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Journal Article•DOI•

Individual Behavior and Group Membership

Gary Charness1, Luca Rigotti2, Aldo Rustichini3•
University of California, Santa Barbara1, University of Pittsburgh2, University of Minnesota3
21 Dec 2006-Social Science Research Network-
TL;DR: In this paper, the saliency of group membership was investigated in two strategic games, the Battle of the Sexes and Prisoner's Dilemma, and it was shown that saliency affects the perception of the environment.
Abstract: People who are members of a group and identify with it behave differently from people who perceive themselves as isolated individuals. This difference depends on two main factors. First, preferences over outcomes change with the degree of identification with the group. Second, this identification depends on the saliency of the group structure. This paper tests these hypotheses and shows that group membership affects preferences over outcomes, and saliency of the group affects the perception of the environment. In two strategic environments, Battle of the Sexes and Prisoner's Dilemma, we create groups by allocating subjects to be Row or Column players. We manipulate the saliency of group membership by letting a player's own group watch as a passive audience as decisions are made, and by making part of the payoff common for members of the group. There is a strong and significant effect of group membership: It increases the aggressive stance of the hosts (people who have their group members in the audience), and reduces the one of the guests. The effect on outcomes depends on the game: In the Battle of the Sexes, the aggressiveness of hosts leads to more coordination; in the Prisoner's Dilemma, it leads to less cooperation. In the first case efficiency is increased, while in the second it is diminished. We also test for differences between in-group and out-group behavior in Prisoner's Dilemma games. In contrast to the minimal-group paradigm of the social-psychology literature, minimal groups do not affect behavior in our strategic environment. We see strong differences between in-group and out-group behavior only when we increase the saliency of group membership by having a degree of common payoffs.

Summary (1 min read)

Jump to: [INSTRUCTIONS (room R)] and [INSTRUCTIONS]

INSTRUCTIONS (room R)

  • They have been randomly divided into two rooms, each with 10 people.
  • These are actual dollars that will be paid in cash.
  • All people in the room (except for the person from the other room) will be able to watch the decider who belongs to their room make his or her choice (however, no verbal comments are permitted).
  • Your green numbers indicate the rounds during which it will be your turn to make a decision in the room where you are now (room R).

INSTRUCTIONS

  • Thank you for participating in this experiment.
  • There are 20 people participating in this session.
  • There will be 10 rounds in this session, and each person will make a decision in each round.
  • In some periods, you will be paired with someone in your color group, while in other periods you will be paired with someone in the other color group.
  • Each person will be making a simultaneous choice between A and B in the following decision matrix:.

