Externalities and stability in social cloud
01 Nov 2014-pp 1-6
TL;DR: A pairwise resource (or pairwise service) sharing social network model is presented to explore the interdependence between social structure and resource (service) availability for an individual user or player and investigates effects of social structure on individual resource availability.
Abstract: Social Clouds have been gaining importance because of their potential for efficient and stable resource sharing without any (monetary) cost implications . There is a need, however, to look at how a social structure or relationship evolves to build a Social Cloud (by identifying factors that affect the social structure) and how social structure impacts individual resource sharing behavior. This paper presents a pairwise resource (or pairwise service) sharing social network model to explore the interdependence between social structure and resource (service) availability for an individual user or player. The paper also investigates effects of social structure on individual resource availability. Further, the paper analyzes positive and negative externalities, and aims to characterize stable social clouds.
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TL;DR: In this article, the impact of link formation between a pair of agents on the resource availability of other agents in a social cloud network, a special case of end-to-end networks, is investigated.
Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of link formation between a pair of agents on the resource availability of other agents (that is, externalities) in a social cloud network, a special case of endo...
4 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the impact of link formation between a pair of agents on the resource availability of other agents (that is, externalities) in a social cloud network, a special case of endogenous sharing economy networks.
Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of link formation between a pair of agents on the resource availability of other agents (that is, externalities) in a social cloud network, a special case of endogenous sharing economy networks. Specifically, we study how the closeness between agents and the network size affect externalities.
We conjecture, and experimentally support, that for an agent to experience positive externalities, an increase in its closeness is necessary. The condition is not sufficient though. We, then, show that for populated ring networks, one or more agents experience positive externalities due to an increase in the closeness of agents. Further, the initial distance between agents forming a link has a direct bearing on the number of beneficiaries, and the number of beneficiaries is always less than that of non-beneficiaries.
2 citations
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25 Nov 2018
TL;DR: It is shown that network density is inversely proportional to positive externalities, and further, it plays a crucial role in determining the kind of externalities.
Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of link formation between a pair of agents on resource availability of other agents in a social cloud network, which is a special case of socially-based resource sharing systems. Specifically, we study the correlation between externalities, network size, and network density.
We first conjecture and experimentally support that if an agent experiences positive externalities, then its closeness (harmonic centrality measure) should increase. Next, we show the following for ring networks: in less populated networks no agent experiences positive externalities; in more populated networks a set of agents experience positive externalities, and larger the distance between agents forming a link, more the number of beneficiaries; and the number of beneficiaries is always less than the number of non-beneficiaries. Finally, we show that network density is inversely proportional to positive externalities, and further, it plays a crucial role in determining the kind of externalities.
1 citations
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors considered the social cloud as an endogenous resource-sharing network, where agents are involved in closeness-based conditional resource sharing and studied the impact of agents' decisions of link addition and deletion on their own local and global resource availability as well as on others' global resources availability.
Abstract: Social cloud has emerged as a case of sharing economy, where socially connected agents share their computing resources within the community. This paper considers the social cloud as an endogenous resource-sharing network, where agents are involved in closeness-based conditional resource sharing. This study focuses on (1) the impact of agents' decisions of link addition and deletion on their own local and global resource availability as well as on others' global resource availability (as spillover effects), (2) the role of agents' closeness in determining spillover effects, (3) agents' link addition behavior, and (4) stability and efficiency of the social cloud. The findings include the following: (i) Agents' decision of link addition (deletion) increases (decreases) their local resource availability. However, these observations do not hold in the case of global resource availability. (ii) In a connected network, agents experience either a positive or a negative spillover effect and there is no case with no spillover effects. Agents observe no spillover effects if and only if the network is disconnected with three or more components. Furthermore, an agent experiences negative spillover if there is no change in its closeness. Although an increase in the closeness of agents is necessary to experience positive spillover effects, the condition is not sufficient. (iii) We study the relation between agents' distance from each other, and their local as well as global resource availabilities. We prove that the local resource availability of an agent from another agent increases with decrease in the distance between them and that maximum local resource availability is obtained from the agent with the least closeness. Using these results, we discuss which agent to add a link to, so as to maximize the local resource availability. We discuss why such results are difficult to establish for global resource availability. However, in a two-diameter network, we show that for an agent, link formation always increases the global resource availability. (iv) We also study resource-sharing network formation and its efficiency in a strategic setting. We prove the existence of a pairwise stable network. Furthermore, we provide a set of conditions for a few prominent network structures (star, complete, wheel, and bipartite networks) to be pairwise stable. We show that the “connected in pairs, otherwise disconnected” network is better than a connected network, in terms of social welfare.
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the impact of link addition and deletion on local and global resource availability, and analyze spillover effects in terms of the impact between a pair of agents on others' utility.
