Book•
Foundations of cognitive grammar
01 Jan 1983-
About: The article was published on 1983-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 3780 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Emergent grammar & Generative grammar.
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TL;DR: A perceptual theory of knowledge can implement a fully functional conceptual system while avoiding problems associated with amodal symbol systems and implications for cognition, neuroscience, evolution, development, and artificial intelligence are explored.
Abstract: Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statis- tics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement record- ing systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the brain capture bottom-up patterns of activation in sensory-motor areas. Later, in a top-down manner, association areas partially reactivate sensory-motor areas to implement perceptual symbols. The stor- age and reactivation of perceptual symbols operates at the level of perceptual components - not at the level of holistic perceptual expe- riences. Through the use of selective attention, schematic representations of perceptual components are extracted from experience and stored in memory (e.g., individual memories of green, purr, hot). As memories of the same component become organized around a com- mon frame, they implement a simulator that produces limitless simulations of the component (e.g., simulations of purr). Not only do such simulators develop for aspects of sensory experience, they also develop for aspects of proprioception (e.g., lift, run) and introspec- tion (e.g., compare, memory, happy, hungry). Once established, these simulators implement a basic conceptual system that represents types, supports categorization, and produces categorical inferences. These simulators further support productivity, propositions, and ab- stract concepts, thereby implementing a fully functional conceptual system. Productivity results from integrating simulators combinato- rially and recursively to produce complex simulations. Propositions result from binding simulators to perceived individuals to represent type-token relations. Abstract concepts are grounded in complex simulations of combined physical and introspective events. Thus, a per- ceptual theory of knowledge can implement a fully functional conceptual system while avoiding problems associated with amodal sym- bol systems. Implications for cognition, neuroscience, evolution, development, and artificial intelligence are explored.
5,259 citations
TL;DR: The sixth claim has received the least attention in the literature on embodied cognition, but it may in fact be the best documented and most powerful of the six claims.
Abstract: The emerging viewpoint of embodied cognition holds that cognitive processes are deeply rooted in the body’s interactions with the world. This position actually houses a number of distinct claims, some of which are more controversial than others. This paper distinguishes and evaluates the following six claims: (1) cognition is situated; (2) cognition is time-pressured; (3) we off-load cognitive work onto the environment; (4) the environment is part of the cognitive system; (5) cognition is for action; (6) offline cognition is body based. Of these, the first three and the fifth appear to be at least partially true, and their usefulness is best evaluated in terms of the range of their applicability. The fourth claim, I argue, is deeply problematic. The sixth claim has received the least attention in the literature on embodied cognition, but it may in fact be the best documented and most powerful of the six claims.
3,387 citations
Book•
01 Jan 2002
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the relationship between metaphor and metaphor in the study of language and its application in the literature, and present a general index of metaphorical and metonymy.
Abstract: 1. What Is Metaphor? 2. Common Source and Target Domains 3. Kinds of Metaphor 4. Metaphor in Literature 5. Nonlinguistic Realizations of Conceptual Metaphors 6. The Basis of Metaphor 7. The Partial Nature of Metaphorical Mappings 8. Cognitive Models, Metaphors, and Embodiment 9. Metaphorical Entailments 10. The Scope of Metaphor 11. Metaphor Systems 12. Another Figure: Metonymy 13. The Universality of Conceptual Metaphors 14. Cultural Variation in Metaphor and Metonymy 15. Metaphor, Metonymy, and Idioms 16. Metaphor and Metonymy in the Study of Language 17. Metaphors and Blends 18. Metaphor in Discourse 19. How Does All This 20. Hang Together? GLOSSARY SOLUTIONS TO EXERCISES REFERENCES GENERAL INDEX METAPHOR AND METONYMY INDEX
2,151 citations
TL;DR: It is proposed that the sensory-motor system has the right kind of structure to characterise both sensory- motor and more abstract concepts, and it is argued against this position using neuroscientific evidence, results from neural computation, and results about the nature of concepts from cognitive linguistics.
Abstract: Concepts are the elementary units of reason and linguistic meaning. They are conventional and relatively stable. As such, they must somehow be the result of neural activity in the brain. The questions are: Where? and How? A common philosophical position is that all concepts-even concepts about action and perception-are symbolic and abstract, and therefore must be implemented outside the brain's sensory-motor system. We will argue against this position using (1) neuroscientific evidence; (2) results from neural computation; and (3) results about the nature of concepts from cognitive linguistics. We will propose that the sensory-motor system has the right kind of structure to characterise both sensory-motor and more abstract concepts. Central to this picture are the neural theory of language and the theory of cogs, according to which, brain structures in the sensory-motor regions are exploited to characterise the so-called "abstract" concepts that constitute the meanings of grammatical constructions and general inference patterns.
2,082 citations
Additional excerpts
...This could include all the primitive image-schemas, such as containment, source-path-goal, force dynamics, orientation schemas, etc. (see Casad & Langacker, 1985; Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Langacker, 1986, 1990, 1991; Lindner, 1981; Talmy, 1983, 1988, 1996, 1999)....
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TL;DR: In this article, a set of hypotheses is formulated for a connectionist approach to cognitive modeling, and these hypotheses are shown to be incompatible with the hypotheses underlying traditional cognitive models, which are considered are massively parallel numerical computational systems that are a kind of continuous dynamical system.
Abstract: A set of hypotheses is formulated for a connectionist approach to cognitive modeling. These hypotheses are shown to be incompatible with the hypotheses underlying traditional cognitive models. The connectionist models considered are massively parallel numerical computational systems that are a kind of continuous dynamical system. The numerical variables in the system correspond semantically to fine-grained features below the level of the concepts consciously used to describe the task domain. The level of analysis is intermediate between those of symbolic cognitive models and neural models. The explanations of behavior provided are like those traditional in the physical sciences, unlike the explanations provided by symbolic models.
1,897 citations