Greed and grievance in civil war
TL;DR: The authors investigated the causes of civil war, using a new data set of wars during 1960-99 and found that economic viability appears to be the predominant systematic explanation of rebellion, while atypically severe grievances such as high inequality, a lack of political rights, or ethnic and religious divisions in society.
Abstract: This study investigates the causes of civil war, using a new data set of wars during 1960-99. Rebellion may be explained by atypically severe grievances, such as high inequality, a lack of political rights, or ethnic and religious divisions in society. Alternatively, it might be explained by atypical opportunities for building a rebel organization. Opportunity may be determined by access to finance, such as the scope for extortion of natural resources, and for donations from a Diaspora population. Opportunity may also depend upon factors such as geography: mountains and forests may be needed to incubate rebellion. These explanations are tested and find that opportunity provides considerably more explanatory power than grievance. Economic viability appears to be the predominant systematic explanation of rebellion. The results are robust to correction for outliers, alternative variable definition, and variations in estimation method
Citations
More filters
30 Oct 2006
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the evidence on the economic impacts of climate change itself, and explore the economics of stabilizing greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, concluding that the benefits of strong, early action on climate change considerably outweigh the costs.
Abstract: The Review's executive summary states that "the Review first examines the evidence on the economic impacts of climate change itself, and explores the economics of stabilizing greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The second half of the Review considers the complex policy challenges involved in managing the transition to a low-carbon economy and in ensuring that societies can adapt to the consequences of climate change that can no longer be avoided".
The report's main conclusion is that the benefits of strong, early action on climate change considerably outweigh the costs.
1,472 citations
TL;DR: Montalvo and Reynal-Querol as discussed by the authors showed that there is no relationship between ethnic fractionalization, ethnic conflict, and civil wars, and that there are at least three alternative explanations for this: First, it could be the case that the classification of ethnic groups in the Atlas Nadorov Mira (henceforth ANM) is not properly constructed.
Abstract: The increasing incidence of ethnic conflicts, and the much-publicized consequences of these conflicts, have attracted the interest of many researchers in the social sciences. Many studies have addressed directly the issue of ethnic diversity and its effects on social conflicts and civil wars. Political scientists have stressed the importance of institutions in the attenuation or intensification of social conflict in ethnically divided societies. Recently economists have connected ethnic diversity with important economic phenomena like investment, growth, or the quality of government (William Easterly and Ross Levine, 1997; Alberto Alesina et al., 2003; Rafael La Porta et al., 1999). The number of papers dealing with the effects of ethnic diversity on issues of economic interest is growing rapidly. In this respect, it is common in recent work to include as a regressor in empirical growth estimations an index of ethnic fractionalization. There are several reasons to include such an indicator. First, some authors have argued that ethnically diverse societies have a higher probability of ethnic conflicts, which may lead to civil war. The political instability caused by potential ethnic conflicts has a negative impact on investment and, indirectly, on growth. Second, ethnic diversity may generate a high level of corruption which, in turn, could deter investment. Finally it has been argued that in heterogeneous societies the diffusion of technological innovations is more difficult, especially when there is ethnic conflict among groups in a country. Business as usual is not possible in a society with a high level of potential ethnic conflict, since this situation affects all levels of economic activity. Trade may be restricted to individuals of the same ethnic group; public infrastructure may have an ethnic bias; government expenditure may favor some ethnic groups, etc. The common element in all these mechanisms is the existence of an ethnic conflict which, through social and political channels, spreads to the economy. However, many empirical studies find no relationship between ethnic fractionalization, ethnic conflict, and civil wars. There are at least three alternative explanations for this. First, it could be the case that the classification of ethnic groups in the Atlas Nadorov Mira (henceforth ANM), source of the traditional index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF), is not properly constructed. Some authors have used other sources to construct datasets of ethnic groups for a large sample of countries. In general, the correlation between the index of fractionalization obtained using these alternative data sources is very high (over 0.8). Second, James D. Fearon (2003) has argued that it is important to measure the “ethnic distance” across groups in order to obtain indicators of cultural diversity. He measures these distances in terms of the proximity in a tree diagram of the families of languages of different countries. As in the case of alternative data sources, the correlation of the index of ethnic fractionalization, using these distances, with the original ELF index is very high, 0.82. * Montalvo: Department of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, C/Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, Barcelona 08005 Spain, and Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Economicas (e-mail: montalvo@upf.es); Reynal-Querol: the World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20433 (e-mail: mreynalquerol@worldbank.org). We are grateful for comments by Antonio Villar, Joan Esteban, Paul Collier, Tim Besley, and two anonymous referees. We thank the participants of seminars at the World Bank, Institut de la Mediterranea, Toulouse, Brown University, the European Economic Association Meetings, and the Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society. We would like to thank Sergio Kurlat, William Easterly, and Anke Hoeffler for sharing their data. Financial support from the BBVA Foundation and the Spanish Secretary of Science and Technology (SEC2003-04429) is kindly acknowledged. Jose G. Montalvo thanks the Public Services Group of the Research Department (DECRG) of the World Bank, where most of the revision of this paper was done, for their hospitality. The conclusions of this paper are not intended to represent the views of the World Bank, its executive directors, or the countries they represent. 1 Measured by the ELF index using the data of the Atlas Nadorov Mira. 2 Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2000), Alesina et al. (2003), or Fearon (2003). 3 See also Francesco Caselli and W. John Coleman (2002).
