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Journal ArticleDOI

Individual Behavior and Group Membership

TL;DR: In this paper, the saliency of group membership was investigated in two strategic games, the Battle of the Sexes and Prisoner's Dilemma, and it was shown that saliency affects the perception of the environment.
Abstract: People who are members of a group and identify with it behave differently from people who perceive themselves as isolated individuals. This difference depends on two main factors. First, preferences over outcomes change with the degree of identification with the group. Second, this identification depends on the saliency of the group structure. This paper tests these hypotheses and shows that group membership affects preferences over outcomes, and saliency of the group affects the perception of the environment. In two strategic environments, Battle of the Sexes and Prisoner's Dilemma, we create groups by allocating subjects to be Row or Column players. We manipulate the saliency of group membership by letting a player's own group watch as a passive audience as decisions are made, and by making part of the payoff common for members of the group. There is a strong and significant effect of group membership: It increases the aggressive stance of the hosts (people who have their group members in the audience), and reduces the one of the guests. The effect on outcomes depends on the game: In the Battle of the Sexes, the aggressiveness of hosts leads to more coordination; in the Prisoner's Dilemma, it leads to less cooperation. In the first case efficiency is increased, while in the second it is diminished. We also test for differences between in-group and out-group behavior in Prisoner's Dilemma games. In contrast to the minimal-group paradigm of the social-psychology literature, minimal groups do not affect behavior in our strategic environment. We see strong differences between in-group and out-group behavior only when we increase the saliency of group membership by having a degree of common payoffs.

Summary (1 min read)

INSTRUCTIONS (room R)

  • They have been randomly divided into two rooms, each with 10 people.
  • These are actual dollars that will be paid in cash.
  • All people in the room (except for the person from the other room) will be able to watch the decider who belongs to their room make his or her choice (however, no verbal comments are permitted).
  • Your green numbers indicate the rounds during which it will be your turn to make a decision in the room where you are now (room R).

INSTRUCTIONS

  • Thank you for participating in this experiment.
  • There are 20 people participating in this session.
  • There will be 10 rounds in this session, and each person will make a decision in each round.
  • In some periods, you will be paired with someone in your color group, while in other periods you will be paired with someone in the other color group.
  • Each person will be making a simultaneous choice between A and B in the following decision matrix:.

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APPENDIX A: Instructions
(Prisoner’s Dilemma)
INSTRUCTIONS (room R)
Thank you for participating in this experiment. You will receive $5 for your participation, in addition to other
money to be paid as a result of decisions made in the experiment.
There are 20 people participating in this session. They have been randomly divided into two rooms, each with 10
people. You are in room R, this means you are a Row decider.
There will be ten rounds in this session
, and each person will make two decisions, one in each room. You have a
card with a green number and a card with a (different) yellow number. These numbers will determine when and
where you make decisions.
Your green number indicates the round during which it will be your turn to make a decision in the room where
you are now (room R).
Your yellow number indicates the round during which it will be your turn to go to the other room (room C) and
make a decision there.
In each round there are two people making a decision. Each person will be making a simultaneous choice between A
and B in the following decision matrix:
Column
A B
A 5 , 5 1 , 7
Row
B 7 , 1 2 , 2
In each cell, the first number represents the outcome for the Row decider and the second number represents the
outcome for the Column decider.
Thus, if both people choose A, the Row decider receives 5 and the Column decider receives 5. If both people choose
B, the Row decider receives 2 and the Column decider receives 2. If the Row decider chooses A and the Column
decider chooses B, the Row decider receives 1 and the Column decider receives 7. If the Row decider chooses B and
the Column decider chooses A, the Row decider receives 7 and the Column decider receives 1.
The other nine members of each room also have a financial stake in the outcome – each person not making a
decision receives 1/3 of the amount shown for the realized outcome.
Thus, if both deciders choose A, every inactive person in room R receives 5/3 and every inactive person from room
C receives 5/3. If both deciders choose B, every inactive person from room R receives 2/3 and every inactive person
from room C receives 2/3. If the Row decider chooses A and the Column decider chooses B, every inactive person
from room R receives 1/3 and every inactive person from room R receives 7/3. If the Row decider chooses B and the
Column decider chooses A, every inactive person from room R receives 7/3 and every inactive person from room R
receives 1/3.
Each unit is worth $0.50 in actual money (2 units = $1) that will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment.
All people in the room (except for the person from the other room) will be able to watch the decider who belongs to
their room make his or her choice (however, no verbal comments are permitted).
The decision of the person who walks into the room, on the other hand, is made privately.

2
The outcome of the joint decision is immediately revealed to all people in the room.
After the 10 rounds are completed, we will total each person’s earnings (from the outcomes of the two self-made
decisions, as well as the other 18 outcomes), add the $5 show-up fee, and pay each person individually and
privately, using the numbers on your two cards to identify your decisions.
Please feel free to ask questions.

