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Journal ArticleDOI

Federalismo e relações intergovernamentais no Brasil: a reforma de programas sociais

01 Jan 2002-Dados-revista De Ciencias Sociais (Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos (IESP) da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ))-Vol. 45, Iss: 3, pp 431-458
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyzed the process of reform in four areas of social policies that affect directly the interests of sub-national governments: basic education, social housing programs, basic sanitation and health.
Abstract: The article analyses the process of reform in four areas of social policies that affect directly the interests of sub-national governments: basic education, social housing programs, basic sanitation and health. As the study reveals, despite the varying degree of success achieved in the various policy initiatives and contrary to the expectations of the prevailing interpretations of the nature of Brazilian federalism, the federal government faced no insurmountable hurdles in implementing their reform agenda. The study aims at demonstrating that (i) in the absence of any constitutional mandatory requirement, the political autonomy of local governments - typical of federative States - actually enhances the veto power of local governments over policy initiatives proposed by the federal Executive branch. However, (ii) power resources available to the federal Executive branch - such as agenda definition and vetoing powers - in addition to control over resources that are essential to the political survival of the representatives increase the chances of success of the federal government. Furthermore, (1999), (iii) the constitutional authority of Brazilian states is far more limited than that of the North-American states; (iv) the category "federalism", however, is not sufficient to define the potential stability of specific policies, which depends upon how inter-governmental relations are structured in each particular policy. Specifically, (v) constitutional rules, legacies from previous policies and the political cycle frame the decision arenas in various ways, thus conditioning both the strategies and chances of success of the federative players.

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Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jun 2004
TL;DR: In this paper, a concentracao da autoridade politica varia entre os Estados federativos e entre politicas particulares, condicionando a capacidade de coordenacao governamental de politicas, discute-se, no caso brasileiro, como se deu a adocao do governo federal.
Abstract: Este texto pretende demonstrar que a concentracao da autoridade politica varia entre os Estados federativos e entre politicas particulares, condicionando a capacidade de coordenacao governamental de politicas. Neste sentido, discute-se, no caso brasileiro, como se deu a adocao do governo federal.

209 citations


Cites background from "Federalismo e relações intergoverna..."

  • ...O presidente Fernando Henrique multiplicou por quatro o percentual de prefeitos da sua base de apoio em seu segundo mandato....

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  • ...Entre 1995 e 2000, 12 das 44 companhias habitacionais municipais fecharam devido à política de não financiamento do governo Fernando Henrique (Arretche, 2002)....

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  • ...É por esta razão que, para alcançar um objetivo nacional – por exemplo, reduzir as assimetrias intra-estaduais de gasto no ensino fundamental e promover a valorização salarial dos professores –, o governo Fernando Henrique adotou como estratégia a aprovação de uma emenda constitucional, como o Fundef.8 Na prática, a implementação desta Emenda Constitucional implicou uma minirreforma tributária de âmbito estadual, à medida que, a cada ano, 15% das receitas de Estados e municípios são automaticamente retidas e contabilizadas em um Fundo Estadual – o Fundef....

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  • ...A montagem de uma coalizão de governo permitiu que os presidentes Itamar Franco e Fernando Henrique contassem com bases de apoio vertical próximas ou superiores a 2/3 do total de governadores e prefeitos....

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  • ...Observe-se, na Tabela 1, que as bases de apoio vertical do governo Fernando Henrique variaram entre 67% e 78% do total de governadores e prefeitos....

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the context of decentralized governance in which local politicians administer most social sector programs reform-minded bureaucrats often find that they have little control over the implementation of their progressive policies as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: How does the state ensure the implementation of national policies in a context of decentralized political authority? This article identifies a new strategy utilized by national bureaucrats to regulate the behavior of subnational politicians: mobilizing civil society as government watchdog and political advocate. In the context of decentralized governance in which local politicians administer most social sector programs reform-minded bureaucrats often find that they have little control over the implementation of their progressive policies. In Brazils AIDS policy sector however bureaucrats have ensured the successful implementation of their policies by developing allies outside government. These state actors-here called activist bureaucrats-have been largely overlooked in the English-language literature yet they form a new layer of politics in Latin America.

87 citations


Cites background from "Federalismo e relações intergoverna..."

  • ...…as a linear, irreversible process, these scholars of fiscal federalism suggest instead that decentralization changes the playing field— on which new struggles between national and subnational politicians will emerge over the distribution of authority (Arretche 2002; Montero 2001a, b)....

