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Book ChapterDOI

From Retrenchment to Revanchism … and Back Again? Russian Grand Strategy in the Eurasian ‘Heartland’

01 Jan 2015-pp 19-41
TL;DR: For instance, this article pointed out the continued importance of power politics in states' strategic calculations, arguing that states' actual motivations appear to have changed little since the end of Cold War bipolarity and the supposed triumph of liberal pluralist ideas that accompanied it.
Abstract: Anyone studying ‘conventional’ power politics today tends to be treated with suspicion by those who view the unreconstructed realist as an academic Neanderthal in a globalized world. And yet both the gradual and more rapid return to prominence of various actors in international politics highlight the ongoing significance of traditional factors linked to material considerations, especially territoriality. The same type of sanctimonious cant — that the 21st century is somehow ‘different’ — was evident in Nick Clegg’s reference to Vladimir Putin as possessing ‘a KGB mentality rooted in the Cold War’ (Watt et al., 2014). But the trend is broader than Russia’s latest adventures in Ukraine. The rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the subsequent US ‘rebalance’ to counter it, persistent tensions over the Korean Peninsula, and contestation over energy resources in Central Asia are all symptomatic of the continued importance of power politics in states’ strategic calculations. While the language of both practitioners and scholars now revolves much more around norms, laws and ethics, states’ actual motivations — and the outcomes they seek to engender — appear to have changed little since the end of Cold War bipolarity and the supposed triumph of liberal pluralist ideas that accompanied it.
Citations
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DissertationDOI
01 Jan 2018
Abstract: Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, its leaders have been preoccupied with efforts to increase state capacity in order to exercise more effective control over their western frontier by controlling their minority population and generating the conditions for economic development in the area. Although these state-building initiatives have always incorporated an international component, the collapse of the USSR, the transnational characteristics of development, and China’s concern around the challenges of terrorism, separatism, and extremism have necessitated an accompanying region-building project in Eurasia. Using a synthesis of the region-building approach and the concept of regionalization, this study traces how Chinese domestic elite-led narratives about security and development generate domestic state-building initiatives which in turn produce region-building projects. Furthermore, this study assesses how region-building projects are promoted through narratives embedded in foreign policies that establish the historicity of China’s engagement in Eurasian affairs and norms of non-interference and CHINA’s EURASIAN FOREIGN POLICY: REGION-BUILDING THROUGH STATE-BUILDING SINCE 1991 by Zenel Garcia Professor Thomas A. Breslin, Major Professor Miami, Florida Florida International University, 2018

16 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Cooley as discussed by the authors explores the dynamics of the new competition over the region since 9/11, pitting America against a newly aggressive Russia and a resource-hungry China, all struggling for influence over one of the volatile areas in the world: the long border region stretching from Iran through Pakistan to Kashmir.
Abstract: The struggle between Russia and Great Britain over Central Asia in the nineteenth century was the original \"great game.\" But in the past quarter century, a new \"great game\" has emerged, pitting America against a newly aggressive Russia and a resource-hungry China, all struggling for influence over one of the volatile areas in the world: the long border region stretching from Iran through Pakistan to Kashmir. In Great Games, Local Rules, Alexander Cooley, one of America's most respected Central Asia experts, explores the dynamics of the new competition over the region since 9/11. All three great powers are pursuing important goals: basing rights for the US, access to natural resources for the Chinese, and increased political influence for the Russians. But Central Asian governments have proven themselves powerful forces in their own right, establishing local rules that serve to fend off foreign involvement, enrich themselves and reinforce their sovereign authority. Cooley's careful and surprising explanation of how small states interact with great powers in this vital region greatly advances our understanding of how world politics actually works in this contemporary era. Available in OSO: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/politicalscience/9780199929825/toc.html

11 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
28 Feb 2021
TL;DR: This article summarized the evolution of historical Russia as the amalgam of multiple ethnic and cultural communities into a growing imperial domain and traced current efforts by the Russian government to reintegrate the disparate parts of the former USSR, including especially regions of other post-Soviet states with a significant ethnic Russian population.
Abstract: The purpose of the present examination is 1) to summarize briefly the evolution of historical Russia as the amalgam of multiple ethnic and cultural communities into a growing imperial domain; 2) to outline more specifically the policies pursued by the tsarist and communist regimes to integrate minority communities into the Russian majority; 3) to examine the impact on Russia of the collapse of the former USSR; and 4) to trace current efforts by the Russian government to reintegrate the disparate parts of the former USSR, including especially regions of other post-Soviet states with a significant ethnic Russian population, into a new “Greater Russia.” Although it will touch on Soviet integration policies that targeted national minorities who, by 1989, represented half of the population, the focus will be on recent and current policies intended to “Greater Russia.”

10 citations


Cites background from "From Retrenchment to Revanchism … a..."

  • ...This is precisely the set of developments that Vladimir Putin set out to correct in a policy termed revanchist by Matthew Sussex (2015) because it aims at undoing major geopolitical developments of the past quarter century....

    [...]

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that regional regimes in Central Asia can be classified into three types of regimes: central, regional, and semi-regional regimes, and that regional regim...
Abstract: Since the 2000s, Russia intensified its relations with the Central Asia. This is particularly visible in the increased institutionalization of the cooperation. This paper argues that regional regim...