3
(Battle of the Sexes)
INSTRUCTIONS (room R)
Thank you for participating in this experiment. You will receive $5 for your participation, in addition to other
money to be paid as a result of decisions made in the experiment.
There are 20 people participating in this session. They have been randomly divided into two rooms, each with 10
people. You are in room R, this means you are a Row decider.
There will be ten rounds in this session
, and each person will make two decisions, one in each room. You have a
card with a green number and a card with a (different) yellow number. These numbers will determine when and
where you make decisions.
Your green number indicates the round during which it will be your turn to make a decision in the room where
you are now (room R).
Your yellow number indicates the round during which it will be your turn to go to the other room (room C) and
make a decision there.
In each round there are two people making a decision. Each person will be making a simultaneous choice between A
and B in the following decision matrix:
Column
A B
A 3 , 1 0 , 0
Row
B 0 , 0 1 , 3
In each cell, the first number represents the outcome for the decider Row and the second number represents the
outcome for the decider Column.
Thus, if both people choose A, the decider Row receives $3 and the decider Column receives $1. If both people
choose B, the decider Row receives $1 and the decider Column receives $3. If non-identical letters are chosen, each
decider receives 0. These are actual dollars that will be paid in cash.
The other nine members of each room also have a financial stake in the outcome – each person not making a
decision receives 1/3 of the amount shown for the realized outcome.
Thus, if both deciders choose A, every person in room R receives $1 and every person in room C receives $1/3. If
both deciders choose B, every person in room R receives $1/3 and every person in room C receives $1. If non-
identical letters are chosen, everyone receives 0. These are also actual dollars that will be paid in cash.
All people in the room (except for the person from the other room) will be able to watch the decider who belongs to
their room make his or her choice (however, no verbal comments are permitted).
The decision of the person who walks into the room, on the other hand, is made privately.
The outcome of the joint decision is immediately revealed to all people in the room.
After the 10 rounds are completed, we will total each person’s earnings (from the outcomes of the two self-made
decisions, as well as the other 18 outcomes), add the $5 show-up fee, and pay each person individually and
privately, using the numbers on your two cards to identify your decisions.
Please feel free to ask questions.

4
(Battle of the Sexes: No Shared payoff)
INSTRUCTIONS (room R)
Thank you for participating in this experiment. You will receive $8 for your participation, in addition to other
money to be paid as a result of decisions made in the experiment.
There are 20 people participating in this session. They have been randomly divided into two rooms, each with 10
people. You are in room R, this means you are a Row decider.
There will be 20 rounds in this session
, and each person will make four decisions, two in each room. You have a two
card with green numbers and two cards with (different) yellow numbers. These numbers will determine when and
where you make decisions.
Your green numbers indicate the rounds during which it will be your turn to make a decision in the room where
you are now (room R).
Your yellow numbers indicate the rounds during which it will be your turn to go to the other room (room C) and
make a decision there.
In each round there are two people making a decision in each room. Each person will be making a simultaneous
choice between A and B in the following decision matrix:
Column
A B
A 3 , 1 0 , 0
Row
B 0 , 0 1 , 3
In each cell, the first number represents the outcome for the Row decider and the second number represents the
outcome for the Column decider.
Thus, if both people choose A, the Row decider receives 3 and the Column decider receives 1. If both people
choose B, the Row decider receives 1 and the Column decider receives 3. If the Row decider chooses A and the
Column decider chooses B, the Row decider receives 0 and the Column decider receives 0. If the Row decider
chooses B and the Column decider chooses A, the Row decider receives 0 and the Column decider receives 0. The
payment to the other people in the room is not affected by what the two people playing choose to do.
Each unit is worth $1 in actual money that will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment.
All people in the room (except for the person from the other room) will be able to watch the decider who belongs to
their room make his or her choice (however, no verbal comments are permitted).
The decision of the person who walks into the room, on the other hand, is made privately.
The outcome of the joint decision is immediately revealed to all people in the room.
After the 20 rounds are completed, we will total each person’s earnings and pay each person individually and
privately, using the numbers on your four cards to identify your decisions.
Please feel free to ask questions.

