God of All the World: Universalism and Developing Monotheism in Isaiah 40–66
TL;DR: The relationship between Israel, the nations, and Israel's God in the eschatological future has long occupied exegetes and theologians as mentioned in this paper, and the meaning of the pilgrimage of the nations to Zion and the servant's charge to become a “covenant to the people (), a light to the nations ()” (Isa 42:6) is a significant locus of dispute.
Abstract: The relationship between Israel, the nations, and Israel's God in the eschatological future has long occupied exegetes and theologians. The meaning of the pilgrimage of the nations to Zion and the servant's charge to become a “covenant to the people (), a light to the nations ()” (Isa 42:6) is a significant locus of dispute. Some argue that here the text charges the Israelites to missionize the Gentiles, while others contend that Second Isaiah holds only a passing interest in the status of foreigners. These disagreements are not unfounded, for the text itself contains seemingly contradictory exclamations right next to one another. In Isa 45:22, for example, YHWH proclaims: “Turn to me and be saved, all the ends of the earth!” In the very next verses, however, Isaiah depicts the nations as subservient to Israel and elsewhere as even licking the dust of the former exiles' feet (49:23)—an image which, at least at first glance, seems incompatible with the notion that foreigners and Israelites similarly benefit from YHWH's saving acts.
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01 Jul 2018
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze the idea of general resurrection of the dead at the end of times in the synoptic Gospels and clarify whether this concept can be interpreted as a transposition of the parallel belief contained in some intertestamental writings, or if the singularity of the religious experience expressed in the Gospels establishes an inexorable moment of discontinuity with the previous apocalyptic framework, making it impossible to understand this doctrine on the sole basis of its Jewish precedents.
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyze the idea of general resurrection of the dead at the end of times in the synoptic Gospels. We intend to clarify whether this concept can be interpreted as a transposition of the parallel belief contained in some intertestamental writings, or if the singularity of the religious experience expressed in the synoptic Gospels establishes an inexorable moment of discontinuity with the previous apocalyptic framework, making it impossible to understand this doctrine on the sole basis of its Jewish precedents. In order to accomplish our goal, we shall first study the general resurrection of the dead in the Q source, the references to this notion in the gospel of Mark, and its meaning in both Matthew and Luke. We will exclude from our treatment all the topics related with the resurrection of Jesus, and we will be focused on the explicit mentions of the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead as such. Since implicit beliefs are always difficult to assess, especially in the context of eschatological ideas, in which vagueness and absence of a systematic effort of exposition often prevail, we will not allude to other synoptic passages which have been regarded as potential expressions of the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead at the end of times.
10 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, Hasker argues that the Bible teaches that the Trinity is a self-consistent, self-evident, and not a group of individuals, which is contrary to social trinitarianism.
Abstract: Is “social” trinitarianism a self-consistent variety of monotheism? Following up discussions of deception arguments against “social” trinitarianism, I argue that it is not. I discuss two early modern treatments of divine deception, monotheism, and the Trinity by Stephen Nye and Noah Worcester, and argue with them that the Bible, contrary to “social” Trinity theories, teaches God to be a self. Finally, I compare contemporary “social” theories to the similar but importantly different theory of early modern philosophical theologian Samuel Clarke. I. Divine Deception? Consider the following inconsistent triad of claims: 1. The Christian God is a self. 2. The Christian God is the Trinity. 3. The Trinity is not a self. “Is” here is unequivocal; it means “is identical to,” and “is not” means “is not identical to.” A “self” is being which is in principle capable of knowledge, intentional action, and interpersonal relationships.1 Any two of these claims entail the falsity of the remaining claim. Which one should a Christian deny? Denying 1 seems to go against the Bible. And probably the greatest living Christian philosopher habitually characterizes theism (i.e. monotheism) as the view that there is “such a person as God.” (Plantinga 1984, 253) Denying 2 is going against a longstanding catholic mainstream. Should one then affirm 1 and 2, while denying 3? Denying 3 is affirming that the Trinity is a self. But, 1 I avoid the term “person” here because to many it suggests being human (often “person” means “human being”), and more