Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey.
About: This article is published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.The article was published on 1958-09-01. It has received 426 citations till now.
Citations
More filters
Book•
15 Dec 2008TL;DR: This exciting and pioneering new overview of multiagent systems, which are online systems composed of multiple interacting intelligent agents, i.e., online trading, offers a newly seen computer science perspective on multi agent systems, while integrating ideas from operations research, game theory, economics, logic, and even philosophy and linguistics.
Abstract: This exciting and pioneering new overview of multiagent systems, which are online systems composed of multiple interacting intelligent agents, i.e., online trading, offers a newly seen computer science perspective on multiagent systems, while integrating ideas from operations research, game theory, economics, logic, and even philosophy and linguistics. The authors emphasize foundations to create a broad and rigorous treatment of their subject, with thorough presentations of distributed problem solving, game theory, multiagent communication and learning, social choice, mechanism design, auctions, cooperative game theory, and modal logics of knowledge and belief. For each topic, basic concepts are introduced, examples are given, proofs of key results are offered, and algorithmic considerations are examined. An appendix covers background material in probability theory, classical logic, Markov decision processes and mathematical programming. Written by two of the leading researchers of this engaging field, this book will surely serve as THE reference for researchers in the fastest-growing area of computer science, and be used as a text for advanced undergraduate or graduate courses.
2,068 citations
TL;DR: A theoretical framework is developed that shows how mesencephalic dopamine systems could distribute to their targets a signal that represents information about future expectations and shows that, through a simple influence on synaptic plasticity, fluctuations in dopamine release can act to change the predictions in an appropriate manner.
Abstract: We develop a theoretical framework that shows how mesencephalic dopamine systems could distribute to their targets a signal that represents information about future expectations. In particular, we show how activity in the cerebral cortex can make predictions about future receipt of reward and how fluctuations in the activity levels of neurons in diffuse dopamine systems above and below baseline levels would represent errors in these predictions that are delivered to cortical and subcortical targets. We present a model for how such errors could be constructed in a real brain that is consistent with physiological results for a subset of dopaminergic neurons located in the ventral tegmental area and surrounding dopaminergic neurons. The theory also makes testable predictions about human choice behavior on a simple decision-making task. Furthermore, we show that, through a simple influence on synaptic plasticity, fluctuations in dopamine release can act to change the predictions in an appropriate manner.
1,920 citations
Cites background from "Games and Decisions: Introduction a..."
...This may explain why it is difficult for animals to maximize long-term rewards and why under appropriate circumstances they appear to be risk-averse (Lute and Raiffa, 1957; Harder and Real, 1987; Real, 1991)....
[...]
...Many explanations cast at a variety of levels have been offered to explain such matching behavior, and various strategies can be formulated to achieve optimal outcomes (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947; Bush and Mosteller, 1955; Lute and Raiffa, 1957)....
[...]
TL;DR: In this paper, a sketch of a computational theory of social exchange (cooperation for mutual benefit) is developed, where the dynamics of natural selection in Pleistocene ecological conditions define adaptive information processing problems that humans must be able to solve in order to participate in social exchange.
628 citations
Cites background from "Games and Decisions: Introduction a..."
...The argument is general to any known, fixed number of games (Luce and Raiffa 1957)....
[...]
...A system of mutual cooperation cannot emerge in a one move Prisoner's Dilemma, because it is always in the interest of each player to defect (Luce and Raiffa 1957; see Fig....
[...]
...In fact, the argument is general to any known, fixed number of games (Luce and Raiffa 1957)....
[...]
01 Sep 2006
TL;DR: Abreu et al. as mentioned in this paper proposed a foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory, and showed that finite social memory is a necessary condition for a Markov equilibrium in the Prisoners' dilemma.
Abstract: References ABREU, D. (1988): “On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting,” Econometrica, 56(2), 383–396. ABREU, D., D. PEARCE, AND E. STACCHETTI (1990): “Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring,” Econometrica, 58(5), 1041–1063. BHASKAR, V., G. J. MAILATH, AND S. MORRIS (2008): “Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 11(3), 515–528. (2013): “A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory,” Review of Economic Studies, 80(3), 925–948. COLE, H. L., AND N. R. KOCHERLAKOTA (2005): “Finite Memory and Imperfect Monitoring,” Games and Economic Behavior, 53(1), 59–72.
