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Journal ArticleDOI

Evaluation Processes, Local Cadres' Behaviour and Local Development Processes

08 Oct 2013-Journal of Contemporary China (Routledge)-Vol. 22, Iss: 84, pp 1048-1066
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated the impact of political evaluations on the behavior of leading county and township cadres in rural China and found that the performance evaluation system and its targets have become an important point of orientation for local cadres, although there are important variations among different groups of officials.
Abstract: This study investigates the impact of political evaluations on the behaviour of leading county and township cadres in rural China. The article is structured in two parts. In the first section the institutional foundations of the evaluation system for local administrations in rural China will be introduced. The section will conclude with a brief overview of policy reforms initiated by the centre to tackle some of the perceived shortcomings of the present system. The second part of this article will feature the behavioural responses of local cadres to evaluations as identified in our field research interviews and secondary literature. It becomes obvious that the performance evaluation system and its targets have become an important point of orientation for local cadres—although there are important variations among different groups of officials. Finally, in the conclusion the argument for an alternative perspective on performance evaluations in the context of rural China will be developed: on the one side a ...
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Wang et al. as mentioned in this paper argued that patron-client relations can be used to improve government performance by resolving principal-agent problems within political hierarchies, and examined how patronage networks shape economic performance of local governments in China.
Abstract: Patron–client networks are widely found in governments of transitional societies and are often seen as an impediment to effective governance. This article advances an alternative view that emphasizes their enabling effects. I argue that patron–client relations can be used to improve government performance by resolving principal–agent problems within political hierarchies. I substantiate this claim by examining how patronage networks shape economic performance of local governments in China. Using an original city–level panel data set between 2000 and 2011, and a new method that identifies patronage ties based on past promotions, I show that city leaders with informal ties to the incumbent provincial leaders deliver significantly faster economic growth than those without. I conduct additional analyses to rule out several important alternative explanations and provide evidence on the incentive‐enhancing mechanism. These findings highlight the importance of informal institutions for bureaucratic management and authoritarian governance.

127 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a thorough investigation of local implementation mechanisms, however, is often hindered by hindering the thorough evaluation of the local implementation mechanism, which is a core component of Chinese political system's adaptability and stability.
Abstract: Effective policy implementation is a core component of the Chinese political system’s adaptability and stability. A thorough investigation of local implementation mechanisms, however, is often hind...

83 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argue that many scholars and policymakers in the United States accept the narrative that China is a revisionist state challenging the U.S.-dominated international liberal order. But they do not consider that the narrative assumes that the...
Abstract: Many scholars and policymakers in the United States accept the narrative that China is a revisionist state challenging the U.S.-dominated international liberal order. The narrative assumes that the...

77 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is found that the distinct design of the measurement system – the combination of result-oriented targets imposed from above and high-powered incentives for target fulfilment – induces pernicious gaming.
Abstract: The implementation of China's reform era target-based cadre evaluation system has instigated various types of gaming behaviour on the part of local officials. How do these gaming strategies differ from each other? Why do local officials sacrifice the public interest for target fulfilment in some cases but not in others? This article argues that gaming is not monolithic and should not be treated as such. It develops a typology that distinguishes between pernicious and benign gaming, and looks into the symptoms and motives of pernicious gaming in particular. It finds that the distinct design of the measurement system – the combination of result-oriented targets imposed from above and high-powered incentives for target fulfilment – induces pernicious gaming. In addition, the system's implementation practically compels local officials to misrepresent their performance, even though they are aware of the negative impact of such behaviour on the public interest. This study shows that to understand the strategies, motivations and implications of gaming better, a more nuanced approach is needed.

65 citations


Additional excerpts

  • ...6 See O’Brien and Li 1999; Whiting 2004, 112–15; Minzer 2009, 100–01; Heberer and Trappel 2013....

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Journal ArticleDOI
Dan Chen1
TL;DR: Wang et al. as discussed by the authors explain why the authoritarian regime tolerates criticism of the party-state and offer an explanation based on polarity of the polarity in the media.
Abstract: Despite the sophisticated control of media in China, criticism of the party-state is not uncommon. Why does the authoritarian regime allow criticism? This article offers an explanation based on pol...

51 citations


Cites background or methods from "Evaluation Processes, Local Cadres'..."

  • ...The evaluation of cadres’ performance based on hard targets is used to assign jobs and determine remuneration (O’Brien and Li, 1999: 172; Heberer and Trappel, 2013)....

    [...]

  • ...Many cadres are able to pass the performance evaluation and be rewarded due to flawed institutional design and lax evaluation processes, despite the stringent criteria specified in the cadre responsibility system (Burns and Wang, 2010; Heberer and Trappel, 2013)....

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References
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the extent to which economic action is embedded in structures of social relations, in modern industrial society, is examined, and it is argued that reformist economists who attempt to bring social structure back in do so in the "oversocialized" way criticized by Dennis Wrong.
Abstract: How behavior and institutions are affected by social relations is one of the classic questions of social theory. This paper concerns the extent to which economic action is embedded in structures of social relations, in modern industrial society. Although the usual neoclasical accounts provide an "undersocialized" or atomized-actor explanation of such action, reformist economists who attempt to bring social structure back in do so in the "oversocialized" way criticized by Dennis Wrong. Under-and oversocialized accounts are paradoxically similar in their neglect of ongoing structures of social relations, and a sophisticated account of economic action must consider its embeddedness in such structures. The argument in illustrated by a critique of Oliver Williamson's "markets and hierarchies" research program.

25,601 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Li et al. as mentioned in this paper argue against the view that the capacity of the central state has declined in the reform era in China and examine how reforms have been introduced into the old system of cadre management to make it more effective, but also how higher levels of the party-state have improved monitoring and strengthened political control through promoting successful township leaders to hold concurrent positions at higher levels and rotating them between different administrative levels and geographical areas.
Abstract: This study argues against the view that the capacity of the central state has declined in the reform era in China. It examines how reforms have been introduced into the old system of cadre management to make it more effective, but also how higher levels of the party-state have improved monitoring and strengthened political control through promoting successful township leaders to hold concurrent positions at higher levels and by rotating them between different administrative levels and geographical areas. Its findings suggest that state capacity, defined as the capacity to monitor and control lower level agents, has increased. The reason behind the failure to implement some policies, such as burden reduction, is not so much inadequate control over local leaders as the centre's own priorities and conflicting policies. The Chinese party-state maintains the ability to be selectively effective in the beginning of 2000s.

649 citations

Book ChapterDOI
08 Dec 2003
TL;DR: One of the questions raised in the introduction to this volume is how one recognizes epochal change, particularly when one is in the midst of it as mentioned in this paper, and the rapid and relentless spread of coercive technologies of accountability into higher education is a case in point.
Abstract: One of the questions raised in the introduction to this volume is how one recognizes epochal change, particularly when one is in the midst of it The rise of what some authors have termed ‘audit culture’, and the rapid and relentless spread of coercive technologies of accountability into higher education is a case in point Few processes have had such a profound impact in re-shaping academics’ conditions of work and conditions of thought since the post-war expansion of the university sector in Britain, yet this major transformation remains curiously under-researched and untheorized If, as anthropologists argue, culture is constantly being invented and re-invented, nowhere is this becoming more evident than in the milieu in which most anthropologists themselves operate: the university sector

421 citations

Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 2000

331 citations