Governing online platforms: Competition policy in times of platformization

TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that a paradigmatic change in competition policy is needed and empirically under way to cope with the challenges posed by economically strong online platforms and their big-data-based business models.

About: This article is published in Telecommunications Policy.The article was published on 2018-06-01 and is currently open access. It has received 33 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Competition (economics) & Non-price competition.

Summary

Summary

• At each pseudo timestep a backward Euler timestepping method is used which gives rise to system of nonlinear equations.
• Re free stream Reynolds number Pr Prandtl number ratio of speci c heats T temperature.
• If the intersection point of the perpendicular bisectors is outside the triangle then xm ym is the midpoint of the edge nearest the intersection point.
• The source sink term SN i will be used to enforce boundary conditions.
• The average normal nx ny and interface area.
• Fij F ij F ij such that the Jacobian of F ij has nonnegative eigenvalues and the Jacobian of F ij has nonpositive eigenvalues.
• The de nition of s in equation carries out this limiting in a smooth manner Note that the form of the boundary condition does not require any type of extrapolation from interior points as is commonly used and is therefore easy to compute fully implicitly.
• This requires the work of evaluations of rv Consequently the ALLFO and MUSRES linearized equations require evaluations of rc and evaluations of rv while the ALLMUS Jacobian requires evaluations of rc and evaluations of rv.

Frequently asked questions

Q1. What contributions have the authors mentioned in the paper "Governing online platforms: competition policy in times of platformization" ?

This paper argues that a paradigmatic change in competition policy is needed and empirically under way to cope with the challenges posed by economically strong online platforms and their big-databased business models. Competition policy needs to move further away from its traditional price-oriented emphasis and increasingly focus on non-price competition, on attention markets and zero prices, and on big user data, which has become a new asset class in digital economies. 

Q2. What are the future works mentioned in the paper "Governing online platforms: competition policy in times of platformization" ?

But there is still substantial uncertainty as to what factors should be taken into account and how to cope with the myriad of methodological challenges involved in extending competition analysis to factors traditionally foreign to competition enforcement. However, it remains an open question whether this competitive protection will ultimately similarly be accorded both to users ( here with a view, for example, to decreases in non-price COMPETITION POLICY IN TIMES OF PLATFORMIZATION 17 elements such as quality or privacy ) and competitors, or whether the latter will be given preferential treatment. In the wake of the general acknowledgement that user data is particularly central in the business models of online platforms, the safeguarding of the user may be sought through regulation such as data, consumer and privacy protection. To the extent that non-price elements will or should be given increased attention in future mergers or cases of abuse of market power, various practices may be coverable under competition law. 

Q3. What was the main issue in the evaluation of and consultation on merger control?

The question of threshold and turnover was also one of the central issues in the evaluation of and consultation on procedural and jurisdictional aspects of EU merger control (European Commission, 2016c). 

Q4. What is the key component of the business model?

The revenue model and thus the decision on how the price is allocated and how the product or service is sold is consequently a key component of the business model. 

Q5. What is the purpose of this paper?

This paper focuses on competition policy and challenges for the control of market dominance and anticompetitive behavior in times of platformization. 

Q6. Why is it doubtful that manageable solutions will soon be available?

due to model complexity and the intricate manageability of more complex models it appears doubtful that manageable solutions and methods will soon be available. 

Q7. What is the meaning of the term non-transaction markets?

Within the recent two-sided markets literature Filistrucchi et al. (2013) refer to these kinds of media market as non-transaction markets, because of the nonobservability of direct transactions. 

Q8. What is the meaning of the term market in the absence of price?

Proponents of markets in the absence of price (Just, 2000; Höppner & Grabenschröer, 2015; Klotz, 2016; Schmidt, 1997) argue that even though a service may be free to users their use of it is of economic value to suppliers inasmuch as they depend on users for their revenue. 

Q9. What is the strongest indicator of the recognition of free Internet markets?

The strongest indicator of the acknowledgement of free Internet markets as being liable to competition law, however, is the Commission’s €2.42 billion fine for Google in June 2017 (Case AT.39740 Google Search (Shopping)). 

Q10. What are the main issues that research will have to address?

These issues are among the urgent methodological challenges that research will have to address, particularly in the light of the need to acknowledge markets in the absence of price. 

Q11. What is the reason for the lack of quality in competition analysis?

This lack results from the multidimensional and often subjective character of quality, which makes it difficult to factor quality into competition analysis or to apply single models and hypotheses to explain market interaction (Ezrachi & Stucke, 2015; OECD, 2013; Sullivan, 1984). 

Q12. Why did the former focus on a single application of competition law?

This is also due to the fact the former were predominantly focused on abolishing sector-specific competition regulation in favor of the sole application of competition law.