Book•
Intermediate microeconomics : A modern approach
01 Jan 2006-
TL;DR: The Varian approach as mentioned in this paper gives students tools they can use on exams, in the rest of their classes, and in their careers after graduation, and is still the most modern presentation of the subject.
Abstract: This best-selling text is still the most modern presentation of the subject. The Varian approach gives students tools they can use on exams, in the rest of their classes, and in their careers after graduation.
Citations
More filters
TL;DR: The paper will introduce the concept of pricing engineering for electronic financial markets based on an analysis of environmental factors and the objectives of the market operator, and a focus will be laid on the implementation of fee structures that include liquidity incentives.
Abstract: Due to the demutualization of exchanges, the business case of operating an electronic financial market has become even more important. Specifically, it is vital to design pricing incentives for the provision of order flow and thereby to assure market liquidity. The paper will introduce the concept of pricing engineering for electronic financial markets. Based on an analysis of environmental factors and the objectives of the market operator, a focus will be laid on the implementation of fee structures that include liquidity incentives. The concepts were implemented in the context of a new electronic market, the Dubai International Financial Exchange (DIFX). The project will be described as a case study for the practical realization of the pricing engineering approach.
5 citations
TL;DR: The tools of neoclassical economic theory and their application to organ transplantation are discussed and the discussion is expanded to theories in behavioral economics that may enrich the understanding.
Abstract: The process of organ transplantation is the culmination of many unique and differentiated individual decisions. Examples of individual decisions on the patient side are the decision to be placed on an organ waiting list, the surgeon’s decision to select desired organ characteristics [ie, Extended Criteria Donor (ECD) organ], the decision to accept or reject an organ that is offered and the type of posttransplant care. Examples on the donor side are the decision to be placed on the donor registry, the next-of-kin donation decisions and the donation decisions of living donors. Developing a better understanding of these individual decisions will facilitate the creation of a more efficient organ transplantation process. A number of neoclassical and behavioral economic principles can be used to address this need. This primer serves as an illustration of how applying these economic principles can be used to advance our understanding of the organ transplant process. The foundation of neoclassical, or traditional, economic theory is expected utility theory. However, a number of behavioral anomalies (ie, Allias Paradox) have arisen which cannot be explained by expected utility theory and the field of behavioral economics has arisen to address these behavioral anomalies (i.e., prospect theory). In our discussion, we will first discuss the tools of neoclassical economic theory and their application to organ transplantation and then expand the discussion to theories in behavioral economics that may enrich our understanding.
5 citations
Cites background from "Intermediate microeconomics : A mod..."
...Copyright © 2015 Wolters Kluwer of preferences that indicates all consumption bundles that yield the same level of utility for an individual.(5) Figure 1 illustrates both of these functions using information that is relevant to organ transplantation....
[...]
...The presence of uncertainty introduces another important neoclassical economic concept, risk aversion.(5,8,9) Risk aversion is based on the premise that individuals are not risk-neutral agents in the presence of uncertainty....
[...]
...Figure 1 illustrates both of these functions using information that is relevant to organ transplantation.(5) The utility function illustrated in Figure 1 represents the surgeon's utility function when they are tasked with the deci-...
[...]
...Risk aversion arises in neoclassical economic terms because the utility of expected wealth from taking the gamble is greater than the expected utility of wealth.(5) This is a result of concavity in an agent's utility function....
[...]
25 Apr 2006
TL;DR: The role of a broker is to add societal objectives to resource allocation algorithms and to mediate between greedy consumers and selfish providers in a market-oriented resource allocation model for large-scale heterogeneous systems.
Abstract: In this paper we discuss the role of a broker in a market-oriented resource allocation model for large-scale heterogeneous systems. The simplified model is based upon a three party system, provider-broker-consumer. The allocation of resources is determined by their price, their utility to the consumer, and by the satisfaction of the consumer. The role of the broker is to add societal objectives to resource allocation algorithms and to mediate between greedy consumers and selfish providers. A simulation experiment was conducted to study the transient and the steady-state behavior of several performance measures, including the average consumer satisfaction, the average utility, and the hourly revenue.
5 citations
Additional excerpts
...A candidate satisfaction function is [19]:...
[...]
TL;DR: An analytical framework is established to examine these three models for addressing the platform’s optimal business decision and reveals that both the time-sensitive cost of heterogeneous passengers and the operating cost of the platform's self-operating vehicles play critical roles in the platforms’ choice of optimal model.
Abstract: Pooling, premier, and hybrid are three business models employed by ride-hailing platforms We establish an analytical framework to examine these three models for addressing the platform’s optimal business decision Our results reveal that both the time-sensitive cost of heterogeneous passengers and the operating cost of the platform’s self-operating vehicles play critical roles in the platform’s choice of optimal model If the operating cost of the platform’s self-operating vehicles is relatively high, the platform should choose the pooling service model when passengers have a low ratio of time-sensitive cost between using the pooling service and using the premier service The premier service model should be implemented if this ratio is in the middle range and the operating cost is sufficiently low Otherwise, the hybrid service model is optimal We characterize the conditions under which the pooling service model and the premier service model can achieve Pareto improvement for the platform and passengers Furthermore, if the ratio is in the middle range, the pooling service model is more beneficial for passengers, while the premier service model is more profitable for the platform
5 citations
Proceedings Article•
01 Jan 2008TL;DR: The paper reveals that both moral hazard and adverse selection problems may occur during the G2B interactions and tamper the relationships between the two and proposes an advanced information technology (IT) solution that can minimize the moral hazard by enhancing supply chain management for the business and on the other hand preventing tax fraud for the government.
Abstract: With the emergence of innovative (networked) organization forms such as enhanced supply chain collaboration and modern forms of public-private partnerships (PPP), effective and efficient collaboration among network participants becomes crucial but often difficult to achieve. One of the leading factors which cause such defective collaboration is the asymmetric information issue among the network participants. Two identifiable problems resulted by the asymmetric information are the moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Former studies mainly positioned asymmetric information problems within the context of traditional business environment; in this paper we suggest that similar problems may also occur in the Government to Business (G2B) context. We discuss these issues via a collaborative pilot case study (hereafter, Beer Living Lab) between the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration (DutchTCA) and a Dutch beer company (Beer Co.). The paper reveals that both moral hazard and adverse selection problems may occur during the G2B interactions and tamper the relationships between the two. In addressing these problems, we propose an advanced information technology (IT) solution, drawing upon an effective and efficient information sharing schema that can on the one hand minimize the moral hazard by enhancing supply chain management for the business and on the other hand preventing tax fraud for the government. Further we argue that the application of the advanced IT may serve as a strong signaling and screening tool for overcoming the adverse selection problem during the PPP forming and result in a win-win situation. The insights learned should benefit those involved in various inter-organizational business networks, partnership as well as supply chain management settings.
5 citations
Cites background from "Intermediate microeconomics : A mod..."
...…more recently, the theory of asymmetric information has been expanded in the field of economics of information technology and discussed by various researches [e.g., (Garicano & Kaplan, 2001; Varian, 2002; Varian et al., 2004; Wigand et al., 1997; Stiglitz, 2000; Kauffman & Mohtadi, 2003)]....
[...]
...For this reason it is sometimes called a hidden action problem” (Varian, 2002)....
[...]