5
(Split audience)
INSTRUCTIONS (room R)
Thank you for participating in this experiment. You will receive $5 for your participation, in addition to other
money to be paid as a result of decisions made in the experiment.
There are 32 people participating in this session. They have been randomly divided into two rooms, each with 16
people. You are in room R, this means you are a member of the Row group.
Half of the people in this room will function as the audience and the other half of the people in this room will make
decisions. The people in the audience will remain in Room R, while the deciders will wait in another room until it is
time for their decisions.
There will be eight rounds in this session
, and each non-audience person will make two decisions, one in each room.
Such people will have a card with a green number and a card with a (different) yellow number. These numbers will
determine when and where they shall make decisions.
For the deciders:
The green number indicates the round during which it will be time to make a decision in the room where you are
now (room R).
The yellow number indicates the round during which it will be time to go to the other room (room C) and make a
decision there.
In each round there are two people making a decision in each room. Each person will be making a simultaneous
choice between A and B in the following decision matrix:
Column
A B
A 3 , 1 0 , 0
Row
B 0 , 0 1 , 3
In each cell, the first number represents the outcome for the decider Row and the second number represents the
outcome for the decider Column.
The other 15 members of each room also have a financial stake in the outcome – each person not making a decision
receives 1/3 of the amount shown for the realized outcome.
Thus, if both deciders choose A, the Row decider receives $3 and the Column decider receives $1; every non-
decider in the Row group receives $1 and every non-decider in the Column group receives $1/3. If both deciders
choose B, the Row decider receives $1 and the Column decider receives $3; every non-decider in the Row group
receives $1/3 and every non-decider in the Column group receives $1. If non-identical letters are chosen, everyone
receives 0. These are actual dollars that will be paid in cash.
Each person making a decision in the room will pass, face down, one of the decision cards to the experimenter, who
will reveal the choices when both cards have been passed. All people in the room will be able to observe the
outcome. However, no verbal comments are permitted at any time during the experiment.
After the eight rounds are completed, we will total each person’s earnings, add the $5 show-up fee, and pay each
person individually and privately, using the numbers on your two cards to identify your decisions. Audience
members receive an extra $1.
Please feel free to ask questions.

Citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use a novel experimental approach that enables them to analyze the contagion of behavior under varied levels of social distance to peers and differences in contagions of pro- and anti-social behavior.
Abstract: Little is known about the underlying mechanisms of behavioral contagion, in particular with respect to differences in contagion of pro- versus anti-social behavior. Our principal contribution is the use of a novel experimental approach that enables us to analyze the contagion of behavior under varied levels of social distance to peers and differences in contagion of pro- and anti-social behavior. Anti-social behavior is found to be more contagious and social distance particularly drives the contagion of anti-social but not prosocial behavior. The results yield policy implications with regards to designing effective nudges and interventions to facilitate (reduce) pro- (anti-)social behavior, in both social and work environments.

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  • ...…existing literature on social coherence, it is reasonable to assume that ob- serving the behavior of people who are socially closer or similar depicts a more salient signal in terms of what is socially accepted or an existing norm (i.e., for the case of reci- procity, see Charness et al. (2007))....

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  • ...…social identification and proximity is a predictor of behavior in different contexts related to charitable giving, trust, punishment, and reciprocity (cf. Akerlof (1997), Charness et al. (2007), Chen & Li (2009), Leider et al. (2009)), as well as neighborhood effects (cf. Damm & Dustmann (2014))....

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  • ...…the existing literature on social coherence, it is reasonable to assume that observing the behavior of people who are socially closer or similar depicts a more salient signal in terms of what is socially accepted or an existing norm (i.e., for the case of reciprocity, see Charness et al. (2007))....

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  • ...…that common group identity increases contributions in public goods games (Eckel and Grossman 2005), facilitates coordination in the battle of sexes game (Charness et al., 2007) and the minimum effort game (Chen and Chen, 2011), and increases relation-specific investment (Morita and Servátka, 2013)....

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DissertationDOI
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Abstract: This dissertation consists of three self-contained essays on the economics of social interactions. The rst chapter is coauthored with Lorenzo Verstraeten. Knowing that Individuals interact with their peers, we study how a social planner can intervene, changing these interactions, in order to achieve a particular objective. When the objective is welfare maximization, we describe the interventions for games of strategic complements and strategic substitutes. We show that, for strategic complements, the planner uses resources to target central players; while she divides individuals into separated communities in the case of strategic substitutes. We study which connections she targets in order to achieve these goals. The second chapter is coauthored with Lorenzo Verstraeten and analyzes a model of contagion on social network. We ask how a social planner should intervene to prevent contagion. We characterize the optimal intervention and the cost associated. We discuss the intuition behind the choice of the planner and we provide comparative static on the cost of intervention for di erent type of network. In the third chapter I develop a theoretical study about groups relationship and ask whether intragroup cooperation crowd-out intergroup cooperation. I consider a gift-giving game where cooperation endogenously arises, within and across groups. Cooperation is sustained through peer punishment with the help of a group speci c monitoring technology. I specify under which conditions cooperation crowding-out occur. I identify two classes of equilibrium: a Sorting equilibrium where guilty players prefer to be matched outside their group due to a less e cient Out-Group monitoring technology, and a Non Sorting equilibrium where the higher level of In-Group cooperation makes it more attractive for everybody. I then compare their welfare properties and draw conclusions on optimal punishment levels. Acknowledgments I am indebted to my advisors David K. Levine and Andrea Galeotti for their guidance. I would like to thank my coauthor Lorenzo Verstraeten, Gabriela Galassi for never-ending support and commitment, and all the participants to the EUI working group for helpful comments and discussions. I would also like to thank Arpad Abraham, Lian Allub, Ines Berniel, Elena Esposito, Gabriel Facchini, Matteo Foschi and Evi Pappa. Finally I would like to thank Jessica Spataro, Lucia Vigna, Sarah Simonsen, Julia Valerio, Anne Banks and Rossella Corridori who make our life at the EUI so pleasant and worry-free that we can focus on research.

