Book•
Intermediate microeconomics : A modern approach
01 Jan 2006-
TL;DR: The Varian approach as mentioned in this paper gives students tools they can use on exams, in the rest of their classes, and in their careers after graduation, and is still the most modern presentation of the subject.
Abstract: This best-selling text is still the most modern presentation of the subject. The Varian approach gives students tools they can use on exams, in the rest of their classes, and in their careers after graduation.
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01 Jan 2007
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a desert-sensitive egalitarian theory of justice, which combines the two forms of egalitarianism in such a way that telic egalitarianism is a baseline position but allows deviations from it for reasons that deontal egalitarianism specifies.
Abstract: The main purpose of my thesis is to present a desert-sensitive egalitarian theory of justice. In this thesis, egalitarianism comes in two principal forms: teleological (telic) egalitarianism and deontological (deontic) egalitarianism. Telic egalitarianism says that we should aim for simple equality, because it makes the outcome better. Deontic egalitarianism says that we should aim for simple equality not because it makes the outcome better, but for some other morally relevant reason. While the two forms of egalitarianism are often regarded as incompatible positions in egalitarian justice, this thesis combines the two in such a way that telic egalitarianism is a baseline position but which allows deviations from it for reasons that deontic egalitarianism specifies. In taking this approach, I show three things. The first is that telic egalitarianism as a base point can be fleshed out as the Principle of Baseline Equality. This principle holds that all people should be equally well off as a point of departure. This would very likely obtain in conditions of moderate scarcity (which is often called ‘the circumstances of justice’). The second is that deontic egalitarianism is better interpreted in the responsibility-sensitive form: substantive inequalities are morally permissible only if they precisely reflect people’s exercise of responsibility. This is what I formulate as the Responsibility-Based Principle of Inequality. This principle can apply in both negative—an agent’s responsibility for being worse off—and positive—an agent’s responsibility for being better
6 citations
Dissertation•
01 Jan 2005
TL;DR: The main thesis of the first part is that secret, two–party communication cannot be prevented on the Internet, regardless of filtering methods, and a protocol for the interactive validation of database replies is presented.
Abstract: 4 This dissertation consists of two parts. The main thesis of the first part is that secret, two–party communication cannot be prevented on the Internet, regardless of filtering methods. We show how partners can arrange a channel for further communication despite active filtering. We examine covert channels on all layers of the TCP/IP stack and its main application protocols. We describe anonymizing techniques and their limits in certain scenarios. By combining covert channels in a popular protocol and anonymization we develop a messaging protocol which allows unobservable communication. In the second part of the dissertation we present a protocol for the interactive validation of database replies. The protocol is efficient in the number and size of the messages exchanged. A special property is that even the non– existence of records can be verified efficiently. Introduction The right to communicate is one of the fundamental human rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [1], the proposed European Constitution [2], and many national constitutions, e.g., the German Grundgesetz [3]. To quote the Universal Declaration, Article 19: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. Ideally, communication should not only be possible, but there should be no negative consequences or fear thereof. To ensure this, the following requirements would have to be met: 1. Two parties can initiate communication without being observed or obstructed. 2. The content of their conversation remains oblique to anyone but themselves (as far as the network is concerned). 3. The very act of communication should not be observable at all. 4. Failing this, it should be extremely hard to identify the communicating parties. The question is, whether this high ideal can be reached in the Internet. The Internet was considered to inherently promote rather than to hinder this and related rights (the right to free expression, for example). This hope was based on the End–to–End design of the Internet Protocol, which transports arbitrary data between each pair of end–points regardless of application–layer content. In chapter 2 we will discuss some of the protocols proposed then, which were to enable free expression of thought and anonymous publication. The hope turned out to be misplaced, however. On the contrary, digital , text–based communication is much easier to monitor than speech over 11 …
6 citations
Cites background from "Intermediate microeconomics : A mod..."
...Since the perspective on data networks from an economic view is certainly different than from a purely technical view, we will make a short excursion into economic theory (for a thorough introduction to neo–classical macroeconomics, we refer the reader to [21])....
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18 Dec 2014
TL;DR: Insight is provided about the influence of context on policy processes for national health insurance proposals, and the effectiveness of PHI and private financing organisations in a national healthcare financing system that aims to achieve UHC is considered.
Abstract: Little is known about the role of the private sector in low and middle income countries moving towards universal health coverage (UHC). This thesis presents a case study of the role of the private sector (health maintenance organisations (HMOs) and healthcare providers) in the national health financing system in Nigeria. The analysis draws on both economic and policy analysis theories and frameworks.
