American Political Science Review Vol. 107, No. 1 February 2013
doi:10.1017/S0003055412000500
How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation
JAMES N. DRUCKMAN Northwestern University
ERIK PETERSON Stanford University
RUNE SLOTHUUS Aarhus University
C
ompetition is a defining element of democracy. One of the most noteworthy events over the
last quarter-century in U.S. politics is the change in the nature of elite party competition: The
parties have become increasingly polarized. Scholars and pundits actively debate how these elite
patterns influence polarization among the public (e.g., have citizens also become more ideologically
polarized?). Yet, few have addressed what we see as perhaps more fundamental questions: Has elite
polarization altered the way citizens arrive at their policy opinions in the first place and, if so, in what
ways? We address these questions with a theory and two survey experiments (on the issues of drilling and
immigration). We find stark evidence that polarized environments fundamentally change how citizens
make decisions. Specifically, polarization intensifies the impact of party endorsements on opinions,
decreases the impact of substantive information and, perhaps ironically, stimulates greater confidence in
those—less substantively grounded—opinions. We discuss the implications for public opinion formation
and the nature of democratic competition.
E.
E. Schattschneider (1960, 138) concluded his
classic book, The Semisovereign People,by
defining democracy as “a competitive political
system in which competing leaders and organizations
define the alternatives of public policy in such a way
that the public can participate in the decision-making
process” (italics in original). Although his work vastly
influenced the trajectory of multiple areas of political
science, his concluding conception of democracy has
received relatively scant attention. In this article, we
take up an aspect of his definition by addressing this
question: How does the tenor of political competition—
a defining element of democracy—affect the nature of
citizen decision making?
We focus on one of the most discussed contemporary
developments in U.S. politics: elite polarization. Over
the last quarter-century, elected representatives and ac-
tivists from the major parties have become more ideo-
logically distinct from one another and more internally
homogeneous (e.g., McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal
2006). Therefore, following previous work, we define
elite polarization as high levels of ideological distance
between parties and high levels of homogeneity within
parties. Lively debate revolves around the causes and
consequences of elite polarization, with notable atten-
tion to whether citizens have also become polarized.
Although there is far from a consensus on the status
of citizen polarization (e.g., Fiorina and Abrams 2008,
James N. Druckman is Payson S. Wild Professor, Department of
Political Science, Northwestern University, Scott Hall, 601 University
Place, Evanston, IL 60208 (druckman@northwestern.edu).
Erik Peterson is a graduate student, Department of Political Sci-
ence, Stanford University, Encina Hall West, 616 Serra Street, Stan-
ford, CA 94305 (erik.peterson@stanford.edu).
Rune Slothuus is Associate Professor, Department of Political Sci-
ence, Aarhus University, Bartholins Alle 7, 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
(slothuus@ps.au.dk).
We thank Laurel Harbridge, Gabe Lenz, Matt Levendusky, Kerry
O’Brien, Josh Robison, and seminar participants at Aarhus Uni-
versity for their helpful comments. We thank Allie Fredendall for
research assistance. We also thank the Northwestern Office of Un-
dergraduate Studies and the Danish Social Science Research Council
(grant 275-07-0179) for financial support.
582; Hetherington 2009, 429), we nonetheless turn to
the more fundamental question of how elite polariza-
tion affects the nature of citizen decision making.
We theorize and find, with two experiments on im-
migration and energy, that elite polarization dramat-
ically changes the ways citizens form opinions. This
change occurs because polarization stimulates parti-
san motivated reasoning, which in turn generates de-
cision making that relies more on partisan endorse-
ments and less on substantive arguments. We discuss
the consequences of this shift in decision-making cri-
teria for understanding the nature of public opinion.
We also consider the implications of these findings for
normative debates about “quality opinions” and more
general discussions about polarization and democratic
competition.