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APPENDIX A: Instructions
(Prisoner’s Dilemma)
INSTRUCTIONS (room R)
Thank you for participating in this experiment. You will receive $5 for your participation, in addition to other
money to be paid as a result of decisions made in the experiment.
There are 20 people participating in this session. They have been randomly divided into two rooms, each with 10
people. You are in room R, this means you are a Row decider.
There will be ten rounds in this session
, and each person will make two decisions, one in each room. You have a
card with a green number and a card with a (different) yellow number. These numbers will determine when and
where you make decisions.
Your green number indicates the round during which it will be your turn to make a decision in the room where
you are now (room R).
Your yellow number indicates the round during which it will be your turn to go to the other room (room C) and
make a decision there.
In each round there are two people making a decision. Each person will be making a simultaneous choice between A
and B in the following decision matrix:
Column
A B
A 5 , 5 1 , 7
Row
B 7 , 1 2 , 2
In each cell, the first number represents the outcome for the Row decider and the second number represents the
outcome for the Column decider.
Thus, if both people choose A, the Row decider receives 5 and the Column decider receives 5. If both people choose
B, the Row decider receives 2 and the Column decider receives 2. If the Row decider chooses A and the Column
decider chooses B, the Row decider receives 1 and the Column decider receives 7. If the Row decider chooses B and
the Column decider chooses A, the Row decider receives 7 and the Column decider receives 1.
The other nine members of each room also have a financial stake in the outcome – each person not making a
decision receives 1/3 of the amount shown for the realized outcome.
Thus, if both deciders choose A, every inactive person in room R receives 5/3 and every inactive person from room
C receives 5/3. If both deciders choose B, every inactive person from room R receives 2/3 and every inactive person
from room C receives 2/3. If the Row decider chooses A and the Column decider chooses B, every inactive person
from room R receives 1/3 and every inactive person from room R receives 7/3. If the Row decider chooses B and the
Column decider chooses A, every inactive person from room R receives 7/3 and every inactive person from room R
receives 1/3.
Each unit is worth $0.50 in actual money (2 units = $1) that will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment.
All people in the room (except for the person from the other room) will be able to watch the decider who belongs to
their room make his or her choice (however, no verbal comments are permitted).
The decision of the person who walks into the room, on the other hand, is made privately.
2
The outcome of the joint decision is immediately revealed to all people in the room.
After the 10 rounds are completed, we will total each person’s earnings (from the outcomes of the two self-made
decisions, as well as the other 18 outcomes), add the $5 show-up fee, and pay each person individually and
privately, using the numbers on your two cards to identify your decisions.
Please feel free to ask questions.
3
(Battle of the Sexes)
INSTRUCTIONS (room R)
Thank you for participating in this experiment. You will receive $5 for your participation, in addition to other
money to be paid as a result of decisions made in the experiment.
There are 20 people participating in this session. They have been randomly divided into two rooms, each with 10
people. You are in room R, this means you are a Row decider.
There will be ten rounds in this session
, and each person will make two decisions, one in each room. You have a
card with a green number and a card with a (different) yellow number. These numbers will determine when and
where you make decisions.
Your green number indicates the round during which it will be your turn to make a decision in the room where
you are now (room R).
Your yellow number indicates the round during which it will be your turn to go to the other room (room C) and
make a decision there.
In each round there are two people making a decision. Each person will be making a simultaneous choice between A
and B in the following decision matrix:
Column
A B
A 3 , 1 0 , 0
Row
B 0 , 0 1 , 3
In each cell, the first number represents the outcome for the decider Row and the second number represents the
outcome for the decider Column.
Thus, if both people choose A, the decider Row receives $3 and the decider Column receives $1. If both people
choose B, the decider Row receives $1 and the decider Column receives $3. If non-identical letters are chosen, each
decider receives 0. These are actual dollars that will be paid in cash.
The other nine members of each room also have a financial stake in the outcome – each person not making a
decision receives 1/3 of the amount shown for the realized outcome.
Thus, if both deciders choose A, every person in room R receives $1 and every person in room C receives $1/3. If
both deciders choose B, every person in room R receives $1/3 and every person in room C receives $1. If non-
identical letters are chosen, everyone receives 0. These are also actual dollars that will be paid in cash.
All people in the room (except for the person from the other room) will be able to watch the decider who belongs to
their room make his or her choice (however, no verbal comments are permitted).
The decision of the person who walks into the room, on the other hand, is made privately.
The outcome of the joint decision is immediately revealed to all people in the room.
After the 10 rounds are completed, we will total each person’s earnings (from the outcomes of the two self-made
