Individual Behavior and Group Membership
Summary (1 min read)
INSTRUCTIONS (room R)
- They have been randomly divided into two rooms, each with 10 people.
- These are actual dollars that will be paid in cash.
- All people in the room (except for the person from the other room) will be able to watch the decider who belongs to their room make his or her choice (however, no verbal comments are permitted).
- Your green numbers indicate the rounds during which it will be your turn to make a decision in the room where you are now (room R).
INSTRUCTIONS
- Thank you for participating in this experiment.
- There are 20 people participating in this session.
- There will be 10 rounds in this session, and each person will make a decision in each round.
- In some periods, you will be paired with someone in your color group, while in other periods you will be paired with someone in the other color group.
- Each person will be making a simultaneous choice between A and B in the following decision matrix:.
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Citations
Cites background or methods from "Individual Behavior and Group Membe..."
...Charness et al. (2006) show that making group membership salient significantly increases the choice of an aggressive stance in the battle of the sexes and leads to more defections in the prisoners dilemma game....
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...7 4The paintings are the same as in Chen and Li (2009) and Chen and Chen (2011): Gebirgsbildung, 1924, by Klee; Subdued Glow, 1928, by Kandinsky; Dreamy Improvisation, 1913, by Kandinsky; Warning of the Ships, 1917, by Klee; Dry-Cool Garden, 1921, by Klee; Landscape with Red Splashes I, 1913, by Kandinsky; Gentle Ascent, 1934, by Kandinsky; A Hoffmannesque Tale, 1921, by Klee; Development in Brown, 1933, by Kandinsky; The Vase, 1938, by Klee. 5Monument in Fertile Country, 1929, by Klee; Start, 1928, by Kandinsky. 6This variant of the Klee and Kandinsky task was chosen based on findings by Chen and Li (2009) who compare group assignment based on picture preferences and random groups and chat/no chat treatments....
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...A social preference function that depends on social identity similar to the utility functions used by Chen and Li (2009) and Chen and Chen (2011) is applied to the game to derive equilibrium solutions and comparative statics results. Social identity is induced by using Chen and Chen (2011)’s variant of the Klee-Kandinsky painting task to increase group contributions in a group contest game. By letting subjects solve a task with group communication groups are made salient but this fails to enhance group contributions. Group contributions are not significantly different from the control treatment which is not in line with the theory and previous findings on the positive effect of social identity on effort and contribution in coordination and public good games. Group contributions in the social identity treatment seem to follow a negative trend that is not prevalent in the control treatment. Looking at the individual contribution decision of subjects supports the finding that contributions in the social identity treatment are decreasing at a faster rate than in the control treatment. There is no indication that chatting or closeness have an effect on individual contributions. The reason for the negative trend in the social identity treatment is open for speculation. It could be argued that subjects have higher expectations in other group members after bonding with them in the Klee and Kandinsky task and are than more disappointed when those expectations are not met, leading to more free-riding. The theoretical model employed in this paper suggests that if beliefs are introduced and subjects believe that other members of the own group increase contributions, it would be a best response to decrease the own contributions. An increase in contributions due to a higher weight on the payoffs of other group members could than be canceled out by the belief that other group members contribute more and the aggregated effect could become negative. Furthermore, if subjects were to believe that the members of the other group are completely unselfish and are also unselfish themselves, the comparative statics suggest that equilibrium contributions would not change with changes in social identity. This highlights the need for more research of the interaction of beliefs and social identity and especially of situations in which changes in beliefs might cause an effect that is opposed to the expected effect of a change in social preferences. The social identity manipulation that is employed in the study closely follows the design employed by Chen and Li (2009) and Chen and Chen (2011) who found a significant effect of identity on behavior....
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...A social preference function that depends on social identity similar to the utility functions used by Chen and Li (2009) and Chen and Chen (2011) is applied to the game to derive equilibrium solutions and comparative statics results. Social identity is induced by using Chen and Chen (2011)’s variant of the Klee-Kandinsky painting task to increase group contributions in a group contest game....
[...]
...7 4The paintings are the same as in Chen and Li (2009) and Chen and Chen (2011): Gebirgsbildung, 1924, by Klee; Subdued Glow, 1928, by Kandinsky; Dreamy Improvisation, 1913, by Kandinsky; Warning of the Ships, 1917, by Klee; Dry-Cool Garden, 1921, by Klee; Landscape with Red Splashes I, 1913, by Kandinsky; Gentle Ascent, 1934, by Kandinsky; A Hoffmannesque Tale, 1921, by Klee; Development in Brown, 1933, by Kandinsky; The Vase, 1938, by Klee....
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References
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"Individual Behavior and Group Membe..." refers background in this paper
...1 Some notable exceptions include Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Alesina et alii (2003), and Easterly and Levine (1997)....
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