1,334 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a variety of hypotheses and supporting evidence for why some countries benefit and others lose from the presence of natural resources are surveyed and some welfare-based fiscal rules for harnessing resource windfalls in developed and developing economies.
Abstract: Are natural resources a "curse" or a "blessing" The empirical evidence suggests that either outcome is possible. This paper surveys a variety of hypotheses and supporting evidence for why some countries benefit and others lose from the presence of natural resources. These include that a resource bonanza induces appreciation of the real exchange rate, deindustrialization, and bad growth prospects, and that these adverse effects are more severe in volatile countries with bad institutions and lack of rule of law, corruption, presidential democracies, and underdeveloped financial systems. Another hypothesis is that a resource boom reinforces rent grabbing and civil conflict especially if institutions are bad, induces corruption especially in nondemocratic countries, and keeps in place bad policies. Finally, resource rich developing economies seem unable to successfully convert their depleting exhaustible resources into other productive assets. The survey also offers some welfare-based fiscal rules for harnessing resource windfalls in developed and developing economies.
1,240 citations
TL;DR: This paper reviewed 14 recent cross-national econometric studies, and many qualitative studies, that cast light on the relationship between natural resources and civil war, concluding that collectively they imply four underlying regularities: first, oil increases the likelihood of conflict, particularly separatist conflict; second, ‘lootable’ commodities like gemstones and drugs do not make conflict more likely to begin, but they tend to lengthen existing conflicts; third, there is no apparent link between legal agricultural commodities, and finally, the association between primary commodities - a broad category that includes both oil and
Abstract: Since the late 1990s, there has been a flood of research on natural resources and civil war. This article reviews 14 recent cross-national econometric studies, and many qualitative studies, that cast light on the relationship between natural resources and civil war. It suggests that collectively they imply four underlying regularities: first, oil increases the likelihood of conflict, particularly separatist conflict; second, ‘lootable’ commodities like gemstones and drugs do not make conflict more likely to begin, but they tend to lengthen existing conflicts; third, there is no apparent link between legal agricultural commodities and civil war; and finally, the association between primary commodities - a broad category that includes both oil and agricultural goods - and the onset of civil war is not robust. The first section discusses the evidence for these four regularities and examines some theoretical arguments that could explain them. The second section suggests that some of the remaining inconsistenc...
1,203 citations
TL;DR: The ACLED dataset as discussed by the authors is an Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) covering 50 unstable countries from 1997 through 2010, covering civil war and transnational violent events.
Abstract: This article presents ACLED, an Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset. ACLED codes the actions of rebels, governments, and militias within unstable states, specifying the exact location and date of battle events, transfers of military control, headquarter establishment, civilian violence, and rioting. In the current version, the dataset covers 50 unstable countries from 1997 through 2010. ACLED’s disaggregation of civil war and transnational violent events allow for research on local level factors and the dynamics of civil and communal conflict. Findings from subnational conflict research challenges conclusions from larger national-level studies. In a brief descriptive analysis, the authors find that, on average, conflict covers 15% of a state’s territory, but almost half of a state can be directly affected by internal wars.