decisions, as well as the other 18 outcomes), add the $5 show-up fee, and pay each person individually and
privately, using the numbers on your two cards to identify your decisions.
Please feel free to ask questions.
4
(Battle of the Sexes: No Shared payoff)
INSTRUCTIONS (room R)
Thank you for participating in this experiment. You will receive $8 for your participation, in addition to other
money to be paid as a result of decisions made in the experiment.
There are 20 people participating in this session. They have been randomly divided into two rooms, each with 10
people. You are in room R, this means you are a Row decider.
There will be 20 rounds in this session
, and each person will make four decisions, two in each room. You have a two
card with green numbers and two cards with (different) yellow numbers. These numbers will determine when and
where you make decisions.
Your green numbers indicate the rounds during which it will be your turn to make a decision in the room where
you are now (room R).
Your yellow numbers indicate the rounds during which it will be your turn to go to the other room (room C) and
make a decision there.
In each round there are two people making a decision in each room. Each person will be making a simultaneous
choice between A and B in the following decision matrix:
Column
A B
A 3 , 1 0 , 0
Row
B 0 , 0 1 , 3
In each cell, the first number represents the outcome for the Row decider and the second number represents the
outcome for the Column decider.
Thus, if both people choose A, the Row decider receives 3 and the Column decider receives 1. If both people
choose B, the Row decider receives 1 and the Column decider receives 3. If the Row decider chooses A and the
Column decider chooses B, the Row decider receives 0 and the Column decider receives 0. If the Row decider
chooses B and the Column decider chooses A, the Row decider receives 0 and the Column decider receives 0. The
payment to the other people in the room is not affected by what the two people playing choose to do.
Each unit is worth $1 in actual money that will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment.
All people in the room (except for the person from the other room) will be able to watch the decider who belongs to
their room make his or her choice (however, no verbal comments are permitted).
The decision of the person who walks into the room, on the other hand, is made privately.
The outcome of the joint decision is immediately revealed to all people in the room.
After the 20 rounds are completed, we will total each person’s earnings and pay each person individually and
privately, using the numbers on your four cards to identify your decisions.
Please feel free to ask questions.
5
(Split audience)
INSTRUCTIONS (room R)
Thank you for participating in this experiment. You will receive $5 for your participation, in addition to other
money to be paid as a result of decisions made in the experiment.
There are 32 people participating in this session. They have been randomly divided into two rooms, each with 16
people. You are in room R, this means you are a member of the Row group.
Half of the people in this room will function as the audience and the other half of the people in this room will make
decisions. The people in the audience will remain in Room R, while the deciders will wait in another room until it is
time for their decisions.
There will be eight rounds in this session
, and each non-audience person will make two decisions, one in each room.
Such people will have a card with a green number and a card with a (different) yellow number. These numbers will
determine when and where they shall make decisions.
For the deciders:
The green number indicates the round during which it will be time to make a decision in the room where you are
now (room R).
The yellow number indicates the round during which it will be time to go to the other room (room C) and make a
decision there.
In each round there are two people making a decision in each room. Each person will be making a simultaneous
choice between A and B in the following decision matrix:
Column
A B
A 3 , 1 0 , 0
Row
B 0 , 0 1 , 3
In each cell, the first number represents the outcome for the decider Row and the second number represents the
outcome for the decider Column.
The other 15 members of each room also have a financial stake in the outcome – each person not making a decision
receives 1/3 of the amount shown for the realized outcome.
Thus, if both deciders choose A, the Row decider receives $3 and the Column decider receives $1; every non-
decider in the Row group receives $1 and every non-decider in the Column group receives $1/3. If both deciders
choose B, the Row decider receives $1 and the Column decider receives $3; every non-decider in the Row group
receives $1/3 and every non-decider in the Column group receives $1. If non-identical letters are chosen, everyone
receives 0. These are actual dollars that will be paid in cash.
Each person making a decision in the room will pass, face down, one of the decision cards to the experimenter, who
will reveal the choices when both cards have been passed. All people in the room will be able to observe the
outcome. However, no verbal comments are permitted at any time during the experiment.
After the eight rounds are completed, we will total each person’s earnings, add the $5 show-up fee, and pay each
person individually and privately, using the numbers on your two cards to identify your decisions. Audience
members receive an extra $1.
Please feel free to ask questions.
Citations
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Journal Article•DOI•
When are women willing to lead? The effect of team gender composition and gendered tasks

