Book•
Information and legislative organization
01 Jan 1991-
TL;DR: In this paper, an alternative informational theory of legislative politics is presented to challenge the conventional view of the political process, and an alternative information theory of the legislative process is proposed. But
Abstract: Presents an alternative informational theory of legislative politics to challenge the conventional view
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TL;DR: The authors argue that norms evolve in a three-stage "life cycle" of emergence, cascades, and internalization, and that each stage is governed by different motives, mechanisms, and behavioral logics.
Abstract: Norms have never been absent from the study of international politics, but the sweeping “ideational turn” in the 1980s and 1990s brought them back as a central theoretical concern in the field. Much theorizing about norms has focused on how they create social structure, standards of appropriateness, and stability in international politics. Recent empirical research on norms, in contrast, has examined their role in creating political change, but change processes have been less well-theorized. We induce from this research a variety of theoretical arguments and testable hypotheses about the role of norms in political change. We argue that norms evolve in a three-stage “life cycle” of emergence, “norm cascades,” and internalization, and that each stage is governed by different motives, mechanisms, and behavioral logics. We also highlight the rational and strategic nature of many social construction processes and argue that theoretical progress will only be made by placing attention on the connections between norms and rationality rather than by opposing the two.
5,761 citations
TL;DR: The term "New Institutionalism" is a term that now appears with growing frequency in political science as mentioned in this paper, and there is considerable confusion about just what the new institutionalism is, how it differs from other approaches, and what sort of promise or problems it displays.
Abstract: The ‘new institutionalism’ is a term that now appears with growing frequency in political science. However, there is considerable confusion about just what the ‘new institutionalism’ is, how it differs from other approaches, and what sort of promise or problems it displays. The object of this essay is to provide some preliminary answers to these questions by reviewing recent work in a burgeoning literature. Some of the ambiguities surrounding the new institutionalism can be dispelled if we recognize that it does not constitute a unified body of thought. Instead, at least three different analytical approaches, each of which calls itself a ‘new institutionalism’, have appeared over the past fifteen years. We label these three schools of thought: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism.’ All of these approaches developed in reaction to the behavioural perspectives that were influential during the 1960s and 1970s and all seek to elucidate the role that institutions play in the determination of social and political outcomes. However, they paint quite different pictures of the political world. In the sections that follow, we provide a brief account of the genesis of each school and characterize what is distinctive about its approach to social and political problems. We then compare their analytical strengths and weaknesses, * An earlier version of this paper WLS presented at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association and at a Conference on ‘What is Institutionalism Now? at the
5,455 citations
Book•
01 Jan 2002
TL;DR: In this paper, Veto players analysis of European Union Institutions is presented, focusing on the role of individual veto players and collective players in the analysis of the institutions of the European Union.
Abstract: List of Figures ix List of Tables xi Preface and Acknowledgments xiii Introduction 1 PART I: VETO PLAYERS THEORY 17 One: Individual Veto Players 19 Two: Collective Veto Players 38 PART II: VETO PLAYERS AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 65 Three: Regimes: Nondemocratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary 67 Four: Governments and Parliaments 91 Five: Referendums 116 Six: Federalism, Bicameralism, and Qualified Majorities 136 PART III: POLICY EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS 161 Seven: Legislation 165 Eight: Macroeconomic Policies 187 PART IV: SYSTEMIC EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS 207 Nine: Government Stability 209 Ten: Judiciary and Bureaucracies 222 Eleven: Veto Players Analysis of European Union Institutions 248 Conclusion 283 Bibliography 291 Index 309
2,983 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that the tendency of students of international political order to emphasize efficient histories and consequential bases for action leads them to underestimate the significance of rule-and identity-based action and inefficient histories.
Abstract: The history of international political orders is written in terms of continuity and change in domestic and international political relations. As a step toward understanding such continuity and change, we explore some ideas drawn from an institutional perspective. An institutional perspective is characterized in terms of two grand issues that divide students of international relations and other organized systems. The first issue concerns the basic logic of action by which human behavior is shaped. On the one side are those who see action as driven by a logic of anticipated consequences and prior preferences. On the other side are those who see action as driven by a logic of appropriateness and a sense of identity. The second issue concerns the efficiency of history. On the one side are those who see history as efficient in the sense that it follows a course leading to a unique equilibrium dictated by exogenously determined interests, identities, and resources. On the other side are those who see history as inefficient in the sense that it follows a meandering, path-dependent course distinguished by multiple equilibria and endogenous transformations of interests, identities, and resources. We argue that the tendency of students of international political order to emphasize efficient histories and consequential bases for action leads them to underestimate the significance of rule- and identity-based action and inefficient histories. We illustrate such an institutional perspective by considering some features of the coevolution of politics and institutions, particularly the ways in which engagement in political activities affects the definition and elaboration of political identities and the development of competence in politics and the capabilities of political institutions.
2,078 citations
TL;DR: The authors suggest that policies generate resources and incentives for political actors, and they provide those actors with information and cues that encourage particular interpretations of the political world, and that these mechanisms operate in a variety of ways, but have significant effects on government elites, interest groups, and mass public.
