousing and data mining, neural networks and resampling/bootstrapping. Chapters are organized to provide a practical, logical progression of the phases of analysis and to group similar types of techniques applicable to most situations.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction.
I. PREPARING FOR A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS.
2. Examining Your Data.
3. Factor Analysis.
II. DEPENDENCE TECHNIQUES.
4. Multiple Regression.
5. Multiple Discriminant Analysis and Logistic Regression.
6. Multivariate Analysis of Variance.
7. Conjoint Analysis.
8. Canonical Correlation Analysis.
III. INTERDEPENDENCE TECHNIQUES.
9. Cluster Analysis.
10. Multidimensional Scaling.
IV. ADVANCED AND EMERGING TECHNIQUES.
11. Structural Equation Modeling.
12. Emerging Techniques in Multivariate Analysis.
Appendix A: Applications of Multivariate Data Analysis.
Index.
37,124 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1990TL;DR: Douglass C. North as discussed by the authors developed an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time.
Abstract: Continuing his groundbreaking analysis of economic structures, Douglass North develops an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time. Institutions exist, he argues, due to the uncertainties involved in human interaction; they are the constraints devised to structure that interaction. Yet, institutions vary widely in their consequences for economic performance; some economies develop institutions that produce growth and development, while others develop institutions that produce stagnation. North first explores the nature of institutions and explains the role of transaction and production costs in their development. The second part of the book deals with institutional change. Institutions create the incentive structure in an economy, and organisations will be created to take advantage of the opportunities provided within a given institutional framework. North argues that the kinds of skills and knowledge fostered by the structure of an economy will shape the direction of change and gradually alter the institutional framework. He then explains how institutional development may lead to a path-dependent pattern of development. In the final part of the book, North explains the implications of this analysis for economic theory and economic history. He indicates how institutional analysis must be incorporated into neo-classical theory and explores the potential for the construction of a dynamic theory of long-term economic change. Douglass C. North is Director of the Center of Political Economy and Professor of Economics and History at Washington University in St. Louis. He is a past president of the Economic History Association and Western Economics Association and a Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has written over sixty articles for a variety of journals and is the author of The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (CUP, 1973, with R.P. Thomas) and Structure and Change in Economic History (Norton, 1981). Professor North is included in Great Economists Since Keynes edited by M. Blaug (CUP, 1988 paperback ed.)
27,080 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the role that institutions, defined as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, play in economic performance and how those institutions change and how a model of dynamic institutions explains the differential performance of economies through time.
Abstract: Examines the role that institutions, defined as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, play in economic performance and how those institutions change and how a model of dynamic institutions explains the differential performance of economies through time. Institutions are separate from organizations, which are assemblages of people directed to strategically operating within institutional constraints. Institutions affect the economy by influencing, together with technology, transaction and production costs. They do this by reducing uncertainty in human interaction, albeit not always efficiently. Entrepreneurs accomplish incremental changes in institutions by perceiving opportunities to do better through altering the institutional framework of political and economic organizations. Importantly, the ability to perceive these opportunities depends on both the completeness of information and the mental constructs used to process that information. Thus, institutions and entrepreneurs stand in a symbiotic relationship where each gives feedback to the other. Neoclassical economics suggests that inefficient institutions ought to be rapidly replaced. This symbiotic relationship helps explain why this theoretical consequence is often not observed: while this relationship allows growth, it also allows inefficient institutions to persist. The author identifies changes in relative prices and prevailing ideas as the source of institutional alterations. Transaction costs, however, may keep relative price changes from being fully exploited. Transaction costs are influenced by institutions and institutional development is accordingly path-dependent. (CAR)
26,011 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that a definition of a firm may be obtained which is not only realistic in that it corresponds to what is meant by a firm in the real world, but is tractable by two of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis developed by Marshall, the idea of the margin and that of substitution.
Abstract: Economic theory has suffered in the past from a failure to state clearly its assumptions. Economists in building up a theory have often omitted to examine the foundations on which it was erected. This examination is, however, essential not only to prevent the misunderstanding and needless controversy which arise from a lack of knowledge of the assumptions on which a theory is based, but also because of the extreme importance for economics of good judgement in choosing between rival sets of assumptions. For instance, it is suggested that the use of the word “firm” in economics may be different from the use of the term by the “plain man.”1 Since there is apparently a trend in economic theory towards starting analysis with the individual firm and not with the industry,2 it is all the more necessary not only that a clear definition of the word “firm” should be given but that its difference from a firm in the “real world,” if it exists, should be made clear. Mrs. Robinson has said that “the two questions to be asked of a set of assumptions in economics are: Are they tractable? and: Do they correspond with the real world?”3 Though, as Mrs. Robinson points out, “more often one set will be manageable and the other realistic,” yet there may well be branches of theory where assumptions may be both manageable and realistic. It is hoped to show in the following paper that a definition of a firm may be obtained which is not only realistic in that it corresponds to what is meant by a firm in the real world, but is tractable by two of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis developed by Marshall, the idea of the margin and that of substitution, together giving the idea of substitution at the margin.
21,195 citations