[...]

Jingnan Chen1, Daniel Houser2•
University of Exeter1, George Mason University2
20 Nov 2019-Leadership Quarterly
TL;DR: For example, this paper found that women in mixed-gender groups are twice as likely as women in single gender groups to suffer from the gender stereotype effect, by shying away from leadership in areas that are gender-incongruent.
Abstract: It is a well-documented phenomenon that a group's gender composition can impact group performance. Understanding why and how this phenomenon happens is a prominent puzzle in the literature. To shed light on this puzzle, we propose and experimentally test one novel theory: through the salience of gender stereotype, a group's gender composition affects a person's willingness to lead a group, thereby impacting the group's overall performance. By randomly assigning people to groups with varying gender compositions, we find that women in mixed-gender groups are twice as likely as women in single-gender groups to suffer from the gender stereotype effect, by shying away from leadership in areas that are gender-incongruent. Further, we provide evidence that the gender stereotype effect persists even for women in single-gender groups. Importantly, however, we find that public feedback about a capable woman's performance significantly increases her willingness to lead. This result holds even in male-stereotyped environments.

29 citations

Journal Article•DOI•
Higher-Order Risk Preferences in Social Settings

[...]

Timo Heinrich1, Thomas Mayrhofer1•
University of Duisburg-Essen1
06 Oct 2014-Social Science Research Network
TL;DR: The majority of choices are risk averse, prudent, and temperate across social settings and individuals are influenced significantly by the preferences of a partner when they are able to communicate and choices are payoff-relevant for both of them.
Abstract: We study higher-order risk preferences, i.e. prudence and temperance, next to risk aversion in social settings. Previous experimental studies have shown that higher-order risk preferences affect the choices of individuals deciding privately on lotteries that only affect their own pay-off. Yet, most risky and financially relevant decisions in the field are made in the social settings of households or organizations. We aim to narrow the gap between laboratory and field evidence by creating a more realistic decision making environment in the laboratory that allows us to identify the influence of different social settings under controlled conditions. We elicit higher-order risk preferences of individuals and systematically vary how an individual’s decision is made (alone or while communicating with a partner) and who is affected by the decision (only the individual or the partner as well). In doing so, we can isolate the effects of other-regarding concerns and communication on choices. We observe that individuals become more risk-averse when the partner is able to communicate with the decision maker. However, we do not observe an influence of social settings on prudence and temperance. Our results reveal that the majority of choices are risk-averse, prudent, and temperate across social settings.

29 citations

Journal Article•DOI•
Dishonesty Under Scrutiny

[...]

Jeroen van de Ven1, Jeroen van de Ven2, Marie Claire Villeval3, Marie Claire Villeval4•
University of Amsterdam1, Tinbergen Institute2, Institute for the Study of Labor3, Centre national de la recherche scientifique4
22 Nov 2014-Social Science Research Network
TL;DR: The authors investigate how different forms of scrutiny affect dishonesty, using Gneezy's deception game, and find that lying behavior is not sensitive to revealing the sender's identity to the observer.
Abstract: We investigate how different forms of scrutiny affect dishonesty, using Gneezy’s (2005) deception game. We add a third player whose interests are aligned with those of the sender. We find that lying behavior is not sensitive to revealing the sender’s identity to the observer. The option for observers to communicate with the sender, and the option to reveal the sender’s lies to the receiver also do not affect lying behavior. Even more striking, senders whose identity is revealed to their observer do not lie less when their interests are misaligned with those of the observer.

29 citations

Cites background from "Individual Behavior and Group Membe..."

  • ...Charness et al. (2007) find that people are more likely to play defect in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game when they are observed by group members who also have a stake 2 It is a bit arbitrary to classify lies as advantageous when (1) holds with equality....

    [...]

Journal Article•DOI•
The Subgroup Problem: When Can Binding Voting on Extractions from a Common Resource Pool Overcome the Tragedy of the Commons?

[...]

Mark Bernard1, Anna Dreber1, Pontus Strimling2, Kimmo Eriksson3, Kimmo Eriksson2 •
Stockholm School of Economics1, Stockholm University2, Mälardalen University College3
17 Mar 2011-Social Science Research Network
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined how cooperation varies with the level at which (binding) votes are aggregated and found that when players can vote on the behavior of the whole group or when leaders from each group can vote for the group as a whole, extraction levels from the common resource pool are close to the social optimum.
Abstract: Using a common pool resource game protocol with voting we examine experimentally how cooperation varies with the level at which (binding) votes are aggregated. Our results are broadly in line with theoretical predictions. When players can vote on the behavior of the whole group or when leaders from each group can vote for the group as a whole, extraction levels from the common resource pool are close to the social optimum. When players extract resources individually, there is substantial overextraction. When players vote in subgroups, there is initially less overextraction but it increases over time. This suggests that in order for binding voting to overcome the tragedy of the commons in social dilemmas, it should ideally affect the group as a whole.

29 citations

Journal Article•DOI•
The Non-Equivalence of Labour Market Taxes: A Real-Effort Experiment

[...]

Matthias Weber1, Arthur Schram2, Arthur Schram3•
University of St. Gallen1, University of Amsterdam2, Tinbergen Institute3
22 May 2015-Social Science Research Network
TL;DR: In a real-effort experiment as discussed by the authors, the effects of these taxes on preferences concerning the size of the public sector, subjective well-being, labor supply, and on-the-job performance were investigated.
Abstract: Under full rationality, a labour market tax levied on employers and a corresponding income tax levied on employees are equivalent. With boundedly rational agents, this equivalence is no longer obvious. In a real-effort experiment, we study the effects of these taxes on preferences concerning the size of the public sector, subjective well-being, labor supply, and on-the-job performance. Our findings suggest that employer-side taxes induce preferences for a larger public sector. Subjective well-being is higher under employer-side taxes while labor supply is lower, at least at the extensive margin. We discuss three mechanisms that may underlie these results.

