Journal Article•
"If Property Rights Were Treated Like Human Rights, They Could Never Get away with This": Blacklisting and Due Process in U.S. Economic Sanctions Programs
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the processes used by OFAC to establish, impose, and implement such sanctions on a particular destination, and the closely related process of blacklisting particular parties associated with the sanctioned destination.
Abstract: Economic sanctions have proliferated in the last half of the twentieth century, and become the "first choice" of U.S. policymakers seeking tools to address many complex international issues. A key feature of these various sanctions programs is the use of a blacklist, to bring third party agents, controlled entities, and corporate cloaks operating elsewhere within the ambit of the sanctions aimed at a particular country or destination. These blacklists have now grown to include several thousand individuals and entities. However, despite the growing importance of economic sanctions, and their accompanying blacklists, these programs are still managed by a relatively small office within the Treasury Department, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Using the example of the IPT Company, Inc., a small but long established U.S. based corporation with foreign ownership, and the economic sanctions program targeted at the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, this Article examines the processes used by OFAC to establish, impose, and implement such sanctions on a particular destination, and the closely related process of blacklisting particular parties associated with the sanctioned destination. It explores the unique, adversarial, relationship with the public which characterized much of OFAC's operations until recent years, and the impact that attitude has had on the promulgation, notice, distribution, and enforcement of OFAC's regulations. After considering the important, but limited, role individual case by case challenges have played in improving these processes, the Article concludes by suggesting that new legislation is required to remedy ongoing deficiencies in OFAC's implementation of its programs. Accordingly, it concludes by urging that the pending Sanctions Reform Act be expanded to provide detailed guidance on how sanctions should be implemented, in a manner similar to the way the U.S. Congress has both directed and overseen the operation of the export control system with the Export Administration Act.
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15 Feb 2010
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a taxonomy of international prisoner transfer, money laundering and counterterrorism financial enforcement, and economic integration and business crimes, with a focus on the international community.
Abstract: 1. Introduction 2. Taxation 3. Money laundering and counterterrorism financial enforcement 4. Transnational corruption 5. Transnational organized crime 6. Export control and economic sanctions 7. Extraterritorial jurisdiction 8. Evidence gathering 9. Extradition 10. International prisoner transfer 11. United Nations 12. The World Bank Group 13. Interpol 14. Economic integration and business crimes.
26 citations
01 Aug 2015
TL;DR: In the United States, several agencies issue regulations and licenses to control exports based on different statutes as mentioned in this paper, and these regulations then interact with numerous free-standing pieces of legislation, many of which are not enacted as amendments to basic statutes or codified.
Abstract: Introduction Export controls and related rules and restrictions, especially those imposed by the United States, create a “frightful labyrinth” for practitioners. In the United States, several agencies issue regulations and licenses to control exports based on different statutes. These regulations then interact with numerous free-standing pieces of legislation, many of which are not enacted as amendments to basic statutes or codified. As a result, it can be hard to find and understand the various applicable laws. In addition, the objectivity and transparency one finds in other regulatory areas are often missing from the export control area. Finally, practitioners working in the export control field often find that limitations on judicial review and judicial deference to the executive branch on matters related to foreign policy or national security result in relatively little oversight of official actions. Economic sanctions are even broader than export controls, encompassing the imposition by governmental or international organizations of economic sanctions for noneconomic foreign policy reasons. Examples include a variety of trade and investment sanctions against apartheid-era South Africa; financial and other sanctions against Panama; measures against Libya, especially after the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103; UN sanctions against Sudanese leaders and against former Liberian head of state Charles Taylor; U.S. sanctions targeting narcotics traffickers and kingpins; and U.S. and international sanctions against persons engaged in transnational terrorism. Sanctioning parties have three possible mechanisms by which to inflict costs on targeted countries: limiting exports, restricting imports, and impeding finances, including reducing aid. Trade sanctions involve costs to the target country in terms of lost export markets, denial of critical imports, lower prices for embargoed exports, and higher domestic prices for substitute imports. In cases where only export or import controls have been invoked, the targeting countries generally prefer export controls to restrictions on imports.
2 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, actividad sancionadora del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas desde the perspective of constitucionalism is analyzed.
Abstract: El presente articulo analiza actividad sancionadora del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas desde la perspectiva constitucional. Tras constatar las dificultades iniciales para exigir responsabilidad a las organizaciones internacionales en general, el trabajo se centra en las llamadas sanciones "inteligentes", directas o selectivas y en las vias para limitar este poder sancionador del Consejo de Seguridad. El autor concluira que es necesario que dicho organismo vaya asumiendo progresivamente los principios constitucionales que otros ordenamientos de naturaleza constitucional manejan para garantizar la legitimidad de su poder sancionador, la efectividad de dichas sanciones asi como contribuir a la progresiva estabilizacion de las relaciones interordinamentales.
1 citations
01 Jan 2012
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze the sanctioning power of the UN Security Council from a constitutional perspective and conclude on the necessity for this organism to assume progressively certain constitutional principles that other constitutional legal orders accept in order to guarantee the legitimacy of its sanction power, the effectiveness of these sanctions as well as to contribute to the stabilization of the inter-ordinal relations.
Abstract: Resumen . El presente articulo analiza actividad sancionadora del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas desde la perspectiva constitucional. Tras constatar las dificultades iniciales para exigir responsabilidad a las organizaciones internacionales en general, el trabajo se centra en las llamadas sanciones “inteligentes”, directas o selectivas y en las vias para limitar este poder sancionador del Consejo de Seguridad. El autor concluira que es necesario que dicho organismo vaya asumiendo progresivamente los principios constitucionales que otros ordenamientos de naturaleza constitucional manejan para garantizar la legitimidad de su poder sancionador, la efectividad de dichas sanciones asi como contribuir a la progresiva estabilizacion de las relaciones interordinamentales. Abst RA ct . This article analyzes the sanctioning power of the UN Security Council from a constitutional perspective. After acknowledging the difficulties of the International Organizations to be accountable, this paper focuses on the so-called “smart” or “targeted sanctions” and the ways to limit the sanctioning power of the Security Council. The author will conclude on the necessity for this organism to assume progressively certain constitutional principles that other constitutional legal orders accept in order to guarantee the legitimacy of its sanctioning power, the effectiveness of these sanctions as well as to contribute to the stabilization of the inter-ordinal relations. PA l A b RA s cl A ve . Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, Sanciones inteligentes, ordenamientos consti