Evidence for Racial Prejudice at the Implicit Level and Its Relationship With Questionnaire Measures
Citations
9,731 citations
3,970 citations
2,690 citations
2,589 citations
2,433 citations
Cites background from "Evidence for Racial Prejudice at th..."
...5This distinction would not apply for priming measures that involve the subliminal presentation of the words “black” or “white” as primes (e.g., Wittenbrink et al. 1997). candy bars (a preference that was not apparent on an explicit measure of liking), these researchers noted: “In our society,…...
[...]
...…2001, Rudman & Glick 2001, Devine et al. 2002, Dovidio et al. 2002), although there are occasional reports of significant correlations (e.g., McConnell & Liebold 2001, with respect to the IAT; Lepore & Brown 1997; Kawakami et al. 1998; Wittenbrink et al. 1997, with respect to a priming measure)....
[...]
...The research has involved a variety of domains, including attitudes (e.g., Fazio et al. 1995, Greenwald et al. 1998), stereotypes (e.g., Wittenbrink et al. 1997, Nosek et al. 2002a), self-esteem (Hetts et al. 1999, Bosson et al. 2000, Koole et al. 2001, Rudman et al. 2001b), close relationships…...
[...]
References
13,453 citations
7,753 citations
7,032 citations
Additional excerpts
...Jacoby, Lindsay, & Toth, 1992; Posner, 1978; Roediger, 1990; Schacter, 1987; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Uleman & Bargh, 1989)....
[...]
5,300 citations
"Evidence for Racial Prejudice at th..." refers background in this paper
...More recently, a rather different explanation has been suggested, according to which a person may, at the same time, hold positive attitudes toward a social group and nevertheless be influenced by negative group stereotypes (Devine, 1989)....
[...]
...To date, most of the work concerned with this distinction has focused on demonstrating that stereotypic knowledge in general, and racial stereotypes in particular, may in fact be activated effortlessly and influence subsequent judgments unbeknownst to the perceiver (Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993; Devine, 1989; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; D. T. Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae, Stangor, & Milne, 1994; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990). Much less work exists that directly assesses the relationship between implicit and explicit measures of stereotyping and prejudice. Perhaps the best known study that has examined this relationship is Devine's (1989) work, in which she argued that all White Americans know of and automatically activate the culturally shared negative stereotype of African Americans. People low in prejudice must then invoke their own personal (more positive) beliefs regarding African Americans by means of a controlled process. The implications of this argument are that there are no individual differences in the associations that are automatically activated by the category Blacks and, therefore, that the degree of prejudice evidenced on an implicit, or automatic, task will be uncorrelated with the degree of prejudice exhibited on an explicit, or controlled task. To test this "dissociation" argument, Devine first showed that participants high and low in prejudice (determined by scores on the Modern Racism Scale [MRS]; McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981 ) differed in the relative numbers of positive to negative qualities they listed as characteristic of African Americans. That is, the MRS predicted differences in explicitly generated lists of valenced attributes. Next, in Devine's (1989) study, participants were subliminally exposed to words associated with the target group, African Americans, such as busing, oppression, slavery, jazz, and basketball Some participants saw a large number of these words, and some only a few. Then participants read about and interpreted the behavior of an ambiguously hostile individual, whose ethnicity was not specified. If a large number of African American-related words had been seen in the subliminal priming task, the ambiguous target was judged to be more hostile than if a small number of such words were seen. Importantly, the extent to which this was true did not depend on the participants' scores on the MRS. Thus, Devine (1989) concluded that implicit stereotyping had occurred and that it had occurred to the same degree for all participants, regardless of their level of explicit prejudice. We have two primary concerns with this study. First, although in the subliminal task, Devine (1989) was careful to avoid words that were direct semantic associates of hostile, many of the words presented were at least indirectly related to the concept "hostility." Busing, oppression, nigger, ghetto, slavery, and prejudice are certainly linked in memory to knowledge of hostility. To the extent that this task activated the general concept of hostility (not as it relates specifically to the stereotypic qualities of African Americans, but simply as a general concept, primed by, for example, busing and oppression), then it is reasonable to expect both that the ambiguous target would be seen as hostile and that this would not depend on MRS scores. Hostility had been primed for all participants (as a general construct), thereby masking any individual differences in the strength of association of hostility to the group African Americans. A second problem is that the ethnicity of the ambiguous target was left unspecified, and thus, the results are arguably a demonstration of implicit stereotyping, given that the target was not specifically identified as a member of the group (and the default assumption would presumably be that the target was White). Thus, a fair evaluation of the dissociation hypothesis proposed by Devine (1989) would require a task that more directly measures the degree of association of stereotypic attributes with the category African Americans in an implicit manner and that tests whether this is related to explicitly measured stereotypes. In fact, not only would such a task be useful to examine whether controlled responses are indeed uncorrelated with what is activated at the automatic level, but it would at the same time allow us to explore the issue of strategic manipulation of the responses in the Judd et al. (1995) studies. A