Journal ArticleDOI
Investment Choice with Managerial Incentive Schemes
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This paper shows that firms might get an additional strategic benefit from using marginal-cost-reducing investments in conjunction with a managerial incentive scheme, and shows a way to mitigate such effects, through heir simultaneous use.Abstract:
In this paper, we show that firms might get an additional strategic benefit from using marginal-cost-reducing investments in conjunction with strategic delegation. While both these instruments allo...read more
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
Process and Product Optimization Using Game Theory
Nuno Costa,João Lourenço +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper , the Stackelberg's technique complemented with a factors scaling tool is proposed for finding equilibrium solutions to multi-objective optimization problems developed in the Response Surface Methodology framework, though optimization of multiple characteristics of process and product is a usual problem faced by practitioners in non-manufacturing environments.
Journal ArticleDOI
Bi-Objective Optimization Problems—A Game Theory Perspective to Improve Process and Product
Nuno Costa,João Carlos Lourenço +1 more
TL;DR: In this article , an approach based on game theory is suggested to find solutions for bi-objective problems, where Stackelberg's technique is employed and complemented with the Factors Scaling tool to help the users in defining its strategy for optimizing process and product quality characteristics.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements
TL;DR: A firm's actions in one market can change competitors' strategies in a second market by affecting its own marginal costs in that other market as mentioned in this paper, and whether the action provides costs or benefits in the second market depends on whether it increases or decreases marginal costs.
Posted Content
Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly
Chaim Fershtman,Kenneth L. Judd +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the incentives which competing principals give their agents, focusing on two oligopoly models where owners write incentive contracts with the managers, and show that a principal will distort his agent's incentives when the agent competes with agents of competing principals.
Posted Content
Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly
Chaim Fershtman,Kenneth L. Judd +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the incentives which competing principals give their agents, focusing on two oligopoly models where owners write incentive contracts with the managers, and show that a principal will distort his agent's incentives when the agent competes with agents of competing principals.
Journal ArticleDOI
Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that entry is deterred in an industry when existing firms have enough capacity to make a new entrant unprofitable, and that this capacity need not be fully utilized in the absence of entry.