Abstract: This paper focuses on social cloud formation, where agents are involved in a closeness-based conditional resource sharing and build their resource sharing network themselves The objectives of this paper are: (1) to investigate the impact of agents' decisions of link addition and deletion on their local and global resource availability, (2) to analyze spillover effects in terms of the impact of link addition between a pair of agents on others' utility, (3) to study the role of agents' closeness in determining what type of spillover effects these agents experience in the network, and (4) to model the choices of agents that suggest with whom they want to add links in the social cloud The findings include the following Firstly, agents' decision of link addition (deletion) increases (decreases) their local resource availability However, these observations do not hold in the case of global resource availability Secondly, in a connected network, agents experience either positive or negative spillover effect and there is no case with no spillover effects Agents observe no spillover effects if and only if the network is disconnected and consists of more than two components (sub-networks) Furthermore, if there is no change in the closeness of an agent (not involved in link addition) due to a newly added link, then the agent experiences negative spillover effect Although an increase in the closeness of agents is necessary in order to experience positive spillover effects, the condition is not sufficient By focusing on parameters such as closeness and shortest distances, we provide conditions under which agents choose to add links so as to maximise their resource availability
References
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks when self-interested individuals can form or sever links, and show that there does not always exist a stable network that is efficient.
2,660 citations
"Externalities and stability in soci..." refers background in this paper
...Jackson and Wolinsky [18] introduced the concept of pairwise stability as follows: Definition 1: A network 5 is pairwise stable if and only if 1) Ui ( S ) 2: Ui ( S -(ij)) and U j( s ) 2: U j( s -(ij)) for all (ij) E 5 2) If Ui ( S + (ij)) > Ui ( S ) , then U j( s + (ij)) U j( s ) for all (ij) � 5 Thus, a network 5 is stable when no player benefits by changing the present link structure, neither by forming new edges nor by severing existing links....
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...Jackson and Wolinsky [18] introduced the concept of pairwise stability as follows: Definition 1: A network 5 is pairwise stable if and only if 1) Ui ( S ) 2: Ui ( S -(ij)) and U j( s ) 2: U j( s -(ij)) for all (ij) E 5 2) If Ui ( S + (ij)) > Ui ( S ) , then U j( s + (ij)) U j( s ) for all (ij) �…...
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2,136 citations
"Externalities and stability in soci..." refers background in this paper
...In [16], Sabidussi et al. proposed measure of players closeness as a function of shortest paths: 1 closenes s ( i) = ----==-----=- L di j jEs\{i} (1) where i is a focal player, j varies over all other players in the network and dij represents geodesic distance (shortest path) between i and j in…...
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TL;DR: It is shown that equilibrium networks always exist and that only moderate levels of network asymmetry can be sustained at equilibrium and a general non-monotonicity result on information flow and unemployment with respect to network size in symmetric networks.
345 citations
"Externalities and stability in soci..." refers background in this paper
...In [14], the author analyzes stability and efficiency of egocentric job contact networks, where players rely only on their direct contacts/ friends to get job information....
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TL;DR: This paper defines Social Cloud computing, outlining various aspects of Social Clouds, and demonstrates the approach using a social storage cloud implementation in Facebook.
Abstract: Online relationships in social networks are often based on real world relationships and can therefore be used to infer a level of trust between users. We propose leveraging these relationships to form a dynamic "Social Cloud,” thereby enabling users to share heterogeneous resources within the context of a social network. In addition, the inherent socially corrective mechanisms (incentives, disincentives) can be used to enable a cloud-based framework for long term sharing with lower privacy concerns and security overheads than are present in traditional cloud environments. Due to the unique nature of the Social Cloud, a social market place is proposed as a means of regulating sharing. The social market is novel, as it uses both social and economic protocols to facilitate trading. This paper defines Social Cloud computing, outlining various aspects of Social Clouds, and demonstrates the approach using a social storage cloud implementation in Facebook.
248 citations
"Externalities and stability in soci..." refers background in this paper
...The relation between P2P storage and Social Cloud is outlined in [1]....
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19 Oct 2003
TL;DR: Samsara as discussed by the authors enforces fairness in peer-to-peer storage systems without requiring trusted third parties, symmetric storage relationships, monetary payment, or certified identities, and punishes unresponsive nodes probabilistically.
Abstract: Peer-to-peer storage systems assume that their users consume resources in proportion to their contribution. Unfortunately, users are unlikely to do this without some enforcement mechanism. Prior solutions to this problem require centralized infrastructure, constraints on data placement, or ongoing administrative costs. All of these run counter to the design philosophy of peer-to-peer systems.Samsara enforces fairness in peer-to-peer storage systems without requiring trusted third parties, symmetric storage relationships, monetary payment, or certified identities. Each peer that requests storage of another must agree to hold a claim in return---a placeholder that accounts for available space. After an exchange, each partner checks the other to ensure faithfulness. Samsara punishes unresponsive nodes probabilistically. Because objects are replicated, nodes with transient failures are unlikely to suffer data loss, unlike those that are dishonest or chronically unavailable. Claim storage overhead can be reduced when necessary by forwarding among chains of nodes, and eliminated when cycles are created. Forwarding chains increase the risk of exposure to failure, but such risk is modest under reasonable assumptions of utilization and simultaneous, persistent failure.
220 citations