Framing, Motivated Reasoning, and Opinions About Emergent Technologies
TL;DR: The authors found that factual information is of limited utility, it does not have a greater impact than other background factors, it adds little power to newly provided arguments/frames (e.g., compared to arguments lacking facts), and it is perceived in biased ways once individuals form clear initial opinions.
Abstract: How do individuals form opinions about new technologies? What role does factual information play? We address these questions by incorporating 2 dynamics, typically ignored in extant work: information competition and over-time processes. We present results from experiments on 2 technologies: carbon-nanotubes and genetically modified foods. We find that factual information is of limited utility—it does not have a greater impact than other background factors (e.g., values), it adds little power to newly provided arguments/frames (e.g., compared to arguments lacking facts), and it is perceived in biased ways once individuals form clear initial opinions (e.g., motivated reasoning). Our results provide insight into how individuals form opinions over time, and bring together literatures on information, framing, and motivated reasoning.
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TL;DR: Exposing 240 adults to simulated news stories about possible climate change health impacts on different groups, it was found the influence of identification with potential victims was contingent on participants’ political partisanship and resulted in a boomerang effect among Republican participants.
Abstract: The deficit-model of science communication assumes increased communication about science issues will move public opinion toward the scientific consensus. However, in the case of climate change, public polarization about the issue has increased in recent years, not diminished. In this study, we draw from theories of motivated reasoning, social identity, and persuasion to examine how science-based messages may increase public polarization on controversial science issues such as climate change. Exposing 240 adults to simulated news stories about possible climate change health impacts on different groups, we found the influence of identification with potential victims was contingent on participants’ political partisanship. This partisanship increased the degree of political polarization on support for climate mitigation policies and resulted in a boomerang effect among Republican participants. Implications for understanding the role of motivated reasoning within the context of science communication are discussed.
758 citations
TL;DR: This article found that polarization intensifies the impact of party endorsements on opinions, decreases impact of substantive information and stimulates greater confidence in those less substantively grounded opinions, and that polarized environments fundamentally change how citizens make decisions.
Abstract: Competition is a defining element of democracy. One of the most noteworthy events over the last quarter-century in U.S. politics is the change in the nature of elite party competition: The parties have become increasingly polarized. Scholars and pundits actively debate how these elite patterns influence polarization among the public (e.g., have citizens also become more ideologically polarized?). Yet, few have addressed what we see as perhaps more fundamental questions: Has elite polarization altered the way citizens arrive at their policy opinions in the first place and, if so, in what ways? We address these questions with a theory and two survey experiments (on the issues of drilling and immigration). We find stark evidence that polarized environments fundamentally change how citizens make decisions. Specifically, polarization intensifies the impact of party endorsements on opinions, decreases the impact of substantive information and, perhaps ironically, stimulates greater confidence in those—less substantively grounded—opinions. We discuss the implications for public opinion formation and the nature of democratic competition.
721 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: The authors found that subjects who scored highest in cognitive reflection were the most likely to display ideologically motivated cognition, which is a form of information processing that promotes individuals' interests in forming and maintaining beliefs that signify their loyalty to important affinity groups.
Abstract: Decision scientists have identified various plausible sources of ideological polarization over climate change, gun violence, national security, and like issues that turn on empirical evidence. This paper describes a study of three of them: the predominance of heuristic-driven information processing by members of the public; ideologically motivated reasoning; and the cognitive-style correlates of political conservativism. The study generated both observational and experimental data inconsistent with the hypothesis that political conservatism is distinctively associated with either unreflective thinking or motivated reasoning. Conservatives did no better or worse than liberals on the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005), an objective measure of information-processing dispositions associated with cognitive biases. In addition, the study found that ideologically motivated reasoning is not a consequence of over-reliance on heuristic or intuitive forms of reasoning generally. On the contrary, subjects who scored highest in cognitive reflection were the most likely to display ideologically motivated cognition. These findings corroborated an alternative hypothesis, which identifies ideologically motivated cognition as a form of information processing that promotes individuals' interests in forming and maintaining beliefs that signify their loyalty to important affinity groups. The paper discusses the practical significance of these findings, including the need to develop science communication strategies that shield policy-relevant facts from the influences that turn them into divisive symbols of political identity.
