Book•
Intermediate microeconomics : A modern approach
01 Jan 2006-
TL;DR: The Varian approach as mentioned in this paper gives students tools they can use on exams, in the rest of their classes, and in their careers after graduation, and is still the most modern presentation of the subject.
Abstract: This best-selling text is still the most modern presentation of the subject. The Varian approach gives students tools they can use on exams, in the rest of their classes, and in their careers after graduation.
Citations
More filters
TL;DR: The considered scheduling problem enhances standard scheduling models by incorporating multiple stakeholders, nonlinear cost functions, and machine operating cost, whereas the presented negotiation approach contributes to the methodology and practice of collaborative decision making.
22 citations
Cites background from "Intermediate microeconomics : A mod..."
...…may have nonlinear operating cost functions for two reasons: firstly, present fixed costs are associated to nonlinear average variable costs (see Varian, 2010, Ch. 21); secondly, a lot of technical procedures of machines and relationships of machine components are nonlinear (see Vergnano et…...
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01 Dec 2010
TL;DR: The estimation problem is reduced to the optimization of a cost function that depends on the system dynamics and the latest output measurements and state estimates which is distributed among the local subsystems by means of dual decomposition.
Abstract: In this paper a distributed version of the Kalman filter is proposed. In particular, the estimation problem is reduced to the optimization of a cost function that depends on the system dynamics and the latest output measurements and state estimates which is distributed among the local subsystems by means of dual decomposition. The techniques presented in the paper are applied to estimate the position of mobile agents.
22 citations
Cites background from "Intermediate microeconomics : A mod..."
...Remark 7: In welfare economics, under certain assumptions such as the absence of externalities in transactions, it is proved that market prices guarantee that, despite of agents selfish behavior, a Pareto optimum is achieved [16]....
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01 Apr 2007
TL;DR: This paper develops a framework for operator competition based on short term ownership of spectrum resources and devise a dynamic spectrum access method called "Dynamic Property Rights Spectrum Access (D-Pass)".
Abstract: In this paper we develop a framework for operator competition based on short term ownership of spectrum resources and devise a dynamic spectrum access method called "Dynamic Property Rights Spectrum Access (D-Pass)". In the D-Pass model, spectrum portions are allocated to operators on a short term basis (few sessions) by a SPS (Spectrum Policy Server) that serves as a controller/enforcer as well as a clearinghouse for spectrum allocations. Prior to each short term allocation, the SPS optimally determines a specific partition of spectrum resources among the operators to maximize a system related objective function. The operators are charged by the SPS for the amount of spectrum they are allocated. Given the spectrum allocation, the operators compete with each other for users present in the system through demand responsive pricing, in the form of an iterative bidding scheme reminiscent of simultaneous ascending auctions. At every iteration, the operators make rate and price offers for each user considering the bandwidth allocated to them and their costs associated with serving the users. The users respond by declaring the probabilities with which they will accept the service offers made. We consider two different objective functions for the SPS to maximize while determining the exact partition of the spectrum resources: (1) the total expected bandwidth utilization, (2) the minimum acceptance probability that a user accepts the offered service. We demonstrate several tradeoffs between these objectives through numerical experiments and illustrate the effect of bandwidth cost on these tradeoffs. Our results also suggest that employing short term allocation of resources could potentially lead to performance gains as opposed to static allocation of resources, especially in regimes where the bandwidth is relatively expensive.
22 citations
Cites result from "Intermediate microeconomics : A mod..."
...In this sense, the above acceptance model is similar to the CobbDouglas curves that are used in economics [17]....
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Posted Content•
TL;DR: The authors argue that description invariance is an implicit axiom of the standard model primarily on the formal structure of its object of choice and only derivatively on the structural structure of preferences.
Abstract: The goal of this paper is to provide an axiomatic framework that can account for framing effects violating the so-called axiom of description invariance. Most existing discussions of the latter in economics are made with respect to Kahneman and Tversky's 1980s work. However, other psychologists have, over the last twenty-five years or so, progressively refined the conditions under which framing effects violating description invariance hold. Our axiomatic framework is motivated by these developments. We argue that description invariance is an implicit axiom of the standard model primarily on the formal structure of its object of choice and only derivatively on the formal structure of preferences. The conditions under which it is violated in psychologists' experiments are a useful guide to make it formally explicit. Furthermore, they also provide normative justifications for weakening it. We propose a way to do so in a mathematically tractable fashion that can account for all the variations in framing effects for which prospect theory cannot (at least straightforwardly) account for.
21 citations
TL;DR: The authors argued that preference assignments in economics are just shorthand descriptions of agents' choices, and that preference assignment does not entail any of the problematic economic methodologies, and indeed it is warranted independently of them.
Abstract: I distinguish several doctrines that economic methodologists have found attractive, all of which have a positivist flavor. One of these is the doctrine that preference assignments in economics are just shorthand descriptions of agents’ choices. Although most of these doctrines are problematic, the latter doctrine about preference assignments is a respectable one, I argue. It does not entail any of the problematic doctrines, and indeed it is warranted independently of them.
21 citations