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Intermediate microeconomics : A modern approach

01 Jan 2006-
TL;DR: The Varian approach as mentioned in this paper gives students tools they can use on exams, in the rest of their classes, and in their careers after graduation, and is still the most modern presentation of the subject.
Abstract: This best-selling text is still the most modern presentation of the subject. The Varian approach gives students tools they can use on exams, in the rest of their classes, and in their careers after graduation.
Citations
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DissertationDOI
01 Jan 2011
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a method to solve the problem of "uniformity" and "uncertainty" in the context of health care, and propose a solution.
Abstract: viii

3 citations


Cites background from "Intermediate microeconomics : A mod..."

  • ...Economic agents’ consumption and saving decisions depend on their preferences and on expected economic conditions (Varian, 1999)....

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Proceedings ArticleDOI
23 May 2015
TL;DR: This paper analyzes quantitatively the amount of work required from faculty to implement the series of measures and concludes that, within this course, continuous assessment is expensive and has reached its limit.
Abstract: The first course on programming is fundamental in the Facultat d’Informatica de Barcelona. After a major redesign of the Programming-1 course in 2006 to give it a more practical flavor, an increasing number of measures have been undertaken over the years to try to increase its pass rate while maintaining a fixed quality level. These measures, that can be roughly summarized as an important increase in assessment, imply an increase in the workload of both students and instructors that does not always correspond to the increase of pass rate they provide. In this paper, and within the context of this course, we analyze quantitatively the amount of work required from faculty to implement the series of measures and we conclude that, within this course, continuous assessment is expensive and has reached its limit.

3 citations


Cites background or methods from "Intermediate microeconomics : A mod..."

  • ...Looking at the graph we can observe that Πt has the typical S-curve shape in economic terms (Varian, 2005)....

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  • ...Abusing again of economics terminology, we call this rate the marginal gain at time t of the undertaken measure (Varian, 2005)....

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  • ...We propose a simple way to interpret them under economic terms by means of productivity and marginal gain notions (Varian, 2005)....

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  • ...Economists define productivity or effectiveness as the ratio of outputs to inputs used in the production process (Varian, 2005)....

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01 Jan 2006
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the field of micro-finance; financial services given to poor and low-income individuals who do not have access to formal financial markets, and the purpose of their study is...
Abstract: In this paper we are exploring the field of microfinance; financial services given to poor and low-income individuals who do not have access to formal financial markets. The purpose of our study is ...

3 citations


Cites background from "Intermediate microeconomics : A mod..."

  • ...(Varian, 2002) In credit markets, adverse selection occurs before a loan agreement has taken place....

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  • ...(Varian, 2002) To reduce the risks associated with asymmetric information, lenders often require collaterals in form of fixed assets (often property such as land, house etc.)....

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Journal Article
TL;DR: By using Cobb-Douglas utility function to construct a price function, the fairness of resource utilization under different load condition was achieved, and it is assumed that more than one user could be con- sidered at the access moment, and a game is used to judge the access, which guaranteed the fairness use of resource.
Abstract: By using Cobb-Douglas utility function to construct a price function, the fairness of resource utilization under different load condition was achieved. To be closer to the real system, it is assumed that more than one user could be con- sidered at the access moment, and a game is used to judge the access, which guaranteed the fairness use of resource. Since video and IPTV can tolerate a certain degree of packet lose, and the data can tolerate a certain degree of delay, therefore a game is used to decide whether to degrade ongoing calls or to reject a new call request to maximize the resource utility under the precondition of fairness of resource utilization. The analysis and simulation results show that, by using this pricing function and game approach, the fairness of resource utilization is well achieved, while the resource utilization is maximized.

3 citations


Additional excerpts

  • ...在微观经济学中,效用是偏好的量化表达式。 效用又分为序数效用和基数效用。其中,序数效用 关心的是效用的相对关系,而不是其绝对值之差; 基数效用以绝对值来衡量效用。在这里,因为并不 针对真实的价格,所以采用序数效用来量化价格函 数。通常,描述序数效用的模式主要有([12,13]):完全 替代模式, u(x1,x2)=ax1+bx2 ;完全互补模式, u(x1,x2)=min(ax1, bx2) ; 准 线 性 偏 好 模 式 , u(x1,x2)=x1+x2 ;柯布-道格拉斯偏好模式, u(x1,x2)= x1x2。 实际上,负载 η和传输比特率 R 之间并不存 在替代和互补的关系,所以,只能用准线性偏好 模式或柯布-道格拉斯偏好模式来描述价格函 数。对于准线性偏好模式,它的边际替代率(在 微观经济学中,边际替代率衡量消费者愿意用一 种商品去替代另一种物品的比率。这里,可以认 为是对负载的偏好和对速率的偏好之间的比值) 只取决于 x1([12]),x2 对它没有任何影响。显然,对 负载 η和传输比特率 R 来说,这种模式是不现实 的,因此本文价格函数采用柯布-道格拉斯偏好 模式,即...

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Dissertation
01 Jan 2018
TL;DR: In this article, the authors formulate a perfectly competitive model that includes electricity generators, retailers, industrial consumers, and an independent system operator as individual agents in a game where each agent simultaneously makes their operational and contract decisions to maximise their risk-adjusted profit across the potential scenarios, given the other agent's decisions.
Abstract: In this thesis, we formulate a perfectly competitive model that includes electricity generators, retailers, industrial consumers, and an independent system operator as individual agents in a perfectly competitive game. These agents each simultaneously make their operational and contract decisions to maximise their risk-adjusted profit across the potential scenarios, given the other agent’s decisions. We show the existence of equilibria for our model, under some relatively nonrestrictive assumptions. We utilise our model to evaluate transmission expansion decisions under agent risk aversion. We find that surprisingly, the new equilibrium with expanded transmission can lead to lower total system welfare. We then show that these inefficiencies are caused by differences in worst case scenarios for generation agents and the system as a whole. We also show how we can rectify this through the use of contracts. The trading of contracts for difference and Arrow-Debreu Securities help align all of the agents’ worst-case scenarios with one another and with the system as a whole. This improves the capacity expansion decisions made by the generation agents, making the transmission line a net benefit, even within this case study. We apply our model within the context of a few extensions. We create a case study where generation agents competitively divest from generation. Secondly, we introduce a stage before expansion, where generation agents need to invest in consent and research into their generation plants (or else they cannot build the actual generation plant). Finally, assuming there is a known and proportional impact of carbon emissions, we show how risk-aversion complicates determining the right tax or subsidy when trying to maximise total risk-adjusted welfare. We use this model and aspects of some of our extensions within the framework of the New Zealand Electricity market. Assuming agents are price takers, we model which generation plants we would expect to be constructed or divested from long term. iii Again, we demonstrate how a liquid contract market impacts investment decisions and how this compares with vertical integration. We compare this all to the socially optimal solution.

3 citations


Cites background from "Intermediate microeconomics : A mod..."

  • ...Cournot competition has the following features [57]: • Players are non-cooperative....

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