# Hare's voting scheme and negative responsiveness

TL;DR: This article showed that negative responsiveness can be caused by the transfer of surplus votes from the elected candidates as well as by the method of transfer of all the votes from all the eliminated candidates.

Abstract: Doron and Kronick (1977) have shown that Hare's voting system may given negative responsiveness. The present note shows that this negative responsiveness can be caused by the method of transfer of surplus votes from the elected candidates as well as by the method of transfer of all the votes from the eliminated candidates.

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01 Jan 2016

TL;DR: The main results of the theory were formulated in 1951 by Kenneth Arrow in his Impossibility Theorem, a statement to the effect that no democratic voting system can simultaneously satisfy a small set of reasonable sounding democratic conditions (values).

Abstract: ALTHOUGH THE THEORY of social choice has roots reaching back to the eighteenth century, major developments in the field have been concentrated in the last three decades. Its prime thrust is the analysis of the concept of rational choice as it extends from the individual to the collectivity. The main results of the theory were formulated in 1951 by Kenneth Arrow in his Impossibility Theorem, a statement to the effect that no democratic voting system can simultaneously satisfy a small set of reasonable sounding democratic conditions (values).' Consequently, social choice theorists have continued to propose other conditions which would either substitute for Arrow's or be evaluated on their own merit.2 One such condition is the reduction principle formalized by Peter Fishbuxn,3 in the spirit of Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.4 The intuitive appeal of this principle for democracy can be illustrated as follows: suppose that in a given election all voters prefer one candidate, X, to another, Y, (a situation which is formally labelled "Pareto Dominance" of X over Y). One would, then, expect X to be elected even if Y did not participate in the

7 citations

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TL;DR: The main results of the theory were formulated in 1951 by Kenneth Arrow in his Impossibility Theorem, a statement to the effect that no democratic voting system can simultaneously satisfy a small set of reasonable sounding democratic conditions (values).

Abstract: ALTHOUGH THE THEORY of social choice has roots reaching back to the eighteenth century, major developments in the field have been concentrated in the last three decades. Its prime thrust is the analysis of the concept of rational choice as it extends from the individual to the collectivity. The main results of the theory were formulated in 1951 by Kenneth Arrow in his Impossibility Theorem, a statement to the effect that no democratic voting system can simultaneously satisfy a small set of reasonable sounding democratic conditions (values).' Consequently, social choice theorists have continued to propose other conditions which would either substitute for Arrow's or be evaluated on their own merit.2 One such condition is the reduction principle formalized by Peter Fishbuxn,3 in the spirit of Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.4 The intuitive appeal of this principle for democracy can be illustrated as follows: suppose that in a given election all voters prefer one candidate, X, to another, Y, (a situation which is formally labelled "Pareto Dominance" of X over Y). One would, then, expect X to be elected even if Y did not participate in the

7 citations