9 citations

15 Jun 2020
TL;DR: In this paper, a series of academic journals such as Cambridge Journals, ProQuest Central, Sage Journals and others were used to identify the relevant literature and evaluate the existing analyses of the grand strategy of the Russian Federation between 2000 and 2019.
Abstract: When talking about International Relations, for the last decades, the popularity of the concept of grand strategy has continuously increased. This led to the present situation when we have a disputed term with multiple distinct definitions. In this context, the central objective of this paper is to select and evaluate the existing analyses of the grand strategy of the Kremlin between 2000 and 2019. Another important goal is to clarify the main elements of this concept. To identify the relevant literature, we used a series of academic journals such as Cambridge Journals, ProQuest Central, Sage Journals and others. The present analysis shows that one category of authors argue that the grand strategy of the Russian Federation has become more assertive. According to their opinion, the Moscow administration is willing to use all means available in order to achieve the main objectives: the status of great power; the return to the spheres of influence; and the return to a multipolar international system. A second category explores sub-elements of grand strategy such as the importance of Ukraine, or the impact of the war in Georgia. Finally, one researcher argues that Russia does not have a grand strategy at all. In conclusion, this paper shows that many elements remain to be explored in relation to a topic of such complexity as the grand strategy of the Russian Federation.

1 citations


Cites background from "From Retrenchment to Revanchism … a..."

  • ...He identifies four conditions for this situation: a relatively short ‘rebound’ time; a strategic emphasis on territory; re-establishment of local primacy through institutions and alliance structures; and the extent of domestic elite consensus over national interests (Sussex, 2015, pp. 21-22)....

    [...]

  • ...Confrontation and Consolidation”, aimed to analyze the themes of the main actors, the fundamental processes and the developing architecture (Kanet and Sussex, 2015, p. 7) in relation to Eurasia (the focus being on Central Asia)....

    [...]

  • ...Rather than attaining total dominance, it has instead engineered a sort of constrained primacy” (Sussex, 2015, p. 37)....

    [...]

  • ...…power has indeed experienced a power reversal of a kind that facilitates revanchist behavior, and this security affairs on its semi-periphery” (Sussex, 2015, p. 37), also emphasizing that “(...) although Russia has certainly attempted to establish a firm sphere of influence in Eurasia, it…...

    [...]

References
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DOI
12 Nov 2015

6,961 citations

Book
01 Jan 2001
TL;DR: In this paper, Mearsheimer explains why the answer is no: a rising China will seek to dominate Asia, while the United States, determined to remain the world's sole regional hegemon, will go to great lengths to prevent that from happening.
Abstract: The updated edition of this classic treatise on the behavior of great powers takes a penetrating look at the question likely to dominate international relations in the twenty-first century: Can China rise peacefully? In clear, eloquent prose, John Mearsheimer explains why the answer is no: a rising China will seek to dominate Asia, while the United States, determined to remain the world's sole regional hegemon, will go to great lengths to prevent that from happening. The tragedy of great power politics is inescapable.

2,694 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, Mearsheimer illuminates his theory of offensive realism through a sweeping survey of modern great power struggles and reflects on the bleak prospects for peace in Europe and northeast Asia, arguing that the United States's security competition with a rising China will intensify regardless of engagement policies.
Abstract: The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, sadly shattered these idyllic illusions, and John Mearsheimer's masterful new book explains why these harmonious visions remain utopian. To Mearsheimer, great power politics are tragic because the anarchy of the international system requires states to seek dominance at one another's expense, dooming even peaceful nations to a relentless power struggle. Mearsheimer illuminates his theory of offensive realism through a sweeping survey of modern great power struggles and reflects on the bleak prospects for peace in Europe and northeast Asia, arguing that the United States's security competition with a rising China will intensify regardless of \"engagement\" policies.

2,080 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argue that if states resist the gains of their neighbors by drawing together to redress the balance, then conquest does not pay and interventions to defend far-flung commitments are not only unnecessary, but often counterproductive in causing local states to unite against the meddling great power and its protege.
Abstract: often with the weaker or with the stronger side in Do states ally more a conflict? In the parlance of international relations theory: do states tend to balance against or bandwagon with a rising state or coalition? The answer to this question is critical to the formulation of grand strategy and the definition of vital interests. If states resist the gains of their neighbors by drawing together to redress the balance, then conquest does not pay’ and interventions to defend far-flung commitments are not only unnecessary, but often counterproductive in causing local states to unite against the meddling great power and its protege. Conversely, if states gravitate to expanding power, then bandwagons will roll, dominoes will fall, and great powers will find it wise, even at the cost of blood and treasure, to defend remote areas of little or no intrinsic value to their national interests.2 While international relations scholars have traditionally accepted the view that states balance against threatening increases of power, paradoxically, practitioners through the ages have held a bandwagoning image of international politics. As Jack Snyder remarks, “most imperial strategists defending far-flung commitments have feared falling dominoes, and most rising chal-

950 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The George W. Bush administration's national security strategy, which asserts that the United States has the right to attack and conquer sovereign countries that pose no observable threat, and to do so without international support, is one of the most aggressively unilateral U.S. postures ever taken.
Abstract: The George W. Bush administration's national security strategy, which asserts that the United States has the right to attack and conquer sovereign countries that pose no observable threat, and to do so without international support, is one of the most aggressively unilateral U.S. postures ever taken. Recent international relations scholarship has wrongly promoted the view that the United States, as the leader of a unipolar system, can pursue such a policy without fear of serious opposition. The most consequential effect of the Bush strategy will be a fundamental transformation in how major states perceive the United States and how they react to future uses of U.S. power. Major powers are already engaging in the early stages of balancing behavior against the United States, by adopting “soft-balancing” measures that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but use international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements to delay, frustrate, and undermine U.S. policies. If th...

676 citations