Abstract: UNTVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY Department of Economics Berkeley, CaHfornia 94720-3880 Working Paper No. 97-251 Psychology and Economics Matthew Rabin Department of Economics University of California, Berkeley January 1997 Key words: bounded rationality, decision making, fairness, framing effects, heuristics and biases, preferences, psychology, reciprocity, reference-dependent utility JEL Classification: A12, B49, D i l , D60, D81, D83, D91 This is a longer version of an essay under preparation for possible publication in the Journal of Economic Literature. I thank John Pencavel and anonymous referees for earlier comments on its structure and content. For comments on this draft, I thank Steven Blatt, Colin Camerer, Peter Diamond, Erik Eyster, Ernst Fehr, Danny Kahneman, George Loewenstein, Ted O'Donoghue, and John Pencavel. For helpful conversations over the past several years on topics covered in this essay, I thank George Akerlof, Gary Chamess, Eddie Dekel, Peter Diamond, David Laibson, David I. Levine, George Loewenstein, Rob MacCoun, James Montgomery, Vai-Lam Mui, Drazen Prelec, and especially Colin Camerer, Danny Kahneman, and Richard Thaler. Co-authors on research related to the topics of this essay include David Bowman, Deborah Minehart, Ted O'Donoghue, and Joel Schrag. Helpful research assistance was provided by Gadi Barlevy, Nikki Blasberg, Gail Brennan, Paul Ellickson, April Franco, Marcus Heng, Bruce Hsu, Jin Woo Jung, and especially Steven Blatt, Jimmy Chan, Erik Eyster, and Clara Wang. I am extremely grateful for financial support from the Russell Sage and Alfred P. Sloan Foundations.