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Institutions for the earth: sources of effective international environmental protection.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on specific international environmental issues: protection of ozone layer European acid rain protection of the Baltic and North Seas oil pollution of the oceans international fisheries management pesticide use in developing countries national population institutions and effective international environmental institutions.
Abstract: Global environmental problems have gained prominence since the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment. Analyses underrepresent the institutional dimensions that shape environmental policy processes. Increased government concern enhanced contracts and increased national capacity have been influenced by international environmental institutions. This volume focuses on specific international environmental issues: protection of the ozone layer European acid rain protection of the Baltic and North Seas oil pollution of the oceans international fisheries management pesticide use in developing countries national population institutions and effective international environmental institutions. The case studies illustrate three distinct functions of international environmental institutions: 1) to enhance the ability to make and keep agreements 2) to promote concern among governments and 3) to build national political and administrative capacity. The obstacles to effective government response to commons and national environmental problems have been low levels of concern about environmental threats lack of the capacity to manage environmental threats and the inability to overcome problems of collective action. Institutions can catalyze government concern and influence environmental policy. International environmental institutions can facilitate contracts by ensuring regular interaction between policy makers on the same set of issues providing monitoring and verification services and monitoring violations. Capacity building can be increased through provision of technical assistance and training programs and of networking between international groups and countries with shared resources. The degree of success of international environmental institutions has varied across issues. Government concern about fisheries issues has not increased and the only key change has been the 200 mile national zone regulations in 1977. Contracts have improved for issues of the ozone layer acid rain and Baltic-North Sea pollution. Building state capacity has improved only for developing countries and not developed ones. Small staffed environment-centered coalitions can be successful.
Citations
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Book ChapterDOI
TL;DR: In the post-Cold War era, Western policymakers have sought to create security arrangements in Europe, as well as in other regions of the globe, that are based on international institutions.
Abstract: Since the Cold War ended, Western policymakers have sought to create security arrangements in Europe, as well as in other regions of the globe, that are based on international institutions In doing so, they explicitly reject balance-of-power politics as an organizing concept for the post-Cold War world During the 1992 presidential campaign, for example, President Clinton declared that, “in a world where freedom, not tyranny, is on the march, the cynical calculus of pure power politics simply does not compute It is ill-suited to a new era” Before taking office, Anthony Lake, the president’s national security adviser, criticized the Bush administration for viewing the world through a “classic balance of power prism,” whereas he and Mr Clinton took a “more ‘neo-Wilsonian’ view” 1

1,811 citations

Book
19 Mar 2013
TL;DR: The drama of the commons has been studied extensively in the literature as discussed by the authors, with a focus on the role of individuals in the drama of commons management and their roles in the commons.
Abstract: 1 Front Matter 2 1 The Drama of the Commons 3 Part I: Resource Users, Resource Systems, and Behavior in the Drama of the Commons 4 2 Common Resources and Institutional Sustainability 5 3 Unequal Irrigators: Heterogeneity and Commons Management in Large-Scale 6 4 Factors Influencing Cooperation in Commons Dilemmas: A Review of Experimental Psychological Research 7 5 Appropriating the Commons: A Theoretical Explanation 8 Part II: Privatization and Its Limitations 9 6 The Tradable Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons: What Have We Learned? 10 7 Common Property, Regulatory Property, and Environmental Protection: Comparing Community-Based Management to Tradable Environmental Allowances 11 Part III: Cross-Scale Linkages and Dynamic Interactions 12 8 Institutional Interplay: The Environmental Consequences of Cross-Scale Interactions 13 9 Cross-Scale Institutional Linkages: Perspectives from the Bottom Up 14 Part IV: Emerging Issues 15 10 Scientific Uncertainty, Complex Systems, and the Design of Common-Pool Institutions 16 11 Emergence of Institutions for the Commons: Contexts, Situations, and Events 17 12 An Evolutionary Theory of Commons Management 18 13 Knowledge and Questions After 15 Years of Research 19 About the Contributors 20 Index

1,474 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper argued that compliance is generally quite good and that this high level of compliance has been achieved with little attention to enforcement, and that those compliance problems that do exist are best addressed as management rather than enforcement problems.
Abstract: Recent research on compliance in international regulatory regimes has argued (1) that compliance is generally quite good; (2) that this high level of compliance has been achieved with little attention to enforcement; (3) that those compliance problems that do exist are best addressed as management rather than enforcement problems; and (4) that the management rather than the enforcement approach holds the key to the evolution of future regulatory cooperation in the international system. While the descriptive findings above are largely correct, the policy inferences are dangerously contaminated by endogeneity and selection problems. A high rate of compliance is often the result of states formulating treaties that require them to do little more than they would do in the absence of a treaty. In those cases where noncompliance does occur and where the effects of selection are attenuated, both self-interest and enforcement play significant roles.

1,285 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine power and distributive questions and the role of formal international organizations in creating norms and understanding, and identify centralization and independence as the key properties of formal organizations.
Abstract: States use formal international organizations (IOs) to manage both their everyday interactions and more dramatic episodes, including international conflicts. Yet, contemporary international theory does not explain the existence or form of IOs. This article addresses the question of why states use formal organizations by investigating the functions IOs perform and the properties that enable them to perform those functions. Starting with a rational-institutionalist perspective that sees IOs as enabling states to achieve their ends, the authors examine power and distributive questions and the role of IOs in creating norms and understanding. Centralization and independence are identified as the key properties of formal organizations, and their importance is illustrated with a wide array of examples. IOs as community representatives further allow states to create and implement community values and enforce international commitments.

1,137 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: The authors argue that a climate change regime complex, if it meets specified criteria, has advantages over any politically feasible comprehensive regime, particularly with respect to adaptability and flexibility, in a setting where the most demanding international commitments are interdependent yet governments vary widely in their interest and ability to implement them.
Abstract: There is no integrated regime governing efforts to limit the extent of climate change. Instead, there is a regime complex: a loosely coupled set of specific regimes. We describe the regime complex for climate change and seek to explain it, using functional, strategic, and organizational arguments. This institutional form is likely to persist; efforts to build a comprehensive regime are unlikely to succeed, but narrower institutions focused on particular aspects of the climate change problem are already thriving. Building on this analysis, we argue that a climate change regime complex, if it meets specified criteria, has advantages over any politically feasible comprehensive regime, particularly with respect to adaptability and flexibility. Adaptability and flexibility are particularly important in a setting, such as climate change policy, in which the most demanding international commitments are interdependent yet governments vary widely in their interest and ability to implement them.

1,090 citations

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What are the important features of effective environmental institutions?

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