1
FRAMING AND PARTY COMPETITION
Our goal is to assess the impact of elite polarization on
citizen decision making. To do so, we employ a coun-
terfactual: We compare the decisions citizens reach in
the presence of competing arguments made in a polar-
ized environment against those made in less polarized
environments (see Mansbridge 1983, 25). Our central
question is, do opinions formed under conditions of
elite polarization differ from those formed sans po-
larization? We specifically compare the role of perhaps
the two most widely used types of information on which
citizens base political decisions: substantive arguments
(of varying types or “strengths”) in the form of distinct
issue frames and partisan cues. We discuss each in turn.
Framing
We operationalize “arguments” as directional issue
or emphasis frames. Few topics have been studied as
1
Others explore how competition influences decision making, and
we build on some of this work in what follows (e.g., Boudreau n.d.;
Petersen, Slothuus, and Togeby 2010; Sniderman and Theriault 2004).
57
How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation February 2013
extensively in the field of political communication (e.g.,
Chong and Druckman 2011; n.d.). Frames refer to
alternative conceptualizations of an issue or event. A
framing effect occurs when “in the course of describing
an issue or event, a speaker’s emphasis on a subset
of potentially relevant considerations causes individu-
als to focus on these considerations when constructing
their opinions” (Druckman and Nelson 2003, 730). An
oft-cited example is that if a speaker describes a hate
group rally in terms of free speech, then the audience
will subsequently base its opinions about the rally on
free speech considerations and support t he right to
rally. In contrast, if the speaker uses a public safety
frame, the audience will base its opinions on public
safety considerations and oppose the rally (Nelson,
Clawson, and Oxley 1997).
A number of studies over the past quarter-century
show that framing effects can substantially shape opin-
ions. This work isolates a variety of factors that mod-
erate the impact of a given frame. One of the most
important factors is a frame’s strength. As with the
psychological attitude literature on argument strength
(e.g., O’Keefe 2002, 147, 156), frame strength is a rela-
tive construct that refers to individuals’ perceptions of
what makes a compelling argument. Scholars typically
assess frame or argument strength by providing re-
spondents with alternative frames/arguments and then
asking them to rate the “effectiveness” or applicability
of each (e.g., Aarøe 2011; Chong and Druckman 2007;
2010; Druckman 2010; Druckman and Leeper 2012a;
O’Keefe 2002).
2
Concerning a hate group rally, for in-
stance, these frames or arguments could involve consid-
erations of free speech, public safety, public litter, traf-
fic problems, the community’s reputation, or racism. A
frame is deemed relatively stronger than another if it
receives a significantly higher rating of effectiveness or
applicability (for detailed discussion, see Chong and
Druckman 2007). Different frames on each side might
be relatively strong or weak when compared to one
another. For example, individuals likely perceive the
public safety frame to be a stronger argument against a
hate group’s rally than an alternative “con” frame that
argues that the rally should not be held because it will
result in litter in the streets.
If two opposing frames are of equal strength, their
effects on an opinion tend to cancel out (Chong and
Druckman 2007; Druckman 2004; Jerit 2009; Snider-
man and Theriault 2004). Perhaps more interesting is
what happens when frames are not evenly matched. A
growing research literature shows that strong frames,
when used in isolation, move opinions. More impor-
tantly, strong frames win out when pitted against
relatively weak frames, even if the weak frame is
repeated. For example, Druckman (2010) pre-tested
frame strength on the issue of a publically funded
2
Another dimension of strength is whether the consideration em-
phasized in the frame is “available,” meaning that individuals are
able to connect a given consideration (e.g., free speech) to the issue
at hand (e.g., the hate group rally). When necessary (e.g., when it is
not evident that considerations are relevant), availability is assessed
by asking respondents to list what considerations come to mind when
they think of the issue.
casino and found that strong frames included the (posi-
tive) economic implications and (negative) social costs
of building the casino. Pretesting also demonstrated
that weak frames included the (positive) entertainment
value and (negative) moral implications surrounding
the casino’s construction. When another group of re-
spondents encountered a mix of these frames, only the
strong frames affected their opinion (e.g., a single ex-
posure to the strong economic frame moved opinion
by 41%), even in the face of multiple negative moral
value frames (also see Aarøe 2011). These results are
sensible insofar as the frames people find strong do in
fact dominate. This leads to our first hypothesis, which
echoes the aforementioned work:
Hypothesis 1: When presented with opposing strong frames,
individuals’ opinions will not be moved by either frame.
