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Journal ArticleDOI

Institutional design of public agencies and coproduction: A study of irrigation associations in Taiwan

01 Jun 1996-World Development (Pergamon)-Vol. 24, Iss: 6, pp 1039-1054
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the successful experience of irrigation governance and management in Taiwan as a means of understanding how joint efforts can be established and sustained through institutional arrangements, including a careful definition of the scope of farmers' participation, complementarity of interests between individuals, reduction of asymmetries involved in the use of authority, and the existence of domains of autonomy.
About: This article is published in World Development.The article was published on 1996-06-01. It has received 222 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Institutional theory & Public good.
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors develop an analytical framework for analyzing rural livelihoods in terms of their sustainability and their implications for rural poverty, arguing that the analysis of rural livelihood needs to understand people's access to five types of capital asset and the ways in which they combine and transform those assets in the building of livelihoods that as far as possible meet their material and their experiential needs.

2,143 citations


Cites background from "Institutional design of public agen..."

  • ...They can also lead to more e cient use of resources, through fostering coordinated action (as in the case of water: Lam, 1996)....

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Journal ArticleDOI
Elinor Ostrom1
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present two cases where public officials play a major role in the process of coproduction, a process through which inputs from individuals who are not “in” the same organization are transformed into goods and services.

1,922 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper looks at the institutional configurations that affect the interactions among resources, resource users, public infrastructure providers, and public infrastructures and proposes a framework that helps identify potential vulnerabilities of SESs to disturbances.
Abstract: What makes social-ecological systems (SESs) robust? In this paper, we look at the institutional configurations that affect the interactions among resources, resource users, public infrastructure providers, and public infrastructures. We propose a framework that helps identify potential vulnerabilities of SESs to disturbances. All the links between components of this framework can fail and thereby reduce the robustness of the system. We posit that the link between resource users and public infrastructure providers is a key variable affecting the robustness of SESs that has frequently been ignored in the past. We illustrate the problems caused by a disruption in this link. We then briefly describe the design principles originally developed for robust common-pool resource institutions, because they appear to be a good starting point for the development of design principles for more general SESs and do include the link between resource users and public infrastructure providers.

1,440 citations


Cites background from "Institutional design of public agen..."

  • ...The irrigation associations have repeatedly been acclaimed as major contributors to efficient irrigation in the country and thus to substantial agricultural development (Levine 1977, Moore 1989, Lam 1996)....

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Posted Content
TL;DR: The authors argue that community governance addresses some common market and state failures but typically relies on insider-outsider distinctions that may be morally repugnant and economically costly, and the individual motivations supporting community governance are not captured by either selfishness or altruism.
Abstract: Community governance is the set of small group social interactions that, with market and state, determine economic outcomes. We argue (i) community governance addresses some common market and state failures but typically relies on insider-outsider distinctions that may be morally repugnant and economically costly; (ii) the individual motivations supporting community governance are not captured by either selfishness or altruism; (iii) communities, markets and states are complements, not substitutes; (iv) when poorly designed, markets and states crowd out communities; (v) some distributions of property rights are better than others at fostering community governance; and (vi) communities will probably increase in importance in the future.

1,310 citations


Cites background from "Institutional design of public agen..."

  • ...…shows that the greater success of the former is due to the effective intervention of national governments in providing a favourable legal environment Royal Economic Society 2002 and handling cases in which the informal sanctions of the community would not be adequate (Lam, 1996; Wade, 1988)....

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  • ...be adequate (Lam, 1996; Wade, 1988). Similar community-governmental synergy is found in Tendler’s (1997) study of the delivery of health care and Ostrom’s (1996)...

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A systematic review of 122 articles and books (1987-2013) of co-creation/co-production with citizens in public innovation is presented in this article, where the authors analyze the objectives and outcomes of the process.
Abstract: This article presents a systematic review of 122 articles and books (1987–2013) of co-creation/co-production with citizens in public innovation It analyses (a) the objectives of co-creation and co-production, (b) its influential factors and (c) the outcomes of co-creation and co-production processes It shows that most studies focus on the identification of influential factors, while hardly any attention is paid to the outcomes Future studies could focus on outcomes of co-creation/co-production processes Furthermore, more quantitative studies are welcome, given the qualitative, case study, dominance in the field We conclude with a research agenda to tackle methodological, theoretical and empirical lacunas

1,257 citations


Cites background from "Institutional design of public agen..."

