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Journal Article

Jihadism, Narrow and Wide: The Dangers of Loose Use of an Important Term

23 Apr 2015-Perspectives on terrorism-Vol. 9, Iss: 2
TL;DR: This article looked at the derivation and use of Jihadism and related terms, at definitions provided by a number of leading scholars, and at media usage, and showed that even these scholarly definitions actually make important distinctions between jihadism and associated ideology.
Abstract: The term “jihadism” is popular, but difficult. It has narrow senses, which are generally valuable, and wide senses, which may be misleading. This article looks at the derivation and use of “jihadism” and of related terms, at definitions provided by a number of leading scholars, and at media usage. It distinguishes two main groups of scholarly definitions, some careful and narrow, and some appearing to match loose media usage. However, it shows that even these scholarly definitions actually make important distinctions between jihadism and associated ideology. The article closes with a warning against the risks of loose and wide understandings of such important, but difficult, terms.

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Citations
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Book
05 Mar 2020
TL;DR: Abdallah Azzam, the Palestinian cleric who led the mobilization of Arab fighters to Afghanistan in the 1980s, played a crucial role in the internationalization of the jihadi movement as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Abdallah Azzam, the Palestinian cleric who led the mobilization of Arab fighters to Afghanistan in the 1980s, played a crucial role in the internationalization of the jihadi movement. Killed in mysterious circumstances in 1989 in Peshawar, Pakistan, he remains one of the most influential jihadi ideologues of all time. Here, in the first in-depth biography of Azzam, Thomas Hegghammer explains how Azzam came to play this role and why jihadism went global at this particular time. It traces Azzam's extraordinary life journey from a West Bank village to the battlefields of Afghanistan, telling the story of a man who knew all the leading Islamists of his time and frequented presidents, CIA agents, and Cat Stevens the pop star. It is, however, also a story of displacement, exclusion, and repression that suggests that jihadism went global for fundamentally local reasons.

48 citations

Dissertation
01 Jan 2016
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a survey of the state of the art in the field of bioinformatics: http://www.biomedical-information-engineering.org/
Abstract: ........................................................................................................... xvii

44 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article explored the implications of this labeling for Muslim communities and explored the interpretations Muslims themselves accord to the dichotomy of moderate and extremist and consider whether the use of such binary terms is at all helpful as a way of rallying Muslims to the cause of tackling terrorism and radicalisation.
Abstract: The rhetorical use of labels in the war on terror has become an important tactic post 9/11. One such example is the deployment of the categories of “moderate” and “extremist” within counterterrorism discourse, with Muslims distinguished as either friend or foe based on this dichotomy. The moderate Muslim label is a relational term, only making sense when it is contrasted with what is seen as non-moderate (i.e., extremism). Such binary constructs carry a range of implicit assumptions about what is regarded as an acceptable form of Islam and the risks posed by the Islamic religion and Muslim communities. In this article, we explore the implications of this labelling for Muslim communities. In particular, we explore the interpretations Muslims themselves accord to the dichotomy of moderate and extremist and consider whether the use of such binary terms is at all helpful as a way of rallying Muslims to the cause of tackling terrorism and radicalisation. We draw on focus group data collected from Musli...

33 citations


Cites background from "Jihadism, Narrow and Wide: The Dang..."

  • ...These scholars argue that debates about Muslim moderation often ignore the wide variety of positions within Islam towards key religious texts and principles (Ashour 2009; Esposito 2005; Esposito and Mogahed 2007; Olsson 2014; Sedgwick 2015)....

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  • ...pinning jihadism and violent extremism (Kepel 2002; Sedgwick 2015; Wiktorowicz 2006)....

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  • ...positions within Islam towards key religious texts and principles (Ashour 2009; Esposito 2005; Esposito and Mogahed 2007; Olsson 2014; Sedgwick 2015)....

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  • ...Salafism is an ultraconservative form of Sunni Islam and has been identified as providing the underlying ideology underpinning jihadism and violent extremism (Kepel 2002; Sedgwick 2015; Wiktorowicz 2006)....