different procedure to get at spontaneous activation of stereotypic knowledge has been developed by Dovidio, Gaertner, and their colleagues (Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983). This task is a variation on Meyer and Schvaneveldt's (1971 ) classic procedure demonstrating semantic priming effects. In the Meyer and Schvaneveldt procedure, participants first see a single word, the prime (e.g., BREAD) and then are presented with a letter string, the target (e.g., BLrrrEa), to which they have to respond with, for example, a wordnonword judgment. Response latencies are facilitated by semantic associations between the prime and the target stimulus. A common explanation for this by now well established finding (for a review, see Neely, 1991 ) derives from the concept of spreading activation. Presumably, activation of the prime spreads to semantically related concepts and thus reduces the time required for the activation of related targets to reach recognition threshold (cf. Neely, 1977; Posner & Snyder, 1975). Dovidio et al. (1986) used similar reasoning when asking their participants about what attributes they associated with White Americans and African Americans....
[...]
...To date, most of the work concerned with this distinction has focused on demonstrating that stereotypic knowledge in general, and racial stereotypes in particular, may in fact be activated effortlessly and influence subsequent judgments unbeknownst to the perceiver (Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993; Devine, 1989; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; D. T. Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae, Stangor, & Milne, 1994; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990)....
[...]
...To date, most of the work concerned with this distinction has focused on demonstrating that stereotypic knowledge in general, and racial stereotypes in particular, may in fact be activated effortlessly and influence subsequent judgments unbeknownst to the perceiver (Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993; Devine, 1989; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; D. T. Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae, Stangor, & Milne, 1994; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990). Much less work exists that directly assesses the relationship between implicit and explicit measures of stereotyping and prejudice. Perhaps the best known study that has examined this relationship is Devine's (1989) work, in which she argued that all White Americans know of and automatically activate the culturally shared negative stereotype of African Americans. People low in prejudice must then invoke their own personal (more positive) beliefs regarding African Americans by means of a controlled process. The implications of this argument are that there are no individual differences in the associations that are automatically activated by the category Blacks and, therefore, that the degree of prejudice evidenced on an implicit, or automatic, task will be uncorrelated with the degree of prejudice exhibited on an explicit, or controlled task. To test this "dissociation" argument, Devine first showed that participants high and low in prejudice (determined by scores on the Modern Racism Scale [MRS]; McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981 ) differed in the relative numbers of positive to negative qualities they listed as characteristic of African Americans. That is, the MRS predicted differences in explicitly generated lists of valenced attributes. Next, in Devine's (1989) study, participants were subliminally exposed to words associated with the target group, African Americans, such as busing, oppression, slavery, jazz, and basketball Some participants saw a large number of these words, and some only a few. Then participants read about and interpreted the behavior of an ambiguously hostile individual, whose ethnicity was not specified. If a large number of African American-related words had been seen in the subliminal priming task, the ambiguous target was judged to be more hostile than if a small number of such words were seen. Importantly, the extent to which this was true did not depend on the participants' scores on the MRS. Thus, Devine (1989) concluded that implicit stereotyping had occurred and that it had occurred to the same degree for all participants, regardless of their level of explicit prejudice. We have two primary concerns with this study. First, although in the subliminal task, Devine (1989) was careful to avoid words that were direct semantic associates of hostile, many of the words presented were at least indirectly related to the concept "hostility." Busing, oppression, nigger, ghetto, slavery, and prejudice are certainly linked in memory to knowledge of hostility. To the extent that this task activated the general concept of hostility (not as it relates specifically to the stereotypic qualities of African Americans, but simply as a general concept, primed by, for example, busing and oppression), then it is reasonable to expect both that the ambiguous target would be seen as hostile and that this would not depend on MRS scores. Hostility had been primed for all participants (as a general construct), thereby masking any individual differences in the strength of association of hostility to the group African Americans. A second problem is that the ethnicity of the ambiguous target was left unspecified, and thus, the results are arguably a demonstration of implicit stereotyping, given that the target was not specifically identified as a member of the group (and the default assumption would presumably be that the target was White). Thus, a fair evaluation of the dissociation hypothesis proposed by Devine (1989) would require a task that more directly measures the degree of association of stereotypic attributes with the category African Americans in an implicit manner and that tests whether this is related to explicitly measured stereotypes. In fact, not only would such a task be useful to examine whether controlled responses are indeed uncorrelated with what is activated at the automatic level, but it would at the same time allow us to explore the issue of strategic manipulation of the responses in the Judd et al. (1995) studies....