697 citations
TL;DR: The authors examined if the emergence of more partisan media has contributed to political polarization and led Americans to support more partisan policies and candidates, and found no evidence for a causal link between more partisan messages and changing attitudes or behaviors.
Abstract: This article examines if the emergence of more partisan media has contributed to political polarization and led Americans to support more partisan policies and candidates. Congress and some newer media outlets have added more partisan messages to a continuing supply of mostly centrist news. Although political attitudes of most Americans have remained fairly moderate, evidence points to some polarization among the politically involved. Proliferation of media choices lowered the share of less interested, less partisan voters and thereby made elections more partisan. But evidence for a causal link between more partisan messages and changing attitudes or behaviors is mixed at best. Measurement problems hold back research on partisan selective exposure and its consequences. Ideologically one-sided news exposure may be largely confined to a small, but highly involved and influential, segment of the population. There is no firm evidence that partisan media are making ordinary Americans more partisan.
695 citations
TL;DR: This article explored partisan motivated reasoning in a survey experiment focusing on support for an energy law and identified two politically relevant factors that condition partisan motivation: (1) an explicit inducement to form an “accurate” opinion, and (2) cross-partisan, but not consensus, bipartisan support for the law.
Abstract: Political parties play a vital role in democracies by linking citizens to their representatives. Nonetheless, a longstanding concern is that partisan identification slants decision-making. Citizens may support (oppose) policies that they would otherwise oppose (support) in the absence of an endorsement from a political party—this is due in large part to what is called partisan motivated reasoning where individuals interpret information through the lens of their party commitment. We explore partisan motivated reasoning in a survey experiment focusing on support for an energy law. We identify two politically relevant factors that condition partisan motivated reasoning: (1) an explicit inducement to form an “accurate” opinion, and (2) cross-partisan, but not consensus, bipartisan support for the law. We further provide evidence of how partisan motivated reasoning works psychologically and affects opinion strength. We conclude by discussing the implications of our results for understanding opinion formation and the overall quality of citizens’ opinions.
559 citations
References
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Book•
01 Jan 1962
TL;DR: A history of diffusion research can be found in this paper, where the authors present a glossary of developments in the field of Diffusion research and discuss the consequences of these developments.
Abstract: Contents Preface CHAPTER 1. ELEMENTS OF DIFFUSION CHAPTER 2. A HISTORY OF DIFFUSION RESEARCH CHAPTER 3. CONTRIBUTIONS AND CRITICISMS OF DIFFUSION RESEARCH CHAPTER 4. THE GENERATION OF INNOVATIONS CHAPTER 5. THE INNOVATION-DECISION PROCESS CHAPTER 6. ATTRIBUTES OF INNOVATIONS AND THEIR RATE OF ADOPTION CHAPTER 7. INNOVATIVENESS AND ADOPTER CATEGORIES CHAPTER 8. DIFFUSION NETWORKS CHAPTER 9. THE CHANGE AGENT CHAPTER 10. INNOVATION IN ORGANIZATIONS CHAPTER 11. CONSEQUENCES OF INNOVATIONS Glossary Bibliography Name Index Subject Index
38,750 citations
TL;DR: The only truly comprehensive advanced level textbook designed for courses in the pscyhology of attitudes and related studies in attitude measurement, social cognition is as mentioned in this paper, which contains a comprehensive coverage of classic and modern research and theory.
Abstract: This is the only truly comprehensive advanced level textbook in the past 20 years designed for courses in the pscyhology of attitudes and related studies in attitude measurement, social cognition. Written by two of the most distinguished scholars in the field, its comprehensive coverage of classic and modern research and theory is unsurpassed.
7,753 citations
TL;DR: A differential diagnosis for why physicians do not follow practice guidelines is offered, as well as a rational approach toward improving guideline adherence and a framework for future research are offered.