When presented with a strong frame on one side (e.g., pro)
and a weak frame on the other side (e.g., con), individuals’
opinions, if affected, will be moved only by the strong frame.
We added the “if affected” caveat to Hypothesis 1 be-
cause if individuals have very strong prior opinions
on an issue, they are unlikely to be persuaded in any
direction (e.g., Brewer 2001).
We briefly mention that we do not necessarily
equate “strong” frames with more normatively desir-
able opinions—particularly because strength i s based
on perceptions and not normatively derived criteria
per se. In our conclusion, we discuss the normative
implications of relying on strong frames as opposed to
other criteria. For now the question is whether parties,
particularly when polarized, influence which types of
frames, if any, that people follow. Do party endorse-
ments matter when frames are of different strengths?
Does polarization influence this process?
Party Competition
Even though most frames enter political discourse via
political actors (e.g., parties, interest groups), most
framing studies have provided study respondents with
either unattributed frames or frames attributed to a
news organization. Only a few studies have explored
how frames from parties influence citizens. The modal
finding of these studies is that party source does matter.
For example, Slothuus (2010) reports that, when parties
switch frames, their members follow (also see Nichol-
son 2011), although not blindly because partisans also
incorporate their own preexisting values. Slothuus and
de Vreese (2010) find that party-sponsored frames have
greater influence on issues where the parties conflict.
These studies, however, do not explore competitive
framing environments or vary frame strength (or the
substance of distinct arguments more generally), and
they do not directly account for different partisan en-
vironments (e.g., polarized or not).
Perhaps surprisingly, a similar assessment can be
made of the long-standing literature on party cues and
endorsement effects. (We use the terms “party cue”
and “party endorsements” interchangeably, although
we recognize that an endorsement is only one type of
cue.). Although scholars have long acknowledged cues
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American Political Science Review Vol. 107, No. 1
as central to opinion formation, little existing work
explores how citizens grapple with party cues in the
presence of substantive information. As Bullock (2011,
496) explains, “In spite of numerous claims about the
relative influence of policy attributes and position-
taking by party elites [i.e., party endorsements], di-
rect evidence is slight because few studies directly
compare the effects of these variables.” He continues,
noting that “in political debate, cues and frames al-
most always appear together: Party elites rarely take
a position without trying to frame it in a way that
will garner support for it” (511). Bullock (2011) re-
views the relevant literature (e.g., Arceneaux 2008,
Druckman et al. 2010) and tests the effects of party
cues versus policy arguments by varying the avail-
ability of cues and content. He finds that party cues
have an effect, but do not overwhelm content. He
concludes that “party cues are influential, but par-
tisans ... are generally affected at least as much –
and sometimes much more—by exposure to substantial
amounts of policy information” (2011, 512).
Although these results are telling, they are not suffi-
cient to address our question. We need to introduce two
variations that Bullock did not address: (1) variations in
argument type (e.g., frame strength) and (2) variations
in partisan polarization. By doing so we can examine
the conditions under which party cues dominate, re-
gardless of frame strength, as well as the conditions in
which frame strength is the more important factor (also
see Nicholson 2011).
To address how partisan polarization affects the rel-
ative influence of party cues and substantive arguments
on opinion formation, we draw on the theory of parti-
san motivated reasoning.
3
Motivated reasoning refers
to the tendency to seek out information that confirms
prior beliefs (i.e., a confirmation bias), view evidence
consistent with prior opinions as stronger or more ef-
fective (i.e., a prior attitude effect), and spend more
time arguing and dismissing evidence inconsistent with
prior opinions, regardless of objective accuracy (i.e.,
a disconfirmation bias).