1,192 citations
References
More filters
TL;DR: For 98 countries in the period 1960-1985, the growth rate of real per capita GDP is positively related to initial human capital (proxied by 1960 school-enrollment rates) and negatively related to the initial (1960) level as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: For 98 countries in the period 1960–1985, the growth rate of real per capita GDP is positively related to initial human capital (proxied by 1960 school-enrollment rates) and negatively related to the initial (1960) level of real per capita GDP. Countries with higher human capital also have lower fertility rates and higher ratios of physical investment to GDP. Growth is inversely related to the share of government consumption in GDP, but insignificantly related to the share of public investment. Growth rates are positively related to measures of political stability and inversely related to a proxy for market distortions.
9,420 citations
Book•
09 Jan 1997TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose Continuous Outcomes Binary Outcomes Testing and Fit Ordinal Outcomes Numeric Outcomes and Numeric Numeric Count Outcomes (NOCO).
Abstract: Introduction Continuous Outcomes Binary Outcomes Testing and Fit Ordinal Outcomes Nominal Outcomes Limited Outcomes Count Outcomes Conclusions
7,306 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a newly assembled data set consisting of subjective indices of corruption, the amount of red tape, the efficiency of the judicial system, and various categories of political stability for a cross section of countries is analyzed.
Abstract: This paper analyzes a newly assembled data set consisting of subjective indices of corruption, the amount of red tape, the efficiency of the judicial system, and various categories of political stability for a cross section of countries. Corruption is found to lower investment, thereby lowering economic growth. The results are robust to controlling for endogeneity by using an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization as an instrument.
7,191 citations
TL;DR: This article showed that ethnic diversity helps explain cross-country differences in public policies and other economic indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa, and that high ethnic fragmentation explains a significant part of most of these characteristics.
Abstract: Explaining cross-country differences in growth rates requires not only an understanding of the link between growth and public policies, but also an understanding of why countries choose different public policies. This paper shows that ethnic diversity helps explain cross-country differences in public policies and other economic indicators. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, economic growth is associated with low schooling, political instability, underdeveloped financial systems, distorted foreign exchange markets, high government deficits, and insufficient infrastructure. Africa's high ethnic fragmentation explains a significant part of most of these characteristics.
5,648 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: Collier and Hoeffler as discussed by the authors compare two contrasting motivations for rebellion: greed and grievance, and show that many rebellions are linked to the capture of resources (such as diamonds in Angola and Sierra Leone, drugs in Colombia, and timber in Cambodia).
Abstract: Of the 27 major armed conflicts that occurred in 1999, all but two took place within national boundaries. As an impediment to development, internal rebellion especially hurts the world's poorest countries. What motivates civil wars? Greed or grievance? Collier and Hoeffler compare two contrasting motivations for rebellion: greed and grievance. Most rebellions are ostensibly in pursuit of a cause, supported by a narrative of grievance. But since grievance assuagement through rebellion is a public good that a government will not supply, economists predict such rebellions would be rare. Empirically, many rebellions appear to be linked to the capture of resources (such as diamonds in Angola and Sierra Leone, drugs in Colombia, and timber in Cambodia). Collier and Hoeffler set up a simple rational choice model of greed-rebellion and contrast its predictions with those of a simple grievance model. Some countries return to conflict repeatedly. Are they conflict-prone or is there a feedback effect whereby conflict generates grievance, which in turn generates further conflict? The authors show why such a feedback effect might be present in both greed-motivated and grievance rebellions. The authors' results contrast with conventional beliefs about the causes of conflict. A stylized version of conventional beliefs would be that grievance begets conflict, which begets grievance, which begets further conflict. With such a model, the only point at which to intervene is to reduce the level of objective grievance. Collier and Hoeffler's model suggests that what actually happens is that opportunities for predation (controlling primary commodity exports) cause conflict and the grievances this generates induce dias-poras to finance further conflict. The point of policy intervention here is to reduce the absolute and relative attraction of primary commodity predation and to reduce the ability of diasporas to fund rebel movements. This paper - a product of the Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study civil war and criminal violence. For more on this effort, go to www.worldbank.org/research/conflict. Paul Collier may be contacted at pcollier@worldbank.org.
5,349 citations