Abstract: ContextDespite wide promulgation, clinical practice guidelines have had limited
effect on changing physician behavior. Little is known about the process and
factors involved in changing physician practices in response to guidelines.ObjectiveTo review barriers to physician adherence to clinical practice guidelines.Data SourcesWe searched the MEDLINE, Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC),
and HealthSTAR databases (January 1966 to January 1998); bibliographies; textbooks
on health behavior or public health; and references supplied by experts to
find English-language article titles that describe barriers to guideline adherence.Study SelectionOf 5658 articles initially identified, we selected 76 published studies
describing at least 1 barrier to adherence to clinical practice guidelines,
practice parameters, clinical policies, or national consensus statements.
One investigator screened titles to identify candidate articles, then 2 investigators
independently reviewed the texts to exclude articles that did not match the
criteria. Differences were resolved by consensus with a third investigator.Data ExtractionTwo investigators organized barriers to adherence into a framework according
to their effect on physician knowledge, attitudes, or behavior. This organization
was validated by 3 additional investigators.Data SynthesisThe 76 articles included 120 different surveys investigating 293 potential
barriers to physician guideline adherence, including awareness (n = 46), familiarity
(n = 31), agreement (n = 33), self-efficacy (n = 19), outcome expectancy (n
= 8), ability to overcome the inertia of previous practice (n = 14), and absence
of external barriers to perform recommendations (n = 34). The majority of
surveys (70 [58%] of 120) examined only 1 type of barrier.ConclusionsStudies on improving physician guideline adherence may not be generalizable,
since barriers in one setting may not be present in another. Our review offers
a differential diagnosis for why physicians do not follow practice guidelines,
as well as a rational approach toward improving guideline adherence and a
framework for future research.
6,378 citations
TL;DR: The authors found that bad is stronger than good, as a general principle across a broad range of psychological phenomena, such as bad emotions, bad parents, bad feedback, and bad information is processed more thoroughly than good.
Abstract: The greater power of bad events over good ones is found in everyday events, major life events (e.g., trauma), close relationship outcomes, social network patterns, interpersonal interactions, and learning processes. Bad emotions, bad parents, and bad feedback have more impact than good ones, and bad information is processed more thoroughly than good. The self is more motivated to avoid bad self-definitions than to pursue good ones. Bad impressions and bad stereotypes are quicker to form and more resistant to disconfirmation than good ones. Various explanations such as diagnosticity and salience help explain some findings, but the greater power of bad events is still found when such variables are controlled. Hardly any exceptions (indicating greater power of good) can be found. Taken together, these findings suggest that bad is stronger than good, as a general principle across a broad range of psychological phenomena.
5,340 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, subjects supporting and opposing capital punishment were exposed to two purported studies, one seemingly confirming and one seemingly disconfirming their existing beliefs about the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty.
Abstract: People who hold strong opinions on complex social issues are likely to examine relevant empirical evidence in a biased manner. They are apt to accept "confirming" evidence at face value while subjecting "discontinuing" evidence to critical evaluation, and as a result to draw undue support for their initial positions from mixed or random empirical findings. Thus, the result of exposing contending factions in a social dispute to an identical body of relevant empirical evidence may be not a narrowing of disagreement but rather an increase in polarization. To test these assumptions and predictions, subjects supporting and opposing capital punishment were exposed to two purported studies, one seemingly confirming and one seemingly disconfirming their existing beliefs about the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty. As predicted, both proponents and opponents of capital punishment rated those results and procedures that confirmed their own beliefs to be the more convincing and probative ones, and they reported corresponding shifts in their beliefs as the various results and procedures were presented. The net effect of such evaluations and opinion shifts was the postulated increase in attitude polarization. The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion draws all things else to support and agree with it. And though there be a greater number and weight of instances to be found on the other side, yet these it either neglects and despises, or else by some distinction sets aside and rejects, in order that by this great and pernicious predetermination the authority of its former conclusion may remain inviolate. (Bacon, 1620/1960)
3,808 citations