4
These biases influence the r e-
ception of new information and may lead individuals to
“reason” their way to a desired conclusion. For exam-
ple, consider a George W. Bush supporter who receives
information suggesting that the president misled voters
about the Iraq war. Given these biases, this supporter
3
We recognize that there are two (nonexclusive) competing theories
of how party sponsorship may influence opinions. First, party spon-
sorship could work as a simple cue that people follow, with content
ignored entirely. Second, sponsorship could serve as a perceptual
anchor that shades the interpretation of information. We opt for
the latter approach here (see Petersen et al. n.d., for some direct evi-
dence), and we believe that some of the evidence we offer (regarding
assessment of argument content) is more consistent with the moti-
vated reasoning approach. That said, we recognize that our results
do not rule out the simple cue approach. This is not a problem per se,
because our interest lies in uncovering the effects of polarization on
citizen decision making and not in isolating the precise psychological
mechanism at work.
4
We employ the t erm “motivated reasoning,” but this should be
viewed as synonymous with Taber and Lodge’s (2006) “motivated
skepticism” and Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen’s (2012) “parti-
san perceptional screen.” We also focus on information evaluation
rather than information seeking (for evidence on information seek-
ing, see Druckman et al. 2012).
is likely to interpret this information as either false
or as evidence of strong leadership in times of crises.
Motivated reasoning will likely lead this supporter and
others like him or her to become even more support-
ive of Bush (e.g., Jacobson 2008). This same behavior
also takes place in the presence of partisan cues that
anchor reasoning (e.g., Bartels 2002; Goren, Federico,
and Kittilson 2009). For instance, individuals interpret
a policy in light of existing opinions concerning the
policy’s sponsor. Thus, a Democrat might view a Demo-
cratic policy as effective (e.g., a new economic stimulus
plan) and support it, whereas he or she would see the
same policy as less effective and perhaps even oppose
it if not endorsed by Democrats or if sponsored by
Republicans (e.g., Druckman and Bolsen 2011). Sim-
ilarly, Democrats (Republicans) may view economic
conditions favorably during a Democratic (Republi-
can) administration even if they would view the same
conditions negatively if Republicans (Democrats) were
in power (e.g., Bartels 2002; Lavine, Johnston, and
Steenbergen 2012).
5
In short, partisan motivated reasoning theory sug-
gests that partisans will view their party’s frame as more
effective than a frame not sponsored by their party
or a frame sponsored by the other party. This theory
also suggests that partisans will more likely be moved
by their own party’s frame, regardless of its strength.
This leads to two hypotheses. (In our hypotheses, it is
less interesting to examine when an individual’s own
party offers a strong frame because in that case both
pieces of information—the party sponsor and the frame
strength—push in the same direction.)
Hypothesis 2: When partisans receive a frame, regardless of
its strength, sponsored by their party and a conflicting frame,
regardless of its strength, sponsored by the other party, they
will view their own party’s frame as more effective and the
other party’s frame as less effective.
Hypothesis 3: When partisans receive a frame, regardless of
its strength, sponsored by their party and a conflicting frame,
regardless of its strength, sponsored by the other party, they
will be more likely to move in the direction of their party’s
frame than in the direction of the other party’s frame.
6
A number of factors moderate partisan motivated rea-
soning, including motivation itself. When individuals
are highly motivated to form accurate opinions, they
tend to focus on substance regardless of their parti-
sanship and/or prior opinions (e.g., Kunda 1990, 485;
also see Nir 2011; Prior 2007). Even so, most evidence
to date suggests that, on political issues, i ndividuals
generally lack such motivation and instead fall back on
5
This coheres with social identity theory—indeed, motivated rea-
soning should be driven by individuals’ desire to be loyal to and
consistent with their own group and to maximize difference with the
outgroup. Partisan groups are clearly important to political catego-
rization (Nicholson 2012; Smith et al. 2005).
