Intergovernmentalism and Its Limits Assessing the European Union’s Answer to the Euro Crisis
TL;DR: In the context of an existential challenge, the intergovernmental approach faced a structural difficulty in solving basic dilemmas of collective action as discussed by the authors, and the euro crisis has thus represented a test for the validity of the inter-governmental constitution of the Lisbon Treaty.
Abstract: The Lisbon Treaty has institutionalized a dual constitution, supranational in the single market’s policies and intergovernmental in (among others) economic and financial policies. The extremely complex system of economic governance set up for answering the euro crisis has been defined and implemented on the basis of the intergovernmental constitution of the EU. The euro crisis has thus represented a test for the validity of the intergovernmental constitution of the Lisbon Treaty. Although the measures adopted in the period 2010-2012, consisting of legislative decisions and new intergovernmental treaties, are of an unprecedented magnitude, they were nevertheless unable to promote effective and legitimate solutions for dealing with the financial crisis. In the context of an existential challenge, the intergovernmental approach faced a structural difficulty in solving basic dilemmas of collective action.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the three dominant approaches to European integration cannot fully explain why the two most recent crises of the European Union (EU) resulted in very different outcome.
Abstract: This contribution argues that the three dominant approaches to European integration cannot fully explain why the two most recent crises of the European Union (EU) resulted in very different outcome...
291 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyzed the role of the European Commission in financial stability support, economic policy surveillance, coordination of national polices and supervision of the financial sector in the European Union.
Abstract: Since the latest financial and economic crisis took hold of the European Union (EU), its economic governance architecture has been undergoing crucial changes. Research into the institutional consequences of these reforms is still fragmented — especially with regard to the function of the European Commission. This article seeks to fill this void by analysing the supranational executive’s role in the four areas that have witnessed the most important changes: financial stability support, economic policy surveillance, coordination of national polices and supervision of the financial sector. The empirical evidence suggests that the Commission continues to be a powerful player in EU economic governance, but its primary role is changing. While its agenda-setting power is decreasing, most decisions in economic governance depend on the Commission to make them work. With more and stronger implementation competences, it may be less visible. But it is not less important. This finding qualifies the degree of i...
265 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the ways in which EU actors have engaged in incremental changes to the eurozone rules by stealth, that is, by reinterpreting the rules and recalibrating the numbers without admitting it in their public discourse.
Abstract: This article examines the ways in which EU actors have engaged in incremental changes to the eurozone rules ‘by stealth’ ‒ that is, by reinterpreting the rules and recalibrating the numbers without admitting it in their public discourse. Using the methodological framework of discursive institutionalism to focus on agents’ ideas and discursive interactions in institutional context, the article links EU actors’ reinterpretation of rules to their efforts to ensure greater legitimacy in terms of policy performance and governance processes as well as citizen politics. Using the normative theoretical framework of EU democratic systems theory, it analyses EU actors’ considerations of legitimacy not only in terms of their policies’ ‘output’ performance and citizens’ political ‘input’ but also the ‘throughput’ quality of their governance processes. The article illustrates this by elaborating on the different pathways to legitimation of the European Central Bank and the European Commission.
118 citations
Book•
26 Feb 2015TL;DR: In this paper, the Lisbon Treaty and the Euro crisis are considered as the starting point for the institutionalisation of multiple unions in the European Union, and a new political order in Europe is proposed.
Abstract: Preface: how many Unions? Part I. Institutionalisation of Multiple Unions: 1. From Rome to the Lisbon Treaty 2. The Lisbon Treaty and the Euro Crisis 3. Institutionalisation and constitutional divisions Part II. Main Perspectives on the European Union: 4. The perspective of the economic community 5. The perspective of intergovernmental union 6. The perspective of parliamentary union Part III. Towards the Compound Union Perspective: 7. Comparing democratic models 8. Compound unions and the EU 9. A new political order in Europe.
99 citations
TL;DR: The European Union's core intergovernmental forums for policy coordination, the European Council, the Eurogroup and the Foreign Affairs Council, have been identified as central to EU decision-making.
Abstract: This special issue follows up on a stream of recent contributions on what has been identified as a particular phase of post-Maastricht European integration: the ‘new intergovernmentalism’ and ‘the intergovernmental union’. This literature considers the European Union’s (EU) core intergovernmental forums for policy coordination, the European Council, the Eurogroup and the Foreign Affairs Council as central to EU decision-making. These bodies perform functions related to policy initiation and implementation which were traditionally associated with the European Commission. Intergovernmentalisation is primarily detectable in new areas of EU activity such as economic governance and foreign affairs which operate mainly outside the community method and in policy sectors which depict a mix of legislative and non-legislative decision-making mechanisms, such as justice and home affairs and energy. More integration is achieved without significant further supranationalisation. These developments affect how th...
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TL;DR: The European Council has emerged as the centre of political gravity in the field of economic governance as mentioned in this paper, and the Eurogroup fulfils a crucial role as forums for policy debate, which is the reflection of an integration paradox inherent to the post-Maastricht EU.
Abstract: The European Union's (EU's) responses to the economic and financial crisis provided a vigorous illustration for how the role of the Union's core intergovernmental bodies – the European Council and the Council – has evolved in recent years. The European Council has emerged as the centre of political gravity in the field of economic governance. The Council and the Eurogroup fulfil a crucial role as forums for policy debate. The emphasis on increased high-level intergovernmental policy co-ordination is the reflection of an integration paradox inherent to the post-Maastricht EU. While policy interdependencies have grown, member state governments have resisted the further transfer of formal competences to the EU level and did not follow the model of the Community method. Instead, they aim for greater policy coherence through intensified intergovernmental co-ordination. Given its consensus dependency, this co-ordination system can best be conceptualized as deliberative intergovernmentalism.
276 citations
Book•
18 Mar 2010TL;DR: Juncke as mentioned in this paper discusses the past, present and future of the Stability and Growth Pact and its implications for European integration theory, including the role of experts and ideas in good and bad times.
Abstract: Foreword Jean-Claude Juncke 1. The politics of the Stability and Growth Pact Part I: 2. States, intergovernmentalism and negotiating the SGP 3. Opening the box: a domestic politics approach to the SGP 4. The functional logic behind the SGP 5. The role of experts and ideas Part II: 6. Implementation of the SGP in good and in bad times 7. From bad times to crisis 8. The SGP before the European Court of Justice 9. The SGP in times of financial turbulence and economic crisis 10. Conclusion: the past, present and future of the SGP and implications for European integration theory Appendix.
149 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) is a red herring that distracts attention from the more important and pervasive increase in the formality and judicialisation of EU policy making.
Abstract: Many academic analysts have greeted EU efforts to promote ‘new modes of governance’ including the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) with enthusiasm. Most of the literature on EU governance suggests that the introduction of new modes of governance is desirable and that the OMC and other new modes of governance are likely to play a greater role in EU governance in the future. We challenge this view of the OMC and other ‘new’ modes of governance. The current significance and likely future impact of such modes of governance has been greatly exaggerated. The OMC and new modes of governance more generally are red herring that distract attention from the more important and pervasive increase in the formality and judicialisation of EU policy making. While we agree that the idealised model of the OMC might be desirable in many respects, we question the conceptual underpinnings of this hopeful vision and find that the actual practice of the OMC to date has little to recommend it. Finally, we reject claims...
90 citations