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This coversheet template is made available by AU Library
Version 1.0, October 2016
Coversheet
This is the accepted manuscript (post-print version) of the article.
Contentwise, the post-print version is identical to the final published version, but there may be
differences in typography and layout.
How to cite this publication
Please cite the final published version:
Binderkrantz, A. S., Christiansen, P. M., & Pedersen, H. H. (2015). Interest Group Access to the
Bureaucracy, Parliament, and the Media. Governance, 28(1), 95-112. DOI: 10.1111/gove.12089
Publication metadata
Title:
Interest Group Access to the Bureaucracy, Parliament, and the Media
Author(s):
Anne Skorkjær Binderkrantz, Peter Munk Christiansen, Helene Helboe
Pedersen
Journal:
Governance
DOI/Link:
10.1111/gove.12089
Document version:
Accepted manuscript (post-print)
1
Interest Group Access to the Bureaucracy, Parliament and the
Media
Abstract
A key issue for interest groups and policy makers is the ways through which organized interests
voice their interests and influence public policy. This article combines two perspectives on
interest group representation to explain patterns of interest group access to different political
arenas. From a resource exchange perspective it argues that access to different political arenas is
discrete as it is determined by the match between the supply and demands of interest groups and
gatekeepers – politicians, bureaucrats and reporters. From a partly competing perspective, it is
argued that access is cumulative and converges around wealthy and professionalized groups.
Based on a large-scale investigation of group presence in Danish political arenas, the analyses
show a pattern of privileged pluralism. This describes a system where multiple political arenas
provide opportunities for multiple interests, but where unequally distributed resources produce
cumulative effects, i.e. the same groups have high levels of arena access.
2
Interest groups are central to political representation and thus to the public policy agenda and
public policy output. Groups voice their concerns in the media, lobby politicians and seek access
to bureaucrats. Although complicated to ascertain group influence, it is indisputable that many
interest groups have decisive political influence (Baumgartner et al. 2011; Dür 2007). For
decades, scholars have debated the extent to which interest group systems provide different
societal groups with equal opportunities for representation (Dahl 1961; Olson 1971;
Schattschneider 1975). The underlying premise is that diversity in group representation is a
democratic good – but many studies have found significant bias in the group system, with
overrepresentation of privileged groups such as business interests (Danielian and Page 1995;
Schattschneider 1975: 34-35; Schlozman 1984; Schlozman et al. 2012; Walker 1991: 3).
Evidence suggests that group representation varies across political arenas (Bouwen 2004;
Halpin et al. 2012; Salisbury 1984: 74-75). This issue is crucial because interest groups striving
to affect public policy seek access to different arenas (Beyers 2004; Binderkrantz 2005; Kriesi et
al. 2007). Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 35) argue that it is democratically less important
whether a particular venue confers advantages to specific groups than whether multiple venues
exist in a political system. Different political arenas provide opportunities for different groups to
voice their concerns. If, on the other hand, the same types of groups dominate all political arenas,
losers in one arena have nowhere to turn.
We define a political arena as a political institution of importance for political decisions
and/or the political agenda of a society.
1
We focus on interest group access in the bureaucracy,
parliament and the media in order to address the extent to which different arenas permit different
1. Political arena is a broader concept than policy venue (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). A policy venue
is a group or institution in society that has authority to make decisions concerning an issue. Decision-
making capacity is not a defining characteristic of a political arena and arenas also include institutions
important to the political agenda such as the media.
3
groups and types of interests to be politically represented. Existing studies of group access across
political arenas are mainly descriptive (Halpin et al. 2012; Salisbury 1984). We go beyond
description by conducting a systematic test of the importance of group type and resources in
explaining access to the bureaucracy, parliament and the media.
The article juxtaposes two perspectives on arena access: one emphasizing diversity in
arena access and one arguing that access can be expected to be cumulative across arenas. The
expectation about diversity is based on a theoretical argument focusing on resource exchange
between interest groups and gate-keepers in political arenas. In contrast to previous studies
(Beyers and Kerremanns 2007; Bouwen 2004; Hansen 1991) we incorporate not only the
resources that groups may supply to bureaucrats, politicians and reporters, but also the different
priorities groups may ascribe to different goods to be won in different arenas. Interest groups are
seen as rational actors screening political arenas for the best prospects for success (Binderkrantz
and Krøyer 2012; see however Pralle 2003). Group access is a result of an exchange with
gatekeepers in different arenas (Bouwen 2004; Braun 2012: 7; Öberg et al. 2011). Crucially, the
goals and assets of interest groups vary. For example, groups interested in affecting the political
agenda will direct much attention to the media, while groups seeking influence on preparation
and implementation of policies are more likely to approach bureaucrats (Gais and Walker 1991).
The value of different assets also varies across arenas (Bouwen 2004). A group may provide
detailed technical information valuable to a bureaucrat preparing a policy decision, but not very
attractive for a journalist selling newspapers. Consequently we expect patterns of group
representation to differ across arenas. From a partly competing perspective, we stress that group
access to different arenas may be cumulative. Here, spillover effects and the relevance of general
resources are central. Some group resources such as finances and staff are relevant for access
across all political arenas. Further, access to one arena may positively affect access to other
arenas – for example the news media are more likely to report on actors with insider positions in
the political system (Bennett 1990).
4
The empirical analysis of these different perspectives on arena access draws on a study of
Danish interest groups. Denmark has traditionally been one of the world’s more corporatist
countries, but in recent decades corporatism has been in decline (Öberg et al. 2011). At the same
time, parliament has gained in relevance as target of interest groups, and the media has become
an increasingly important political arena (Binderkrantz 2005; Rommetvedt et al. 2013). Our
analysis draws on a unique dataset combining measures of group access across three arenas with
information from a survey of all national interest groups. This allows us to trace each individual
group as it appears in the media, in the bureaucracy, and in parliament – and to link this with
survey data on group resources.
After discussing the conceptualization of group diversity, the article proceeds to a
discussion of the resource exchange model of group access and the competing model of
cumulative access. Subsequently, research design and data are presented followed by the
empirical analysis.
Bias and diversity in arena access
The issue of diversity versus bias in interest group systems is classic. Ever since Schattschneider
(1960/1975) questioned the pluralist assumption of a relatively well-balanced group system,
scholars have investigated different groups’ success in mobilization and political influence
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998: 100-19; Jordan et al. 2012; Lowery and Gray 2004; Schlozman et
al. 2012; Walker 1991; Wonka et al. 2010). One challenge is that there is no way to know what
unbiased group presence would look like. Some groups may be compared to relevant societal
groups (see Schlozman 1984), but often it is not feasible to establish how their “natural”
presence in the group system might look (Baumgartner and Leech 1998: 93). It is, however,
possible to compare the share of different types of groups in politically mobilized interest group
populations to the level of political access obtained (Danielian and Page 2006) and to establish
the relative success of groups across different political venues (Halpin et al. 2012).