Abstract: As governmental activity has expanded, scholars have been increasingly inclined to suggest that the structure of public policies has an important influence on patterns of political change. Yet research on policy feedback is mostly anecdotal, and there has so far been little attempt to develop more general hypotheses about the conditions under which policies produce politics. Drawing on recent research, this article suggests that feedback occurs through two main mechanisms. Policies generate resources and incentives for political actors, and they provide those actors with information and cues that encourage particular interpretations of the political world. These mechanisms operate in a variety of ways, but have significant effects on government elites, interest groups, and mass publics. By investigating how policies influence different actors through these distinctive mechanisms, the article outlines a research agenda for moving from the current focus on illustrative case studies to the investigation of broader propositions about how and when policies are likely to be politically consequential.
1,708 citations
References
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Book•
03 Jul 1980TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a review of the book "The Politics of Regulation, edited by James Q. Wilson." The review is based on a survey of the issues addressed in the book.
Abstract: The article presents a review of the book “The Politics of Regulation,” edited by James Q. Wilson.
1,134 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a modification of the theory of the legislature which retains the assumption of self-interested maximizing behavior, but yields predictions consistent with empirical observation, is presented, which suggests rationales for other features of Congress that are commonly reported in the empirical literature: the existence of various "norms," "roles," and "expectations."
Abstract: This paper presents a modification of the theory of the legislature which retains the assumption of self-interested maximizing behavior, but yields predictions consistent with empirical observation. In addition, this perspective suggests rationales for other features of Congress that are commonly reported in the empirical literature: the existence of various "norms," "roles," and "expectations."
576 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1984
TL;DR: A comprehensive examination of the origins, development, and status of committees and committee systems in both the House and Senate can be found in this paper, where the authors carry on the book's tradition of comprehensive coverage, empirical richness, and theoretical relevance in its discussion of these essential and distinguishing features of our national legislature.
Abstract: Providing a comprehensive examination of the origins, development, and status of committees and committee systems in both the House and Senate, this edition carries on the book's tradition of comprehensive coverage, empirical richness, and theoretical relevance in its discussion of these essential and distinguishing features of our national legislature. While the second edition focused on the 'post-reform' committee systems, addressed the shifts in the internal distribution of power, and hinted at the forces that had already begun to undermine the power of committees, this edition updates that analysis and looks at the reforms that evolved under the Republicans. It offers complete coverage of the rules and structural changes to the House and Senate committee systems. It extends its discussion of committee power and influence in the context of the 'Contract with America', Republican reforms, and the inter-party warfare on Capitol Hill.
405 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that the existence of a relatively stable outcome to voting does indeed imply that the underlying theory of logrolling is correct, and that there is no endless cycling in the real world, but acts are passed with reasonable dispatch and then remain unchanged for very long periods of time.
Abstract: One of Duncan Black's (1958) more important contributions was a classically simple proof that with complex issues and majority voting a stable outcome is unlikely. This very simple proof that there would normally be no motion which can get a majority against all others, and hence that any possible outcome is dominated by another has been elaborated and made more precise by later work. Without most improbable conditions endless cycling would be expected. This is particularly true when logrolling is present as it normally is. If we look at the real world, however, we observe not only is there no endless cycling, but acts are passed with reasonable dispatch and then remain unchanged for very long periods of time. Thus, theory and reality seem to be not only out of contact, but actually in sharp conflict. It is the purpose of this article to demonstrate that our existing theory when properly looked at, does indeed imply a relatively stable outcome to voting. In some cases, however, this stability will not be a true equilibrium because a random member of a large set will be chosen and then that random outcome will be left unchanged for long periods of time. It does not dominate all other outcomes, but is retained merely because of its particular history. There are already several possible explanations for the observed stability in the literature. We will take them up as they become relevant to the general line of reasoning. I should, however, warn the reader that my own previous work, including joint work with Buchanan, will play a major role here. This may simply reflect egotism, but I think that some of the early work which is now partially forgotten can provide solutions for more modern problems. Much recent Public Choice work has involved spatial models and these models frequently ignore logrolling. The reason, presumably, is that it is very hard to put logrolling in a two-dimensional diagram. We shall begin considering such special models and assume that the issues are the sort that does not lead to logrolling, and then turn to more complex logrolling problems. With respect to the first situation in which logrolling does not occur, there is already one possible explanation for the observed stability in the literature,
295 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1981
TL;DR: Sundquist as mentioned in this paper traces the long series of congressional decisions that created the modern presidency and relates these to certain weaknesses that the Congress recognized in itself, and analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the new Congress and appraises its potential for leadership and coordination.
Abstract: " Solid ground for optimism as well as cause for foreboding." So James L. Sundquist views the outcome of the struggle by the Congress in the 1970s to recapture powers and responsibilities that in preceding decades it had surrendered to a burgeoning presidency. The resurgence of the Congress began in 1973, in its historic constitutional clash with President Nixon. For half a century before that time, the Congress had acquiesced in its own decline vis--vis the presidency, or had even initiated it, by building the presidential office as the center of leadership and coordination in the U.S. government and organizing itself not to initiate and lead but to react and follow. But the angry confrontation with President Nixon in the winter of 1972-73 galvanized the Congress to seek to regain what it considered its proper place in the constitutional scheme. Within a short period, it had created a new congressional budget process, prohibited impoundment of appropriated funds, enacted the War Powers Resolution, intensified oversight of the executive, extended the legislative veto over a wide range of executive actions, and vastly expanded its staff resources. The Decline and Resurgence of Congress, after reviewing relations between president and Congress over two centuries, traces the long series of congressional decisions that created the modern presidency and relates these to certain weaknesses that the Congress recognized in itself. It then recounts the events that marked the years of resurgence and evaluates the results. Finally, it analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the new Congress and appraises its potential for leadership and coordination.
216 citations