The analysis of the policy development process for national health insurance in Nigeria reveals that private sector actors and the political context influenced the pace and outcome of the policy-making process, including the institution of a role for HMOs to supply the government’s social health insurance (SHI) alongside their private health insurance (PHI) plans. However, an analysis of the market for the health insurance products supplied by HMOs revealed imperfect competition in the (PHI) sub-market which was characterised by product differentiation, multiple private pools, relatively higher premiums for benefits compared to the SHI, and adoption of harmful pricing strategies. The analysis of the agency relationship between HMOs as purchasers, and healthcare providers also revealed that healthcare providers respond to incentives created by the business strategies of purchasers, in such a way as to protect their own income, but their ability to do so rests on the distribution of power within the agency relationship. Finally, the weak regulatory system that emerged from the policy making process influenced (and was influenced by) the behaviours of actors in the HMO industry, and influenced the agency relationship between HMOs and healthcare providers.
Overall, this thesis provides insights about the influence of context on policy processes for national health insurance proposals, and considers the effectiveness of PHI and private financing organisations in a national healthcare financing system that aims to achieve UHC.
6 citations
Cites background from "Intermediate microeconomics : A mod..."
...…of products in response to demand characteristics (product differentiation) (Lancaster, 1975, Phlips, 1981), the pricing strategies employed to maximize profits (pricing behaviour) (Varian, 2010, Tirole, 1988, Phlips, 1981), and measures to increase market share and profits such as mergers....
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...Monopoly This refers to a market structure characterised by only one firm within the industry (Varian, 2010)....
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...Consumers see the products in the market as substitutes and demand will be affected by the price and characteristics of substitute goods (Varian, 2010)....
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...Monopoly This refers to a market structure characterised by only one firm within the industry (Varian, 2010)....
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...Consumer and provider behaviours are reflected in the quantity of products available at given prices that they are willing to consume (demand) or produce (supply), respectively (Folland et al., 2007, Varian, 2010, Parkin et al., 2008)....
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Dissertation•
22 Jan 2010
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the existence and magnitude of switching costs in Finnish retal bank lending, possibly providing a primer for authority intervention, and found that the long-term character of customer relationships enabling banks to price discriminate between new and old customers as well as providing incumbent banks with an informational advantage over competitors concerning customer creditworthiness.
Abstract: Competition in the banking industry has been under scrutiny from both Nordic and European competition authorities, and switching costs have been found as a plausible reason for weak consumer mobility. (Switching costs are the costs faced by consumers when changing from one supplier to another.) This thesis examines the existence and magnitude of switching costs in Finnish retal bank lending, possibly providing a primer for authority intervention. A review of theoretical switching cost models reveals several important features of banking affecting market performance. Most important is the long-term character of customer relationships enabling banks to price discriminate between new and old customers as well as providing incumbent banks with an informational advantage over competitors concerning customer creditworthiness. The Finnish retail bank market in particular displays several characteristics nurturing switching costs: substantial physical distances between towns create fragmented markets where customers become informationally captured to local banks; markets are segmented based on history; and bank services are bundled together rendering focused purchasing very advantageous. Switching costs facing customers choosing either a local cooperative or savings banks are examined by estimating price elasticities and cross price elasticities with regard to lending. Financial report data on outstanding loans and interest income are used to approximate loan output and price for 37 cooperative-savings bank pairs during 1999-2008. The obtained panel is analyzed in two LSDV-models, one for each bank category. The resulting price and cross price elasticity estimates are below one in absolute value, in line with earlier research, indicating substantial switching costs. The results are robust to minor changes in model formulation. Interestingly enough, cooperative bank customers appear more loyal than savings bank customers which seems to be reflected in higher return rates on total assets. Plausible explanations lie both in ownership structure (many cooperative bank customers are ownermembers) and in the well developed loyalty program offered by many cooperative banks. Yet the results need to be interpreted with care as misspecifikation tests indicate various
6 citations
Cites background from "Intermediate microeconomics : A mod..."
...Vesala [1995] och Kauko [2007] undersökte finska bankers marknadstyrka med den så kallade Panzar-Rosse-metoden, som mäter hur prisförändringar i produktionsfaktorer reflekteras i bankernas...
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors considered multicriteria decision-making problems under bounded (above, below, or from both sides) continuous or discrete criteria, and proposed methods for comparing variants of solutions using the information accumulated in the form of interval estimates of replacing the values of some criteria by the value of others.
Abstract: Multicriteria decision-making problems under bounded (above, below, or from both sides) continuous or discrete criteria are considered. Methods for comparing variants of solutions using the information accumulated in the form of interval estimates of replacing the values of some criteria by the values of others (such replacements are called tradeoffs; in other words, this can be considered as a compensation of the deterioration of some criteria by improving the values of others) are proposed along with simple consistency conditions of such information. The issue of constructing the set of nondominated variants is discussed.
6 citations