Game Theoretical Approach to Novel Reactive Power Ancillary Service Market Mechanism
01 Mar 2021-IEEE Transactions on Power Systems (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE))-Vol. 36, Iss: 2, pp 1298-1308
TL;DR: In this paper, a market mechanism for real-time reactive power ancillary service market based on Stackelberg game model is proposed considering voltage-apparent power coupled subsystems.
Abstract: In deregulated power systems, reactive power ancillary service through electricity market is becoming relevant where private generation companies participate in maintaining system wide bus voltage within the permissible limits. Marginal cost price (MCP) based real time reactive power ancillary service market faces several challenges due to the localized nature of reactive power. In this paper, a market mechanism for real time reactive power ancillary service market based on Stackelberg game model is proposed considering voltage-apparent power coupled subsystems. In the proposed Stackelberg game model, Independent System Operator (ISO) is considered as the leader, and GENCOs as followers. In the formulation, each GENCO is associated with a relevance factor in the partitioned subsystem so as to consider the real time voltage support requirement in the system. The market is then formulated as Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints problem (MPEC). Existence of equilibrium, incentive compatibility, and individual rationality of the proposed market mechanism is then analysed in this work. The numerical examples are illustrated in PJM 5-bus system, and tested on IEEE 30- bus system, and Nordic 32 Bus-system. The mechanism induces truth-telling behavior of GENCOs, yields a non-negative profit, and the system wide bus voltage is improved.
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TL;DR: In this article , the authors provide a comprehensive overview of the characteristics and hardships of reactive power markets, focusing on market power, game theoretical approaches, Reinforcement Learning, and manipulation.
Abstract: Liberalization of the energy system sets the way towards market-based solutions for ancillary service provision. Local reactive power markets are envisioned to achieve more economically and technically efficient reactive power provision to solve voltage control problems in future distribution and transmission grids. However, market-based reactive power procurement is a difficult and yet unsolved problem. This survey provides a comprehensive overview of the characteristics and hardships of reactive power markets. That is followed by a literature overview of reactive power market design, including local markets and markets on system operator level. Further, methods how to analyse reactive power markets are discussed, focusing on market power, game theoretical approaches, Reinforcement Learning, and manipulation of reactive power markets. From this overview, trends and current research gaps are derived and some general research recommendations are given to serve as a guideline for future research in the field of reactive power markets.
20 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a thorough review of the electricity markets worldwide with solar energy is provided, and a variety of proposed mathematical solutions to the problem are also discussed, with the focus on the uncertainty-based market operations.
Abstract: With the accelerating penetration of solar energy in energy systems, market operations concerning the solar-associated intermittency are widely discussed. How to correctly model the solar generation in the market and solve the uncertainty-based operation problems call for solutions. Unlike other renewable resources, solar power can be more easily applied to the demand side through behind-the-meter installations in a distributed manner with significant future extensibility. The corresponding operational rules in the markets are largely being revised. Over the past two decades, with the development of deregulated power markets, numerous studies related to uncertainty-based market operations tend to transform the market from a deterministic and centralized framework to a stochastic and decentralized one. As the relevant literature is most recent, this paper reviews their contributions to electricity market operations with solar integration and underlines the research directions of this topic and ongoing industry practices. A thorough review of the electricity markets worldwide with solar energy is provided. A variety of proposed mathematical solutions to the problem are also discussed.
18 citations
TL;DR: In this paper , the impacts and challenges of electricity market on hydro-dominated power system operations are analyzed, and two kinds of suggestions are presented to overcome these difficulties for different market objects: hydropower enterprises are suggested to improve generation prediction level, reconstruct market-based operation rules, implement multiscale nested operations and bidding, strengthen collaborative bidding of different stakeholders, and analyze market demands and competitors.
16 citations
TL;DR: The proposed methodology has been tested on modified IEEE 30-bus and IEEE 118-bus test systems and the performance of both test systems is analyzed for two studies namely, VAr dispatch without wind integration, and V Ar dispatch under wind integration.
9 citations
TL;DR: A novel, low-cost, efficient, and user-friendly smart PQ meter that implements a novel PQ-based tariff scheme that penalizes consumers violating the PQ limits and provides incentives for a good PQ profile is presented.
Abstract: Regarding the modern power smart grid, distribution consumers and prosumers are highly concerned about power quality (PQ). In fact, they would prefer to pay higher prices for a reliable and good quality power supply. Unfortunately, utility operators still aim for reliability alone, ignoring the quality of supply voltage and current. There are no clear guidelines for monitoring, penalizing, or implementing PQ-based tariff schemes in LV distribution systems. In addition, the implementation of a PQ-based tariff requires a real-time measuring mechanism at the user end, which is very expensive and difficult to understand for a domestic consumer. This paper presents a novel, low-cost, efficient, and user-friendly smart PQ meter to overcome these issues and limitations. It is essentially a PQ analyzer with energy metering functionality, which implements a novel PQ-based tariff scheme that penalizes consumers violating the PQ limits and provides incentives for a good PQ profile. It measures as many as 28 parameters and keeps track of the PQ for both the consumer and the grid in real-time. This paper demonstrates the specifications, design, and testing of the meter and proves the validity of the concept by practical implementation. The meter is practical, feasible, and economical for implementing PQ-based tariff schemes in LV distribution systems or smart grids.