6
It is implied that we expect perceptions of frame effectiveness
to mediate the process by which the frame will influence overall
attitude. Yet, we do not offer a formal prediction because, as will be
clear, the nature of our design—in which perceptions and attitudes
are measured simultaneously—means that directly testing this type
of mediational prediction is not possible.
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How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation February 2013
partisan motivated reasoning when interpreting new
information. Taber and Lodge (2006, 767) conclude,
“despite our best efforts to promote the even-handed
treatment of policy arguments in our studies, we find
consistent evidence of directional partisan bias....Our
participants may have tried to be evenhanded, but they
found it impossible to be fair-minded.”
That said, one factor that does moderate partisan
reasoning is the strength of partisan identity—those
who possess strong partisan identities are more inclined
to base their assessments of frames entirely on their
partisan priors. In contrast, weaker partisans are less
skewed by their identities and are more likely to re-
spond to content. Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen
(2012) present substantial evidence of this weakening
effect, concluding that partisan “ambivalence under-
cuts the judgmental confidence that citizens typically
derive from partisan cues, [and] they should turn away
from these perceptual anchors and pay more atten-
tion to the particulars” (chapter 5: 2; also see Druck-
man, Fein, and Leeper 2012; Redlawsk 2002; Taber and
Lodge 2006).
The evidence presented by Lavine, Johnston, and
Steenbergen (2012) suggests that, when a stimulus
prompts partisan ambivalence, motivated reasoning
should vitiate and a focus on the substance of the
frame should increase. The stimulus we focus on is
elite partisan polarization (as mentioned, elite polar-
ization is a measurement concept distinct from citizen
polarization; see Fiorina and Abrams 2008). We fol-
low convention and define elite polarization as having
“two components: the ideological distance between
the parties, and the ideological homogeneity of each
party” (Levendusky 2010, 118). As party elites polar-
ize and that polarization is relayed to citizens, partisans
should become less ambivalent about (i.e., more sure
of) their own party identity. This is the type of dynamic
uncovered by Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes (2012) who
find that negative campaigning between parties, which
stems from increased polarization, is “an especially im-
portant contextual factor that heightens the salience of
partisan identity.” Similarly, Dancey and Goren (2010,
686) explain, “When partisan elites debate an issue
and the news media cover it, partisan predispositions
are activated in the minds of citizens and subsequently
constrain their policy preferences.” Nicholson (2012,
52, 55) states, “In the American political system, one’s
political identity typically means one’s partisan identity
(see Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002), especially
in an era of partisan polarization.... In an environment
characterized by intergroup disagreement, the desire
to seek difference with the outgroup will likely be
strong.”
7
And Levendusky (2010, 114–15) adds, “When
elites are polarized, they send voters clearer signals
about where they stand on the issues of the day....
7
Slothuus and de Vreese (2010, 637) state, “In contrast to political
consensus, party conflict signals that partisan values are at stake and
emphasizes differences between parties. In such conflict situations,
citizens’ partisanship should to be more salient to them and hence
more likely be used in judging the applicability of framings of the
issue.”
As voters follow these party cues on multiple issues,
they begin to hold more consistent attitudes.” In sum,
under conditions of polarization, partisan identifica-
tion becomes stronger and less ambivalent, leading to
increased motivated reasoning (and stronger party cue
effects); see Nicholson (2012, 54–5) for further psycho-
logical discussion.
8
We should thus see stronger moti-
vated reasoning effects in the polarized conditions than
in the non-polarized environment.
Hypothesis 4: In a polarized environment, when partisans
receive a frame, regardless of its strength, sponsored by
their party, and a conflicting frame, regardless of its strength,
sponsored by the other party, they will view their own party’s
frame as more effective and the other party’s frame as less
effective—to a greater extent than they do in a non-polarized
environment (and/or a nonparty cue environment).