[...]
...To date, most of the work concerned with this distinction has focused on demonstrating that stereotypic knowledge in general, and racial stereotypes in particular, may in fact be activated effortlessly and influence subsequent judgments unbeknownst to the perceiver (Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993; Devine, 1989; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; D. T. Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae, Stangor, & Milne, 1994; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990). Much less work exists that directly assesses the relationship between implicit and explicit measures of stereotyping and prejudice. Perhaps the best known study that has examined this relationship is Devine's (1989) work, in which she argued that all White Americans know of and automatically activate the culturally shared negative stereotype of African Americans. People low in prejudice must then invoke their own personal (more positive) beliefs regarding African Americans by means of a controlled process. The implications of this argument are that there are no individual differences in the associations that are automatically activated by the category Blacks and, therefore, that the degree of prejudice evidenced on an implicit, or automatic, task will be uncorrelated with the degree of prejudice exhibited on an explicit, or controlled task. To test this "dissociation" argument, Devine first showed that participants high and low in prejudice (determined by scores on the Modern Racism Scale [MRS]; McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981 ) differed in the relative numbers of positive to negative qualities they listed as characteristic of African Americans. That is, the MRS predicted differences in explicitly generated lists of valenced attributes. Next, in Devine's (1989) study, participants were subliminally exposed to words associated with the target group, African Americans, such as busing, oppression, slavery, jazz, and basketball Some participants saw a large number of these words, and some only a few. Then participants read about and interpreted the behavior of an ambiguously hostile individual, whose ethnicity was not specified. If a large number of African American-related words had been seen in the subliminal priming task, the ambiguous target was judged to be more hostile than if a small number of such words were seen. Importantly, the extent to which this was true did not depend on the participants' scores on the MRS. Thus, Devine (1989) concluded that implicit stereotyping had occurred and that it had occurred to the same degree for all participants, regardless of their level of explicit prejudice. We have two primary concerns with this study. First, although in the subliminal task, Devine (1989) was careful to avoid words that were direct semantic associates of hostile, many of the words presented were at least indirectly related to the concept "hostility." Busing, oppression, nigger, ghetto, slavery, and prejudice are certainly linked in memory to knowledge of hostility. To the extent that this task activated the general concept of hostility (not as it relates specifically to the stereotypic qualities of African Americans, but simply as a general concept, primed by, for example, busing and oppression), then it is reasonable to expect both that the ambiguous target would be seen as hostile and that this would not depend on MRS scores. Hostility had been primed for all participants (as a general construct), thereby masking any individual differences in the strength of association of hostility to the group African Americans. A second problem is that the ethnicity of the ambiguous target was left unspecified, and thus, the results are arguably a demonstration of implicit stereotyping, given that the target was not specifically identified as a member of the group (and the default assumption would presumably be that the target was White). Thus, a fair evaluation of the dissociation hypothesis proposed by Devine (1989) would require a task that more directly measures the degree of association of stereotypic attributes with the category African Americans in an implicit manner and that tests whether this is related to explicitly measured stereotypes....
[...]