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, Jihadist tactical technical communication persuades individuals to act by creating identification between individuals and audiences, and by associating terrorist tactics with everyday practices such as cooking, which is known as tactical technical communications.
Abstract: Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Jihadist organizations such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have focused increasingly on motivating unaffiliated individuals in the United States and Western countries to carry out lone-wolf attacks in their home countries. To this end, many Jihadist organizations produce what is known as tactical technical communication. Jihadist tactical technical communication persuades individuals to act by creating identification between individuals and audiences, and by associating terrorist tactics with everyday practices such as cooking.

29 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
18 Aug 2021-Religion
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that the contents of the Friday sermons, that reach at least 50 percent of the country's adult males every week, have moved from Turkish nationalist understanding of militarism and martyrdom to more radical, Islamist and pro-violence interpretations that actively promote dying for the nation, homeland, religion and God.

19 citations

References
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Journal Article
TL;DR: Islamism emerged in the late 1980s in French academe and then crossed into English, where it eventually displaced Islamic fundamentalism in specialized contexts as discussed by the authors, and since September 11, 2001, it may even have established itself as the preferred American usage.
Abstract: The issue has been the subject of a heated debate for two decades. For a while, both general and scholarly usage in America accepted fundamentalism. Islamism emerged in the late 1980s in French academe and then crossed into English, where it eventually displaced Islamic fundamentalism in specialized contexts. More recently, the term Islamism has gained even wider currency, and since September 11, 2001, it may even have established itself as the preferred American usage. Still newer terminology may lie over the horizon.

66 citations


"Jihadism, Narrow and Wide: The Dang..." refers background in this paper

  • ...Sometimes it is used very widely, however, interchangeably with terms such as “Islamism” and “violent extremism.”...

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  • ...If “caliphate” is replaced by “state,” this could equally serve as a definition of “Islamism” or even “fundamentalism.”...

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  • ...“Jihadism” may even seem to be replacing “Islamism,” a possibility foreseen by Martin Kramer more than ten years ago in an article in which he noted how “Islamism” was then replacing “fundamentalism,” and wondered what new term might one day replace “Islamism” [2]....

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  • ...Most scholars do generally distinguish between jihadism on the one hand and ideologies such as Islamism or Salafism on the other hand....

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  • ...It may, however, appear to offer an explanation, especially when used loosely and widely in the media, where jihadism, Islamism, and Salafism may be conflated....

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a comparative study of the history of Islam revolts with a religious aspect or ideology has been conducted, showing that these revolts, common in the early centuries of Islam, became less frequent thereafter.
Abstract: Within the Muslim world, revolts with a religious aspect or ideology have had a long history. My current comparative research on this topic indicates that these revolts, common in the early centuries of Islam, became less frequent thereafter. These revolts may generally be characterized as either “left” sectarian or “orthodox” revivalist. The latter were particularly important after ca. 1700. It is part of my thesis to see three phases to these modern revivalist revolts, and to say that all three phases were, in different ways, tied to interaction with the West, although this was far from being their only cause. These three phases were the pre-colonial phase, early resistance to colonialism, and the recent Islamic revival. The scope here covers the whole Muslim world and the approach is comparative.

65 citations

Book
22 Aug 2006
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a clear-sighted and sobering analysis of where we are today in the struggle against terrorism and present a pragmatic but principled approach to defeating the terrorist enterprise.
Abstract: The author presents a clear-sighted and sobering analysis of where we are today in the struggle against terrorism. Jenkins, an internationally renowned authority on terrorism, distills the jihadists’ operational code and outlines a pragmatic but principled approach to defeating the terrorist enterprise. We need to build upon our traditions of determination and self-reliance, he argues, and above all, preserve our commitment to American values.

57 citations


"Jihadism, Narrow and Wide: The Dang..." refers background in this paper

  • ...Yes, all these movements are jihadist in the narrow sense that they consider jihad both legitimate and instrumentally efficient, but while al-Qaeda is clearly global in Hegghammer’s sense—in terms of targeting the West in general and the U.S. in particular—other groups appear to be much less global if two questions are asked....

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  • ...[15] Brian Michael Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), p....

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  • ...Religious Socialization among Young Muslims in Scandinavia and Western Europe’ (London & New York: Routledge, 2015)....

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  • ...A review in early 2015 of four British and American publications, two non-tabloid and two tabloid, [18] showed that all these terms were used to identify both IS and Europeans going to join it, and also to identify a variety of other groups and individuals from Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Mourabitoun in Mali, to al-Qaeda and various lone actors in the West....