Hypothesis 5: When partisans receive a frame, regardless of
its strength, sponsored by their party and a conflicting frame,
regardless of its strength, sponsored by the other party, they
will be more likely to move in the direction of their party’s
frame than in the direction of the other party’s frame—to a
greater extent than they do in a non-polarized environment
(and/or a nonparty cue environment).
9,10
Our final hypothesis concerns the importance that a re-
spondent attributes to his or her updated opinion after
receiving the frame. When individuals engage in moti-
vated reasoning, their goal is to confirm an opinion they
already hold (Taber and Lodge 2006). They therefore
view new information as bolstering their prior opinion,
and this added evidence boosts the importance of that
opinion to them (e.g., via increased confidence in the
opinion). In contrast, when acting against a prior belief
(e.g., generated by the partisan perceptional screen),
people may become unsure about what to think and
thus view the opinion as less personally important (e.g.,
Brader 2006, chaps. 4–5). Our expectation of increased
attitude importance with partisan motivated reasoning
coheres with social psychological work in which social
identification is seen as “one of the antecedents of atti-
tude importance” (Smith et al. 2005, 168; Wyer 2010).
Specifically, Smith et al. (2005, 168) report that when
individuals perceived that an “issue was highly relevant
to the group under consideration, they reported t hat
their own attitudes were more personally important.”
8
We build on Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen (2012) given their
compelling evidence regarding attitude ambivalence; however, in
theory, other aspects of partisan identity can be affected via polar-
ization (e.g., importance of that identity, relevance of that identity,
etc.).
9
We again avoid a formal mediational prediction.
10
We previously noted that our predictions could be consistent with
a theory of partisan cue taking rather than partisan motivated rea-
soning. In this regard, it could be that the existence of polarization
indicates that the parties feel more strongly about the issue (are more
certain about their positions). This kind of certainty then makes the
cue stronger because t he source is more certain. We thank Gabe
Lenz for this point (April 17, 2011, personal communication). As
mentioned, although we believe our motivated reasoning approach
offers a fuller, more compelling explanation, it may be that the
process at work is cue taking, yet that does not alter our ultimate
substantive conclusions.
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American Political Science Review Vol. 107, No. 1
Hypothesis 6: Partisans will view their opinions as increas-
ingly important when receiving a frame with their parti-
san sponsor (versus a frame without their partisan spon-
sor) and, even more so, when this occurs in polarized
conditions.
11
EXPERIMENTAL TESTS OF PARTISAN
POLARIZATION AND FRAMING
We conducted two experiments to test our hypotheses
via the internet, with a sample drawn to be representa-
tive of the U.S. population, during the spring of 2011.
12
Both experiments appeared on the same survey.
One concern in any experiment concerning parti-
sanship is that asking about party identification primes
respondents to base attitudes on that identity. We were
thus fortunate that our survey experiments avoided this
problem by coming as part of a panel that started in the
summer of 2010. Respondents reported their partisan
identification by responding to the item, “Generally
speaking, which of the options on the scale below best
describes your party identification?” on a 7-point fully
labeled scale from strong Democrat to strong Repub-
lican. They also reported other demographic informa-
tion on this prior wave.
13
We focused our analyses on partisans; that is, indi-
viduals identifying with or leaning toward either party
(N = 646). As with Levendusky’s (2010, 120) experi-
ment on partisan polarization, we excluded pure inde-
pendents (also see, e.g., Bullock 2011). This approach
is typical because independent leaners are similar to
partisans in their vote choice and policy opinions (e.g.,
Lascher and Korey 2011). After excluding indepen-
dents, our sample consisted of 53% Democrats and
47% Republicans.
We next describe our experimental design, dis-
cussing the issues used in the experiments, the frames
we employed, our polarization manipulation, our pre-
cise experimental conditions, and our main dependent
measures.