29 citations

Cites background from "Individual Behavior and Group Membe..."

  • ...Second, subjects with other-regarding preferences are affected differently when (as in the world outside of the laboratory) their decisions have real consequences for another person (Charness et al., 2007; Sutter, 2009)....

    [...]

References
More filters
An integrative theory of intergroup conflict

[...]

Henri Tajfel, John C. Turner1•
Australian National University1
01 Jan 2001

14,106 citations

Journal Article•DOI•
Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory.

[...]

John C. Turner, Michael A. Hogg, Penelope J. Oakes, Stephen Reicher, Margaret Wetherell 
01 Jul 1989-Contemporary Sociology
TL;DR: In this paper, a self-categorization theory is proposed to discover the social group and the importance of social categories in the analysis of social influence, and the Salience of social Categories is discussed.
Abstract: 1. Introducing the Problem: Individual and Group 2. Rediscovering the Social Group 3. A Self-Categorization Theory 4. The Analysis of Social Influence 5. Social Identity 6. The Salience of Social Categories 7. Social Identity and Group Polarization 8. Crowd Behaviour as Social Action 9. Conclusion.

8,872 citations

Journal Article•DOI•
Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions

[...]

William Easterly1, Ross Levine2•
World Bank1, University of Virginia2
01 Nov 1997-Quarterly Journal of Economics
TL;DR: This article showed that ethnic diversity helps explain cross-country differences in public policies and other economic indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa, and that high ethnic fragmentation explains a significant part of most of these characteristics.
Abstract: Explaining cross-country differences in growth rates requires not only an understanding of the link between growth and public policies, but also an understanding of why countries choose different public policies. This paper shows that ethnic diversity helps explain cross-country differences in public policies and other economic indicators. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, economic growth is associated with low schooling, political instability, underdeveloped financial systems, distorted foreign exchange markets, high government deficits, and insufficient infrastructure. Africa's high ethnic fragmentation explains a significant part of most of these characteristics.

5,648 citations

"Individual Behavior and Group Membe..." refers background in this paper

  • ...1 Some notable exceptions include Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Alesina et alii (2003), and Easterly and Levine (1997)....

    [...]

Book•
The Principles of Scientific Management

[...]

Frederick Winslow Taylor
01 Jan 1911
TL;DR: The Taylor System as discussed by the authors was developed as a system for increasing productivity in industry, and its principles have been applied to all kinds of large-scale enterprises, including operations with departments and agencies of the federal government.
Abstract: This brief essay by the founder of scientific management has served for nearly a century as a primer for administrators and for students of managerial techniques. Although scientific management was developed primarily as a system for increasing productivity in industry, its principles have been applied to all kinds of large-scale enterprises, including operations with departments and agencies of the federal government. It is in this volume that Frederick Winslow Taylor gave the theory of scientific management its clearest airing. Born in 1856, Taylor began work at age eighteen as an apprentice to a pattern-maker and as a machinist. A few years later he joined the Midvale Steel Company as a laborer, and in eight years rose to chief engineer. During this time he developed and tested what he called the "task system," which became known as the Taylor System and eventually as scientific management. He made careful experiments to determine the best way of performing each operation and the amount of time it required, analyzing the materials, tools, and work sequence, and establishing a clear division of labor between management and workers. His experiments laid the groundwork for the principles that are expounded in this essay, which was first published in 1911.

5,361 citations

Journal Article•DOI•
Economics and Identity

[...]

George A. Akerlof1, Rachel E. Kranton2•
University of California, Berkeley1, University of Maryland, College Park2
01 Aug 2000-Quarterly Journal of Economics
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider how identity, a person's sense of self, affects economic outcomes and incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior, and construct a simple game-theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions.
Abstract: This paper considers how identity, a person's sense of self, affects economic outcomes. We incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior. In the utility function we propose, identity is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave. We then construct a simple game-theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions. The paper adapts these models to gender discrimination in the workplace, the economics of poverty and social exclusion, and the household division of labor. In each case, the inclusion of identity substantively changes conclusions of previous economic analysis.

4,825 citations

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Frequently Asked Questions (1)
Q1. What are the contributions in this paper?

In this paper, if both people choose A, the Row decider receives 5 and the Column deciders receives 5.