7 citations
References
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider a modified version of the game with shared constraints and show that if the leader objectives admit a potential function, the global minimizers of the potential function over the shared constraint are equilibria.
Abstract: Multi-leader multi-follower games are a class of hierarchical games in which a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints is complicated by nonconvex agent problems and therefore providing tractable conditions for existence of global or even local equilibria for it has proved challenging. Consequently, much of the extant research on this topic is either model specific or relies on weaker notions of equilibria. We consider a modified formulation in which every leader is cognizant of the equilibrium constraints of all leaders. Equilibria of this modified game contain the equilibria, if any, of the original game. The new formulation has a constraint structure called shared constraints, and our main result shows that if the leader objectives admit a potential function, the global minimizers of the potential function over the shared constraint are equilibria of the modified formulation. We provide another existence result using fixed point theory that does not require potentiality. Additionally, local minima, B-stationary, and strong-stationary points of this minimization are shown to be local Nash equilibria, Nash B-stationary, and Nash strong-stationary points of the corresponding multi-leader multi-follower game. We demonstrate the relationship between variational equilibria associated with this modified shared-constraint game and equilibria of the original game from the standpoint of the multiplier sets and show how equilibria of the original formulation may be recovered. We note through several examples that such potential multi-leader multi-follower games capture a breadth of application problems of interest and demonstrate our findings on a multi-leader multi-follower Cournot game.
59 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the relative electrical distance (RED) concept is used to estimate the relative locations of load nodes with respect to the generator nodes for transmission charge allocation in EHV power systems.
51 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the minimum amount of reactive power (Q/sub min/) required for a given generator to transmit its own active power to support a real-life power system is determined.
Abstract: Reactive power is an important system support service in the current power market. Power producers or generators have the opportunity to offer this service to make a profit. Given the fact that a generator needs reactive power to transmit its own active power, however, it is possible that certain generators cannot support a system even if they are generating reactive power. This paper investigates such a phenomenon and proposes a method to determine the minimum amount of reactive power (Q/sub min/) required for a given generator. If a generator cannot supply this minimum amount, it actually draws reactive power support from the system to facilitate its own active power selling activity. Compensation to a generator's reactive power output should be made only to the amount that is above the Q/sub min/ amount. The proposed ideas are illustrated with simple systems in this paper and tested on a real-life power system. The test results verified the validity of the proposed concept and method.
44 citations
16 Oct 2006
TL;DR: In this paper, a localized competitive market for reactive power ancillary services at the level of individual voltage-control areas is proposed, based on uniform price auction, using a modified optimal power-flow model.
Abstract: Summary form only given. In this paper, we present the design of a localized competitive market for reactive power ancillary services at the level of individual voltage-control areas. The concept of electrical distance has been used to identify the different voltage-control areas within a power system. The proposed reactive power market is settled on uniform price auction, using a modified optimal power-flow model. Uniform prices for various components of reactive power service are obtained for each voltage-control area. In the study cases described in the paper, we examine whether such a localized reactive power market is more desirable than a common system-wide reactive power market.
43 citations
"Game Theoretical Approach to Novel ..." refers background or methods in this paper
...To avoid exercising of market power it was suggested to estimate reactive power cost curve at transmission operator for each generator with the bid data of day ahead market [4]....
[...]
...Sufficient models considering various aspects of reactive power cost have been found in literature, which are found to be effective [4], [7]–[10]....
[...]
...A uniform price for reactive power by minimizing the expected payment function, was proposed in each voltage control area [4]....
[...]
TL;DR: This work considers a modified formulation in which every leader is cognizant of the equilibrium constraints of all leaders and shows that if the leader objectives admit a potential function, the global minimizers of the potential function over this shared constraint are equilibria of the modified formulation.
Abstract: Multi-leader multi-follower games are a class of hierarchical games in which a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints is complicated by nonconvex agent problems and therefore providing tractable conditions for existence of global or even local equilibria has proved challenging. Consequently, much of the extant research on this topic is either model specific or relies on weaker notions of equilibria. We consider a modified formulation in which every leader is cognizant of the equilibrium constraints of all leaders. Equilibria of this modified game contain the equilibria, if any, of the original game. The new formulation has a constraint structure called shared constraints, and our main result shows that if the leader objectives admit a potential function, the global minimizers of the potential function over this shared constraint are equilibria of the modified formulation. We provide another existence result using fixed point theory that does not require potentiality. Additionally, local minima, B-stationary, and strong-stationary points of this minimization problem are shown to be local Nash equilibria, Nash B-stationary, and Nash strong-stationary points of the corresponding multi-leader multi-follower game. We demonstrate the relationship between variational equilibria associated with this modified shared-constraint game and equilibria of the original game from the standpoint of the multiplier sets and show how equilibria of the original formulation may be recovered. We note through several examples that such potential multi-leader multi-follower games capture a breadth of application problems of interest and demonstrate our findings on a multi-leader multi-follower Cournot game.
41 citations
"Game Theoretical Approach to Novel ..." refers background in this paper
...proven using potential function game representation of MLMF game [15]....
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...Thus the minimiser for potential game exists and by the definition of potential function an equilibrium for the MLMF game also thus exists [15]....
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