11
We recognize that importance, like our aforementioned ambiva-
lence construct, is a dimension of attitude strength. As Visser, Bizer,
and Krosnick (2006) make clear, different types of attitude strength
are relevant in distinct situations and at varying points in the reason-
ing process. It is for this reason that we looked at different dimensions
and did not attempt to envelope them under a general rubric of
strength.
12
We contracted with a survey research company (Bovitz Inc.) to col-
lect the data. The sample was drawn from a panel of respondents who
had opted in to complete online surveys. The panel was originally
developed based on a random-digit-dial (RDD) telephone survey,
where to enter the panel a respondent needed to have access to the
internet; in this sense, it is a nonprobability sample in the same way as
those taken by firms such as Polimetrix are nonprobability samples.
The panel has continued to grow based on ongoing RDD recruiting
and referrals. From the panel, which has approximately 1 million
members, a given sample is drawn using a matching algorithm (based
on likely response rates) to ensure that those screened to qualify for
the survey constitute a sample that demographically represents the
United States.
13
Demographics of the sample are available from the authors; 45%
of t1 participants responded at t2, which is a fairly standard rate.
Policy Issues
One experiment focused on an energy policy proposal:
drilling for oil and gas. The second experiment ex-
amined immigration policy, specifically the DREAM
Act—which stands for the Development, Relief, and
Education for Alien Minors Act. These two issues
share several features that make them well suited for
testing our hypotheses. First, both received attention in
policy debates in the United States prior to our study
and thus are meaningful and relevant issues. Although
drilling for oil in the ocean began in the late 1800s
and became widely used in the mid-twentieth century
the issue received substantial attention in U.S. politics
during 2010. In March of that year, President Obama
announced that the United States would allow drilling
for oil and gas off the Atlantic Coast and in the east-
ern Gulf of Mexico. He suggested it was necessary to
sustain economic growth. Then, on April 20, 2010, the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the worst offshore oil spill
in U.S. history, occurred in the Gulf of Mexico. Conse-
quently, the Obama administration shifted policy and
decided that it would not open up new areas of the east-
ern Gulf and Atlantic seaboard to drilling, at least for
seven years. Similarly, the DREAM Act, a legislative
proposal first introduced in the U.S. Senate in 2001, has
been regularly debated in the U.S. Congress and several
state legislatures over the last decade. Although the
bill has been proposed in various forms, its core is the
creation of a pathway to citizenship for undocumented
immigrants living in the United States, provided they
entered the United States before age 16, graduated
from high school, have “good moral character,” and
have completed at least two years of college or served
at least t wo years in the U.S. military.
14
Second, we suspect that, although these issues are
topically relevant, the public’s opinions on them are
not crystallized and, indeed, are somewhat conflicted.
As we discuss later in further detail, this conflict stems
from t he existence of many competing considerations
on each issue (Krauss and Broder 2012). As with most
other work, we opted for such conflict because it means
there is room for movement in our experiments (see,
e.g., Chong and Druckman 2010, 667; Druckman and
Leeper 2012b; Levendusky 2010, 119–20; Nicholson
2011; Slothuus 2011).
Third, it was important that we chose i ssues on
which the parties do not consistently hold dramatically
different positions.
15
Doing so allows our experimen-
tal prompts to shape the perceived level of partisan
14
In June 2012, President Obama enacted elements of this proposal
through an executive order that halted the deportation of undocu-
mented immigrants eligible for the DREAM Act.
15
We also chose issues that were not “owned” by either party to
ensure each party had roughly equivalent credibility in discussing an
issue. Pew data asking which party does a “better job” at handing a
given issue show that, in September 2010, respondents gave Republi-
cans an advantage on immigration with 39% citing the Republicans,
32% citing the Democrats, and the others saying both, neither, or
don’t know. For the question about which party does a better job
handling energy, which was asked in March 2011, there is a near
split, with 42% saying the Democrats could do a better job and 37%
favoring the Republicans (Pew Research Center 2010; 2011).
61