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  • ...Struggles between federal government officials and subnational politicians are particularly acute in Brazil, a case of “strong” or “robust” federalism, in which governors wield a large amount of influence over national politics (Abrucio 1995; Arretche 2002; Samuels 2003; Souza 1997)....

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the healthcare regionalization process in the Brazilian states in the period from 2007 to 2010, seeking to identify the conditions that favor or impede this process.
Abstract: This article examines the healthcare regionalization process in the Brazilian states in the period from 2007 to 2010, seeking to identify the conditions that favor or impede this process. Referential analysis of public policies and especially of historical institutionalism was used. Three dimensions sum up the conditioning factors of regionalization: context (historical-structural, political-institutional and conjunctural), directionality (ideology, object, actors, strategies and instruments) and regionalization features (institutionality and governance). The empirical research relied mainly on the analysis of official documents and interviews with key actors in 24 states. Distinct patterns of influence in the states were observed, with regionalization being marked by important gains in institutionality and governance in the period. Nevertheless, inherent difficulties of the contexts prejudice greater advances. There is a pressing need to broaden the territorial focus in government planning and to integrate sectorial policies for medium and long-term regional development in order to empower regionalization and to overcome obstacles to the access to healthcare services in Brazil.

65 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined 59 initiatives of legislation addressing federal matters voted by the Chamber of Deputies from 1989 to 2006 and explored how political institutions affect the decision-making process of federal issues, by distinguishing main actors' preferences from federal institutions, controlled by presidential terms.
Abstract: The article shows that the drafters of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution approved political institutions that combine broad jurisdictional authority to the Federal government along with limited institutional veto powers to subnational governments. The study has examined 59 initiatives of legislation addressing federal matters voted by the Chamber of Deputies from 1989 to 2006. The article explores how political institutions affect the decision-making process of federal issues, by distinguishing main actors´ preferences from federal institutions, controlled by presidential terms.

65 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper analyzed inequality of educational opportunities and outcomes in Brazil, pointing to persistent inequalities related to race and class in the Brazilian school system, and concluded that parents with higher socioeconomic status invest in private elementary and secondary schools for their children in order to facilitate their progression in the system.
Abstract: This article analyzes inequality of educational opportunities and outcomes in Brazil. The findings corroborate those of previous studies, pointing to persistent inequalities related to race and class in the Brazilian school system. However, the analyses indicate that parents' wealth and type of school (public, Federal, or private) are fundamental factors for explaining persistent inequalities. Parents with higher socioeconomic status invest in private elementary and secondary schools for their children in order to facilitate their progression in the system. In other words, in addition to inequality related to family characteristics, inequality is promoted by the educational system itself. The article presents sensitivity analyses to explain the possible effect of unmeasured variables, as well as a methodology to show the effect of educational transitions on inequality in educational outcomes. The author concludes that in order to promote access to educational progression, Brazil needs to improve not only the quality of its schools, but also the living conditions of Brazilian families.

64 citations

References
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors examined the role of ideas in policy making, based on the concept of policy paradigms, and found that a conventional model of social learning fit some types of changes in policy well but not the movement from Keynesian to monetarist modes of policymaking.
Abstract: This article examines the model of social learning often believed to confirm the autonomy of the state from social pressures, tests it against recent cases of change in British economic policies, and offers a fuller analysis of the role of ideas in policymaking, based on the concept of policy paradigms. A conventional model of social learning is found to fit some types of changes in policy well but not the movement from Keynesian to monetarist modes of policymaking. In cases of paradigm shift, policy respond to a wider social debate bound up with electoral competition that demands a reformulation of traditional conceptions of state-society relations.