605 citations
References
More filters
01 Jan 1992
TL;DR: It is argued that humans have a faculty of social cognition, consisting of a rich collection of dedicated, functionally specialized, interrelated modules organized to collectively guide thought and behavior with respect to the evolutionarily recurrent adaptive problems posed by the social world.
Abstract: The human mind is the most complex natural phenomenon humans have yet encountered, and Darwin's gift to those who wish to understand it is a knowledge of the process that created it and gave it its distinctive organization: evolution. Because we know that the human mind is the product of the evolutionary process, we know something vitally illuminating: that, aside from those properties acquired by chance, the mind consists of a set of adaptations, designed to solve the long-standing adaptive problems humans encountered a s hunter-gatherers. Such a vie w i s uncontroversial to mos t behavioral scientists when applied to topics such as vision or balance. Yet adaptationist approaches to human psychology are considered radical—o r even transparently false—when applie d t o mos t other area s of human thought and action , especially social behavior. Nevertheless, the logic of the adaptationist postion is completely general, and a dispassionate evaluatio n of its implications leads to the expectation that humans should have evolved a constellation of cognitive adaptations to social life. Our ancestors have been members of social groups and engaging in social interactions for millions and probably tens of millions of years. To behave adaptively, they not only needed to construct a spatial map of the objects disclosed to them by their retinas, but a social map of the persons, relationships, motives, interactions, emotions, and intentions that made up their social world. Our view, then, is that humans have a faculty of social cognition, consisting of a rich collection o f dedicated, functionally specialized, interrelated modules (i.e., func tionally isolable subunits, mechanisms, mental organs, etc.), organized to collectively guide thought and behavior with respect to the evolutionarily recurrent adaptive problems posed by the social world. Nonetheless, if such a view has merit, it not only must be argued for on theoretical grounds—however compelling—but also must be substantiated by experimental evidence, as well as by converging lines of empirical support drawn from related fields such as neuroscience, linguistics, and anthropology. The 3
1,922 citations
TL;DR: A theoretical framework is developed that shows how mesencephalic dopamine systems could distribute to their targets a signal that represents information about future expectations and shows that, through a simple influence on synaptic plasticity, fluctuations in dopamine release can act to change the predictions in an appropriate manner.
Abstract: We develop a theoretical framework that shows how mesencephalic dopamine systems could distribute to their targets a signal that represents information about future expectations. In particular, we show how activity in the cerebral cortex can make predictions about future receipt of reward and how fluctuations in the activity levels of neurons in diffuse dopamine systems above and below baseline levels would represent errors in these predictions that are delivered to cortical and subcortical targets. We present a model for how such errors could be constructed in a real brain that is consistent with physiological results for a subset of dopaminergic neurons located in the ventral tegmental area and surrounding dopaminergic neurons. The theory also makes testable predictions about human choice behavior on a simple decision-making task. Furthermore, we show that, through a simple influence on synaptic plasticity, fluctuations in dopamine release can act to change the predictions in an appropriate manner.
1,920 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a sketch of a computational theory of social exchange (cooperation for mutual benefit) is developed, where the dynamics of natural selection in Pleistocene ecological conditions define adaptive information processing problems that humans must be able to solve in order to participate in social exchange.
628 citations
01 Sep 2006
TL;DR: Abreu et al. as mentioned in this paper proposed a foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory, and showed that finite social memory is a necessary condition for a Markov equilibrium in the Prisoners' dilemma.
Abstract: References ABREU, D. (1988): “On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting,” Econometrica, 56(2), 383–396. ABREU, D., D. PEARCE, AND E. STACCHETTI (1990): “Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring,” Econometrica, 58(5), 1041–1063. BHASKAR, V., G. J. MAILATH, AND S. MORRIS (2008): “Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 11(3), 515–528. (2013): “A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory,” Review of Economic Studies, 80(3), 925–948. COLE, H. L., AND N. R. KOCHERLAKOTA (2005): “Finite Memory and Imperfect Monitoring,” Games and Economic Behavior, 53(1), 59–72.
605 citations