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  • ...[6] John Ralph Willis, “Jihād fī Sabīl Allāh—its Doctrinal Basis in Islam and some Aspects of its Evolution in Nineteenth-Century West Africa,” The Journal of African History, Vol. 8 (1967), pp. 395-415, at p. 412 & p. 414....

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a study of a multi-stakeholder project, focused on the renewal of the commercial center of the historic garden city of Tapiola, seeks to increase understanding of processes of path dependence and path creation during the project's early stage.

56 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the factors that may lead previously radical and militant Islamist movements to de-radicalize, and in so doing alter their ideologies, strategies, and objectives.
Abstract: This article examines the factors that may lead previously radical and militant Islamist movements to de-radicalize, and in so doing alter their ideologies, strategies, and objectives. In particular it will focus on the process of de-radicalization of the Egyptian Islamic Group, a former ally of al-Qa'ida. It will conclude with a tentative framework explaining the causes behind de-radicalization as well as policy recommendations. In July 1997, the "historical" leadership1 of Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Group (IG), the largest armed Islamist movement in Egypt, declared a unilateral ceasefire that surprised many observers, officials, and even many IG members. The ceasefire declaration contradicted the unwaveringly militant literature of the group, the vows of its leaders to continue the armed struggle until it toppled President Husni Mubarak's regime, and the increasingly violent tactics that the IG affiliates have used since the late 1970s. In 2002, the leadership of the IG not only dismantled its armed wings, but also renounced its radical literature, published new books, and replaced its curricula with those of the relatively moderate Muslim Brothers (MB).2 Members of the shura (consultative) council of the IG issued several tracts explaining its new non-violent ideology, a move which indicated a de-radicalization process that took place not only on the behavioral (strategic/tactical) level but also on the ideological level. This process, as I shall demonstrate in the article, was relatively successful, as it took around 15,000 to 20,000 IG militants away from the Salafi-Jihadi3 camp currently led by al-Qa'ida.4 In addition, other Islamist movements have shown observable rhetorical, behavioral, and ideological changes. Like the IG of Egypt, the military wing of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS),5 the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), declared a unilateral ceasefire in 1997. The ceasefire led to disarmament and demilitarization processes that aimed for the reintegration of the AIS members as well as other armed Islamist factions into the Algerian civilian society. The demilitarization process included subgroups from the notorious Armed Islamic Group (GIA). In Tajikistan, the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) that led the United Tajikistani Opposition (UTO) in the civil war of 1992-1997, re-led the UTO again into a peace agreement, albeit fragile, with the Tajik regime. Similar to the IG in Egypt and the AIS and other militant factions in Algeria, the IRP called for jihad in 1992 and then for a ceasefire, a compromise, and a peaceful resolution of the conflict in 1997. In other predominantly Muslim states, several Islamist movements have been engaging in electoral politics. Those movements include the Muslim Brothers in Egypt; the Islah (Reform) Party in Yemen; the Popular National Congress in Sudan; the Islamic Society6 and the Islamic Union7 in Afghanistan; al-Da'wa (The Call) Party, the Islamist Party, and the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). In addition, moderate Islamist movements have been leaning towards a relatively liberal trend8 like the Justice and Development Parties in Turkey (AKP) and alWasat (The Center) group in Egypt. Given these changes within movements that have long glorified violent struggle and upheld continuity, the main research question that this article will attempt to answer is: why do radical Islamist militants revise their ideologies, strategies, and objectives and initiate a de-radicalization process?9 In other words, can militant, Islamist radicals turn into relatively peaceful groups that accept the "other," and if so, under what conditions? In an attempt to answer this research question, I begin by providing definitions of key terms and concepts as well as a typology of Islamists. In the second section, I provide a brief synthesis of some of the literature on the causes of radicalization and moderation of Islamists. Then, I underline what I perceive as gaps in the literature and situate the article and its expected contribution. …

47 citations


"Jihadism, Narrow and Wide: The Dang..." refers background in this paper

  • ...[17] Omar Ashour, “Lions Tamed? An Inquiry into the Causes of De-Radicalization of Armed Islamist Movements: The Case of the Egyptian Islamic Group,”...

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  • ...by the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG), which showed that a change of view on instrumental efficiency–the conclusion that the jihad was getting nowhere–mattered most in leading the EIG to end its jihad, and was then justified in theological terms [17]....

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