Global finance in crisis: the politics of international regulatory change
21 Jan 2010-
TL;DR: Helleiner and Pagliari as mentioned in this paper discussed the role of international regulatory change in the global financial crisis and its effect on international financial governance, including hedge funds and derivatives in global financial governance.
Abstract: 1. Introduction - Global Finance in Crisis: The Politics of International Regulatory Change Eric Helleiner and Stefano Pagliari Part 1: Issues and Structures 2. Regulatory Reactions to the Global Credit Crisis: Analysing a Policy Community under Stress Eleni Tsingou 3. The Politics of Accounting Regulation: Responses to the Subprime Crisis Andreas Nolke 4. Risk Models and Transnational Governance in the Global Financial Crisis: The Cases of Basel II and Credit Rating Agencies Tony Porter 5. The End of Self-Regulation? Hedge Funds and Derivatives in Global Financial Governance Eric Helleiner and Stefano Pagliari Part 2: Countries and Regions 6. Uncertain Leadership: The U.S. Regulatory Response to the Global Financial Crisis David Andrew Singer 7. Is a European Approach to Financial Regulation Emerging from the Crisis? Elliot Posner 8. Varieties of Global Financial Governance? British and German Approaches to Financial Market Regulation Hubert Zimmermann 9. Mission Accomplished, or a Sisyphean Task? Japan's Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis Saori N. Katada 10. Chinese Attitudes towards Global Financial Regulatory Cooperation: Revisionist or Status Quo? Andrew Walter 11. Whither International Financial Regulation? Hubert Zimmermann
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyzed the IPE of both food and finance and found that US domestic groups were able to boost their influence by allying with other domestic actors concerned about volatile energy prices and by linking their cause to the broader politics of financial reform in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.
Abstract: The global food crisis of 2007–08 triggered an important US-led initiative to tighten regulations over agricultural derivatives markets. The lead role of the US reflected its structural power in global finance and the influence of societal interests within the US concerned about the rapid growth of financial investment in agricultural derivatives markets over the past decade. Encouraged by market developments and deregulation in the United States, these investments represented a “financialization” of agriculture that was blamed for contributing for global food price volatility. In their push for tighter regulation, US domestic groups were able to boost their influence by allying with other domestic actors concerned about volatile energy prices and by linking their cause to the broader politics of financial reform in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. This episode has important lessons for the literatures analyzing the IPE of both food and finance.
171 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on the post-crisis analysis of international prudential financial regulation, focusing on three policy arenas: inter-state, domestic, and transnational, and suggest that researchers may also need to shift from explaining the strengthening of official international standards to analyzing their weakening in the postcrisis world.
Abstract: The global financial crisis that erupted in the summer of 2007 has made the reform of international prudential financial regulation one of the top priorities of global public policy. Past scholarship has usefully explained the creation and strengthening of international financial standards with reference to three policy arenas: inter-state, domestic, and transnational. Despite the accomplishments of this specialist literature, the recent crisis has revealed a number of limitations in the ways scholars have understood inter-state power relations, the influence of domestic politics, and the significance of transnational actors within international financial regulatory politics. Taken together, developments in each of these three arenas suggest that researchers may also need to be prepared to shift from explaining the strengthening of official international standards to analyzing their weakening in the post-crisis world. The latter task will require scholars to devote more analytical attention to a wider set of international regulatory outcomes, including “informal regulatory convergence”, “regulatory fragmentation”, and especially “cooperative regulatory decentralization”.
167 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present an analogous study of multistakeholder governance, or multi-akeholderism, which is a much less well-defined institutional form than multilateralism and exhibits significant variation both in the combinations of actor classes entitled to participate and the nature of authority relations among those actors.
Abstract: Building on John Ruggie’s pioneering study of multilateralism, this paper presents an analogous study of multistakeholder governance, or multistakeholderism. Its central argument is that multistakeholderism is, as yet, a much less well-defined institutional form. Cases exhibit significant variation both in the combinations of actor classes entitled to participate and the nature of authority relations among those actors. The first section discusses multistakeholderism as an institutional form, and proposes a taxonomy of its types. This section also briefly addresses the implications of the analysis for International Relations theory. The paper then conducts a comparative analysis of multistakeholderism, applying the taxonomy to five illustrative cases. It demonstrates the degree of inter-case variation, and the range of issue-areas across which the institutional form is employed and invoked by actors. Three cases are drawn from the increasingly contentious area of Internet governance; the paper thus makes a secondary contribution to this growing literature. The paper’s most striking finding in this regard is that Internet governance often fails to live up to its multistakeholder rhetoric. Other cases include governance of securities regulation and the governance of corporate social responsibility. The paper concludes by examining the implications of our argument, and identifying areas for further research.
120 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the advocacy efforts of financial industry groups since the financial crisis and show evidence that the response has been to invest in more subtle advocacy strategies which focus on other stages of the policymaking cycle.
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78 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed an explanation based on a two-level game for the lack of regulation and oversight in the shadow banking sector, which is largely incorporated in offshore financial centers (OFCs), but instead of swift and radical regulatory reform in that sector after the crisis, we observe only incremental and ineffective measures.
Abstract: A crucial element in the complex chain of factors that caused the recent financial crisis was the lack of regulation and oversight in the shadow banking sector, which is largely incorporated in offshore financial centers (OFCs), but instead of swift and radical regulatory reform in that sector after the crisis, we observe only incremental and ineffective measures. Why? This paper develops an explanation based on a two-level game. On the international level, governments are engaged in competition for financial activity. On the domestic level, governments are prone to capture by financial interest groups, but also susceptible to demands for stricter regulation by the electorate. Governments try to square the circle between the conflicting demands by adopting incremental and symbolic, but largely ineffective, reforms. The explanation is put to empirical scrutiny by tracing the regulatory initiatives on shadow banks and OFCs at the international level and within the United States and the European Union, where I focus on France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
68 citations