  • ...For instance, for public officials, it is often unclear to what extent public services can be improved by incorporating citizens (e.g. Evans, Hills, and Orme 2012) or how co-creation creates budgetary benefits (Abers 1998) or even increases customer interest (Lam 1996)....

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References
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that a definition of a firm may be obtained which is not only realistic in that it corresponds to what is meant by a firm in the real world, but is tractable by two of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis developed by Marshall, the idea of the margin and that of substitution.
Abstract: Economic theory has suffered in the past from a failure to state clearly its assumptions. Economists in building up a theory have often omitted to examine the foundations on which it was erected. This examination is, however, essential not only to prevent the misunderstanding and needless controversy which arise from a lack of knowledge of the assumptions on which a theory is based, but also because of the extreme importance for economics of good judgement in choosing between rival sets of assumptions. For instance, it is suggested that the use of the word “firm” in economics may be different from the use of the term by the “plain man.”1 Since there is apparently a trend in economic theory towards starting analysis with the individual firm and not with the industry,2 it is all the more necessary not only that a clear definition of the word “firm” should be given but that its difference from a firm in the “real world,” if it exists, should be made clear. Mrs. Robinson has said that “the two questions to be asked of a set of assumptions in economics are: Are they tractable? and: Do they correspond with the real world?”3 Though, as Mrs. Robinson points out, “more often one set will be manageable and the other realistic,” yet there may well be branches of theory where assumptions may be both manageable and realistic. It is hoped to show in the following paper that a definition of a firm may be obtained which is not only realistic in that it corresponds to what is meant by a firm in the real world, but is tractable by two of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis developed by Marshall, the idea of the margin and that of substitution, together giving the idea of substitution at the margin.

21,195 citations

Book
Elinor Ostrom1
01 Jan 1990
TL;DR: In this paper, an institutional approach to the study of self-organization and self-governance in CPR situations is presented, along with a framework for analysis of selforganizing and selfgoverning CPRs.
Abstract: Preface 1. Reflections on the commons 2. An institutional approach to the study of self-organization and self-governance in CPR situations 3. Analyzing long-enduring, self-organized and self-governed CPRs 4. Analyzing institutional change 5. Analyzing institutional failures and fragilities 6. A framework for analysis of self-organizing and self-governing CPRs Notes References Index.

16,852 citations


Additional excerpts

  • ...Research findings suggest that self-governance can work and, in many instances, outperform government agencies in the management of an infrastructure and resources such as irrigation systems (Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne, 1993; E. Ostrom, 1990, 1992; Tang, 1992; Lam, 1994)....

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  • ...…of individuals within an agency as a result of an organizing process, which is defined as changing the situation from one in which individuals act independently to one in which they act in a coordinated manner in an effort to accomplish collective benefits (E. Ostrom, 1990; Miller, 1992)....

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Economic Institutions of Capitalism as mentioned in this paper is a seminal work in the field of economic institutions of capitalism. Journal of Economic Issues: Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 528-530.
Abstract: (1987). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Journal of Economic Issues: Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 528-530.

16,767 citations

Journal ArticleDOI

10,424 citations


"Institutional design of public agen..." refers background in this paper

  • ...Research findings suggest that self-governance can work and, in many instances, outperform government agencies in the management of an infrastructure and resources such as irrigation systems (Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne, 1993; E. Ostrom, 1990, 1992; Tang, 1992; Lam, 1994)....

    [...]

  • ...…of individuals within an agency as a result of an organizing process, which is defined as changing the situation from one in which individuals act independently to one in which they act in a coordinated manner in an effort to accomplish collective benefits (E. Ostrom, 1990; Miller, 1992)....

    [...]