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Abstract: Intergenerational interactions play an important part in society with older generations often acting as role models that in uence younger ones. We investigate in a public good experiment how the behavior of more experienced and knowledgeable players (graduate students) is affected when they are informed that some of their personal and behavioral characteristics will be transmitted to future first-year undergraduates (enrolling the following year) playing the same game at the same university. In the "information" treatment, the history of behavior is transmitted with some personal characteristics (e.g. age and gender). In the \photo" treatment, a photo is also transmitted. Despite the absence of any monetary linkage between generations, our results show a significant effect of visibility by the future audience on initial contributions and dynamic behavior. Contrary to previous findings in the literature, contributions are lower in the presence of such personal identification. We explain this surprising negative effect by a "sucker aversion" bias according to which people become more sensitive to being perceived as exploited by their peers. We argue that the nature of the "audience" matters in reaching such an undesirable outcome.

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  • ...The intergenerational approach was pioneered by Schotter and Sopher [2003, 2007], and developed in the context of public good games by Chaudhuri et al. [2006]. (7)See, for example, Arbak and Villeval [2013], Gächter et al....

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References
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TL;DR: In this paper, a self-categorization theory is proposed to discover the social group and the importance of social categories in the analysis of social influence, and the Salience of social Categories is discussed.
Abstract: 1. Introducing the Problem: Individual and Group 2. Rediscovering the Social Group 3. A Self-Categorization Theory 4. The Analysis of Social Influence 5. Social Identity 6. The Salience of Social Categories 7. Social Identity and Group Polarization 8. Crowd Behaviour as Social Action 9. Conclusion.

8,872 citations

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TL;DR: This article showed that ethnic diversity helps explain cross-country differences in public policies and other economic indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa, and that high ethnic fragmentation explains a significant part of most of these characteristics.
Abstract: Explaining cross-country differences in growth rates requires not only an understanding of the link between growth and public policies, but also an understanding of why countries choose different public policies. This paper shows that ethnic diversity helps explain cross-country differences in public policies and other economic indicators. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, economic growth is associated with low schooling, political instability, underdeveloped financial systems, distorted foreign exchange markets, high government deficits, and insufficient infrastructure. Africa's high ethnic fragmentation explains a significant part of most of these characteristics.

5,648 citations


"Individual Behavior and Group Membe..." refers background in this paper

  • ...1 Some notable exceptions include Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Alesina et alii (2003), and Easterly and Levine (1997)....

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Book
01 Jan 1911
TL;DR: The Taylor System as discussed by the authors was developed as a system for increasing productivity in industry, and its principles have been applied to all kinds of large-scale enterprises, including operations with departments and agencies of the federal government.
Abstract: This brief essay by the founder of scientific management has served for nearly a century as a primer for administrators and for students of managerial techniques. Although scientific management was developed primarily as a system for increasing productivity in industry, its principles have been applied to all kinds of large-scale enterprises, including operations with departments and agencies of the federal government. It is in this volume that Frederick Winslow Taylor gave the theory of scientific management its clearest airing. Born in 1856, Taylor began work at age eighteen as an apprentice to a pattern-maker and as a machinist. A few years later he joined the Midvale Steel Company as a laborer, and in eight years rose to chief engineer. During this time he developed and tested what he called the "task system," which became known as the Taylor System and eventually as scientific management. He made careful experiments to determine the best way of performing each operation and the amount of time it required, analyzing the materials, tools, and work sequence, and establishing a clear division of labor between management and workers. His experiments laid the groundwork for the principles that are expounded in this essay, which was first published in 1911.

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider how identity, a person's sense of self, affects economic outcomes and incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior, and construct a simple game-theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions.
Abstract: This paper considers how identity, a person's sense of self, affects economic outcomes. We incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior. In the utility function we propose, identity is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave. We then construct a simple game-theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions. The paper adapts these models to gender discrimination in the workplace, the economics of poverty and social exclusion, and the household division of labor. In each case, the inclusion of identity substantively changes conclusions of previous economic analysis.

4,825 citations

Frequently Asked Questions (1)
Q1. What are the contributions in this paper?

In this paper, if both people choose A, the Row decider receives 5 and the Column deciders receives 5.