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Book ChapterDOI

Federalist No. 37

TL;DR: The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side, not only that all power should be derived from the people, but that those entrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the people by a short duration of their appointments; and even during this short period the trust should be placed not in a few, but a number of hands as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: ...Among the difficulties encountered by the convention, a very important one must have lain in combining the requisite stability and energy in government, with the inviolable attention due to liberty and to the republican form. Without substantially accomplishing this part of their undertaking, they would have very imperfectly fulfilled the object of their appointment, or the expectation of the public; yet that it could not be easily accomplished, will be denied by no one who is unwilling to betray his ignorance of the subject. Energy in government is essential to that security against external and internal danger, and to that prompt and salutary execution of the laws which enter into the very definition of good government. Stability in government is essential to national character and to the advantages annexed to it, as well as to that repose and confidence in the minds of the people, which are among the chief blessings of civil society. An irregular and mutable legislation is not more an evil in itself than it is odious to the people; and it may be pronounced with assurance that the people of this country, enlightened as they are with regard to the nature, and interested, as the great body of them are, in the effects of good government, will never be satisfied till some remedy be applied to the vicissitudes and uncertainties which characterize the State administrations. On comparing, however, these valuable ingredients with the vital principles of liberty, we must perceive at once the difficulty of mingling them together in their due proportions. The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side, not only that all power should be derived from the people, but that those entrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the people, by a short duration of their appointments; and that even during this short period the trust should be placed not in a few, but a number of hands.
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the contribution of German subnational constitutional courts to the judicialization of politics in the German states, known as Lander, and found links between causes and effects of judicial decision-making.
Abstract: This paper examines the contribution of German subnational constitutional courts to the judicialization of politics in the German states, known as Lander. This research goal entails three dimensions. First, I have to define and measure judicialization. To accomplish this task, I use an index recently developed by an international group of scholars of comparative politics. Second, based on major theoretical approaches, I identify possible causes that might give reasons for judicialization, namely institutional preconditions and preferences of justices. In a third step, I use a linear regression in order to test the theory empirically and find links between causes and effects of judicial decision-making in subnational constitutional courts. The findings confirm institutionalist approaches that contribute to explaining decision-making in German subnational constitutional courts.

6 citations

References
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the contribution of German subnational constitutional courts to the judicialization of politics in the German states, known as Lander, and found links between causes and effects of judicial decision-making.
Abstract: This paper examines the contribution of German subnational constitutional courts to the judicialization of politics in the German states, known as Lander. This research goal entails three dimensions. First, I have to define and measure judicialization. To accomplish this task, I use an index recently developed by an international group of scholars of comparative politics. Second, based on major theoretical approaches, I identify possible causes that might give reasons for judicialization, namely institutional preconditions and preferences of justices. In a third step, I use a linear regression in order to test the theory empirically and find links between causes and effects of judicial decision-making in subnational constitutional courts. The findings confirm institutionalist approaches that contribute to explaining decision-making in German subnational constitutional courts.

6 citations