importantly, because “person” is a technical term in all post-fourthcentury trinitarian Christian theologies. The concept my term “self” expresses is not technical, and is possessed by all mentally functional adult humans. All of us understand both ourselves and our human fellows to be selves. This concept is compatible with, but doesn’t imply: being divine, being human, being physical, being non-physical, being essentially a self, existing contingently, existing necessarily, being very similar to a normal human being. Alleged beings such as gods, spirits, ghosts, gnomes, elves, fairies, leprechauns, intelligent space aliens, angels, and demons would all be, if real, selves, just as are human beings. Divine Deception and Monotheism Dale Tuggy 187 arguably, the Bible nowhere portrays the Trinity as a self, and if the Trinity in some sense contains three divine selves, then the Trinity would be a fourth divine self – a conclusion trinitarian tradition does not welcome. Many current “social” Trinity theories (hereafter ST) deny 1. For them, the Christian God is not a self, but rather some sort of group, collective, or complex whole which somewhat resembles a self (Hasker 2013, 19-25, 258; Hasker 2014; Copan 2009, 206; Craig 2006). Thus, in an important recent monograph, analytic theologian William Hasker argues that the “Persons” of the Trinity are indeed selves, or as he puts it, The trinitarian Persons are persons... “distinct centers of knowledge, will, love, and action.” ... the Son has experiences the Father does not have, and there are within the Trinity (at least) two distinct subjects of experience...(Hasker 2013, 193)2 As to the one God, the Trinity, Hasker concludes that “in virtue of the closeness of their union, the Trinity is at times referred to as if it were a single person.” (Hasker 2013, 258) Hasker’s Trinity is, in the end, an “it,” not a “he.” For Cornelius Plantinga too, the Trinity is “one thing.” (Hasker 2013, 22; Plantinga 1989, 22) This is surprising, for is not the God of Christians one and the same as the God of the Jews, YHWH, the God of Abraham, proclaimed by the prophets as the one true god? And isn’t this YHWH presented in the Bible as a glorious self, as a being with knowledge and plans, capable of commanding, being argued with, loving and being loved? Further, wouldn’t it have been morally wrong for a collective like the one postulated by ST, more properly speaking, for one or more members of it, to intentionally cause the Jews to falsely believe that the unique provident creator, this one called “YHWH” was a god, and not a group, or at any rate, something other than a god (Tuggy 2004)? This is not to accuse God, but rather to object to ST, that it is inconsistent with the implications of the Bible. II. Refuting the first deception argument? William Hasker has replied to this deception argument on behalf of ST (Hasker 2009; 2010; 2011). In my view, Hasker fails to undermine either this or the other two deception-based arguments against ST (Tuggy 2011). But his latest reply has the seed of a somewhat plausible reply to the first argument. (Hasker 2011, 1178) Recall the analogy on which that argument is based. Three men interact with a young girl, sharing the role of her absentee father. That is, they cause her to believe that she’s interacting with one man. This seems morally wrong, and it seems relevantly like what the members of the Trinity did to ancient Jews, if ST were true. But no divine person does what is wrong. Therefore, ST is false (Tuggy 2004, 270-6). 2 Hasker’s quoted phrase is from Cornelius Plantinga. Divine Deception and Monotheism Dale Tuggy 188 This argument assumes that the members of the Trinity, as theologians often repeat, cooperate in all they do with respect to the cosmos.3 If this is right, then assuming ST, the members of the Trinity would have acted so as to cause belief in a fictional self called “YHWH,” the god of Israel and the one true god. A simple and seemingly well-motivated way for ST to get around this problem is denying this assumption of cooperation in all providential matters. If this assumption is false, then the members of the Trinity according to ST are not relevantly like the three men in the story. Hence, premise 1 of the first deception argument would be false (Tuggy 2004, 272). One may argue that on ST the “YHWH” with whom the ancient Jews interacted was no fictional character, but was the Father himself. It was he who then went by “God”, “the one god,” “YHWH,” “God Almighty,” and so on. Later, these names or titles changed their reference, to refer instead to the Trinity. In sum, in ancient times only one divine self was known. And in these latter days, this divine self has introduced us to his two peers. Where, then, is any deception? Answer: in the famous monotheistic texts of the biblical book of Isaiah, chapters forty to forty-eight. In these, YHWH asserts that (in some sense) he’s the only god. And as Hasker would (I think correctly) read these texts, the speaker here is neither the Trinity itself, nor the three members of the Trinity speaking together, but rather the Father alone. In Hasker’s view, then, the Father has hereby deceived the hearers and