Individual Behavior and Group Membership
Summary (1 min read)
INSTRUCTIONS (room R)
- They have been randomly divided into two rooms, each with 10 people.
- These are actual dollars that will be paid in cash.
- All people in the room (except for the person from the other room) will be able to watch the decider who belongs to their room make his or her choice (however, no verbal comments are permitted).
- Your green numbers indicate the rounds during which it will be your turn to make a decision in the room where you are now (room R).
INSTRUCTIONS
- Thank you for participating in this experiment.
- There are 20 people participating in this session.
- There will be 10 rounds in this session, and each person will make a decision in each round.
- In some periods, you will be paired with someone in your color group, while in other periods you will be paired with someone in the other color group.
- Each person will be making a simultaneous choice between A and B in the following decision matrix:.
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Cites background from "Individual Behavior and Group Membe..."
...…favoritism, i.e., people treat more generously someone who shares the same group identity than someone who belongs to another social group (e.g., Charness et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2009; Goette et al., 2012).1 Much less research has been conducted on the importance of group identity in…...
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...Previous literature has shown that people who identify with a social group tend to favor their in-group members in terms of cooperation, trust and reciprocity compared to out-group (Goette et al., 2006; Charness et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2009)....
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...…copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3041208 Previous literature has shown that people who identify with a social group tend to favor their in-group members in terms of cooperation, trust and reciprocity compared to out-group (Goette et al., 2006; Charness et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2009)....
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...…public goods games (Eckel and Grossman, 2005), common-pool resource games (Ruffle and Sosis, 2006), and prisoner dilemma games (Goette et al., 2006; Charness et al., 2007; Guala et al., 2013; Li and Liu, 2017), as well as the willingness to preserve other’s image at a cost (Eriksson et al., 2017)....
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..., 2009), cooperation in ultimatum bargaining games (Mcleish and Oxoby, 2011) and in dilemma games such as public goods games (Eckel and Grossman, 2005), common-pool resource games (Ruffle and Sosis, 2006), and prisoner dilemma games (Goette et al., 2006; Charness et al., 2007; Guala et al., 2013; Li and Liu, 2017), as well as the willingness to preserve other’s image at a cost (Eriksson et al....
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3 citations
Cites background from "Individual Behavior and Group Membe..."
...…decision-making contexts, and payoff commonality interaction environments will inevitably cause different degrees of group identity saliency (Charness et al., 2007).7 Eckel and Grossman (2005) conducted experiments consisting of six treatments, which are characterised by various degrees of…...
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...The audience, feedback, decision-making contexts, and payoff commonality interaction environments will inevitably cause different degrees of group identity saliency (Charness et al., 2007)....
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3 citations
References
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"Individual Behavior and Group Membe..." refers background in this paper
...1 Some notable exceptions include Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Alesina et alii (2003), and Easterly and Levine (1997)....
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5,361 citations
4,825 citations