5,505 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: For example, Cardoso became the first Brazilian president to pass the presidential sash to himself in 1998 and won a smashing first-round reelection victory in October 1998, defeating his nearest rival by over 20 percent as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: "Stumping for candidates is a thing of the past, it's a figure of speech. These days, if you advertise that you're going to vote for this or that candidate, it doesn't change anything." So Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso expressed his belief that his support would not help elect candidates for other offices in O Estado de Sao Paulo, August 3, 1998. In January 1999 Cardoso became the first Brazilian president to pass the presidential sash to himself. He won a smashing first-round reelection victory in October 1998, defeating his nearest rival by over 20 percent. The parties in his alliance also won sizable majorities in both houses of congress. By all rights, Cardoso's reelection ought to have rejuvenated his efforts to maintain Brazil's economic stabilization program (the Piano Real) and to pass extensive political reforms. On top of the prestige from his relatively easy victory, the International Monetary Fund agreed soon after the election to provide Brazil with U.S.$42 billion to give Cardoso extra political and economic breathing room to maneuver for reform. Superficially, Cardoso appeared to possess significant political capital at the start of his second term. However, Cardoso experienced no second honeymoon. To the contrary, his second term began as a nightmare. Within weeks of his inauguration, the real collapsed, losing half its value and raising fears of a return to Brazil's infamous days of hyperinflation; the country's foreign currency reserves were drained; two central bank presidents resigned in succession; the Brazilian stock markets went into a free-fall; and former president Itamar Franco, elected governor of the important state of Minas Gerais, effectively defaulted on the debts his state owed to domestic and international creditors. This last straw forced the central government to cover the debts in order to stave off the perception of a generalized government default. The New York Times soon concluded that despite Cardoso's victory "Brazil is struggling against its worst financial crisis in years."' Moreover, as the largest economy in Latin America and the eighth largest in the world, Brazil's troubles reverberated throughout the region. Leery investors feared that Brazil's problems could unleash "new global turmoil" or even precipitate a "global financial meltdown."2 Brazil's economic crisis generated a political crisis, and after his inauguration Cardoso's political prestige quickly slipped with both voters and congress.3 Why was Cardoso's second honeymoon cut short so abruptly? While many fac-

121 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors develop three themes about comparative federalism: the democratization, federalism, and nationalism literatures have been developed in relatively mutual isolation and that we can only make more meaningful and powerful statements if we relate the three literatures to each other, and demonstrate that all federal systems constrain the lawmaking capacity of democratically elected legislators at the center.
Abstract: This paper will develop three themes. First, I show that the democratization, federalism, and nationalism literatures have been developed in relatively mutual isolation and that we can only make more meaningful and powerful statements about comparative federalism if we relate the three literatures to each other. Second, I demonstrate that all federal systems constrain the lawmaking capacity of the democratically elected legislators at the center. However, I argue that it is analytically and politically fruitful to study democratic federal systems as existing along a demos-constraining to demos-enabling continuum. I also make a strong case that at all points in the continuum, federal institutions can have a great impact on policy. I can not develop these arguments without directly addressing and confronting the most influential political scientist who has written on federalism, the late William H. Riker. Riker’s classic and still influential arguments about federalism stand in fundamental opposition to those I advance in this paper. Once these conceptual and methodological debates about federalism have been addressed, in the third part of the paper, I construct and operationalize the analytic framework of the demos-constraining continuum, by evaluating four propositions about federalism, using data from India, Germany, Spain, the United States, and Brazil.

107 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that the rules and regulations governing the budget process affect the distribution of funds both between branches of government and within the legislative branch itself, and that the strategy adopted by the majority supporting the Executive takes into account their contribution to the success of policies sponsored by the administration of which they are part.
Abstract: This article challenges the interpretations concerning participation by Brazilian legislators in the budget process focused on incentives generated by the electoral legislation We show that the rules and regulations governing the budget process affect the distribution of funds both between branches of government and within the legislative branch itself Constitutional and legal rules preserve the original proposal submitted by the Executive Within Congress, the bylaws favor collective participation of members, for example, by way of submission of amendments by State representations We further show that participation by the legislative branch in the budget process can only be understood when the political parties are taken into account Coordination of efforts by the political parties thus ends up grouping them in two major blocs, pro-administration and opposition In other words, partisan participation in the budget process depends on the parties’ relations with the Executive Thus, the strategy adopted by the majority supporting the Executive takes into account their contribution to the success of policies sponsored by the administration of which they are a part

90 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors identify the main difficulties facing federalism, and assess their consequences on the prospects of federalism should tensions continue unabated in Brazil's federalism system.
Abstract: Although there have been deep changes in the federation as a consequence of redemocratization and decentralization, Brazil continues to exhibit profound imbalances among regions. These imbalances create contradictions and tensions in Brazilian federalism. The central problem addressed in this article is to identify the main difficulties facing federalism, and to assess their consequences on the prospects of federalism should tensions continue unabated. Brazilian federalism has always been a means of accommodating deep-rooted regional disparities. Although there are political and fiscal mechanisms to offset some of the problems of regional disparities, such mechanisms have been insufficient to counteract a long history of uneven regional development. Because of the country's inequalities, the capabilities of subnational governments to respond to Brazil's current demands and agendas are highly uneven. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

48 citations