early readers of Isaiah, for in Hasker’s view, the Father is not, in any sense, the only god – the only divine self – but rather one of exactly three. But we must read those chapters very carefully, to understand what they are and are not asserting. Here’s an analogy. Imagine a land populated by many tribes or clans, each lead by a chief, and constantly vying with one another for land and resources. After a particularly brutal round of multi-sided warfare, the tribes gather for a peace conference. One of them, chief Biggo, came out particularly well in recent fighting. Making a bid to unite the tribes, he addresses the assembly. To whom will you liken me? To whom will you compare me? I am Biggo, and there is no other. Your chiefs are nothing – no, less than nothing. I predicted the outcome in advance. Can they do that? No! I vanquished all who opposed me on the battlefield. Can they do that? No! I am the only chief – there has never been a chief like me, nor will there ever be another. If they think they’re really chiefs, let them do likewise. (Don’t hold your breath.) I am Biggo; I am your chief, and other than me, you have no protector. Truly, I am the only chief. Who is with me? How can chief Biggo assert that he’s the only chief, in an assembly where he’s disrespecting several other chiefs to their faces? Is he asserting these other chiefs to be fictional characters? Plainly not. Biggo is asserting his uniqueness. It is understood all around that he too is a chief, and the chief of one particular clan. But 3 In Latin the slogan is opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa. While Augustine several times says things similar to this, the earliest source of this idea I’m aware of is Gregory of Nyssa (1954). There’s also a more specific medieval claim that the Three are a single source of creatures. (Ott 1974, 82-3) Divine Deception and Monotheism Dale Tuggy 189 as he ascends to dominance, he is, as it were, taking the word with him. He’s using the word in a new way – when he says “chief” he doesn’t mean a common clanleader. In the older, ordinary sense, it is granted all around that there are many chiefs. But by “chief,” Biggo means a clan-leader which is so dominant that he will always win against his rivals, and even knows in advance that he’ll win. He truly is the only one of those. He and his followers may now use “Chief” or “the Chief” as a quasi-name, a singular referring term which refers only to Biggo. And they may call him “the one true Chief.” Something like this, I suggest, is going on in the famous monotheistic passages of Isaiah. A distracting element there, with no parallel in my story above, is the repeated mockery of idols, idol worship, and idol worshipers (Isaiah 40:18-24; 41:21-9; 42:8-9, 17; 44:9-20; 45:20; 46:1-7; 48:5). The writer deliberately smudges the difference between the idols and the gods they represent, or who were believed to indwell them. This is because idols appear to be stupid and powerless, and pitifully, must be carried around by others. The gods, by association, are thereby mocked as stupid and powerless in comparison to YHWH. The writer, we must assume, knows the difference between an idol and what its worshipers think dwells in it (
6 citations
TL;DR: The characterisation of Yahweh as a king in the book of Isaiah 40-45 and the use of creation language to reiterate the power of the prophet's power are well known as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The characterisation of Yahweh as king in Isaiah 40-45 and the use of creation language to reiterate Yahweh's power are well known. This article examines the way in which these themes reflect this text's re-working of pre-exilic theology in order to cope with the exilic situation. It discusses the pre-exilic military tradition, especially in relation to Yahweh's roles as warrior, king and creator, then examines how Isaiah 40-45 adapts this tradition to a changed reality. It concludes that the author has abandoned the traditional rendering of the Chaoskampf, in which Yahweh's roles as warrior, king and creator are linked, in order to retain the characteristics necessary to persuade the exiles of Yahweh's power to save. Though Yahweh remains warrior, king and creator, these characteristics are no longer interconnected.
6 citations
Dissertation•
01 Dec 2008
5 citations
TL;DR: A survey of the book of Isaiah can be found in this article, where the authors call for stronger methodological controls for models of composition and redaction, on the basis of comparative data from other ancient Near Eastern texts, especially prophetic texts.
Abstract: This article surveys scholarship on the book of Isaiah since roughly the start of the 21st century Noting that theories of the book's formation based on internal textual data have not commanded consensus, it calls for stronger methodological controls for models of composition and redaction, on the basis of comparative data from other ancient Near Eastern texts, especially prophetic texts Although there has been an outpouring of scholarship from every angle, significant recent trends include centripetal/holistic approaches to the book and study of its reception history
4 citations