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Job Mobility and the Careers of Young Men
TL;DR: This paper studied the joint processes of job mobility and wage growth among young men drawn from the Longitudinal Employee-Employer Data and concluded that the process of job changing for young workers, while apparently haphazard, is a critical component of workers' move toward the stable employment relations that characterize mature careers.
Abstract: We study the joint processes of job mobility and wage growth among young men drawn from the Longitudinal Employee-Employer Data. Following individuals at three month intervals from their entry into the labor market, we track career patterns of job changing and the evolution of wages for up to 15 years. Following an initial period of weak attachment to both the labor force and particular employers, careers tend to stabilize in the sense of strong labor force attachment and increasing durability of jobs. During the first 10 years in the labor market, a typical young worker will work for seven employers, which accounts for about two-thirds of the total number of jobs he will hold in his career. The evolution of wages plays a key role in this transition to stable employment: we estimate that wage gains at job changes account for at least a third of early-career wage growth, and that the wage is the key determinant of job changing decisions among young workers. We conclude that the process of job changing for young workers, while apparently haphazard, is a critical component of workers' move toward the stable employment relations that characterize mature careers.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the impacts of active labor market policies, such as job training, job search assistance, and job subsidies, and the methods used to evaluate their effectiveness.
Abstract: Policy makers view public sector-sponsored employment and training programs and other active labor market policies as tools for integrating the unemployed and economically disadvantaged into the work force. Few public sector programs have received such intensive scrutiny, and been subjected to so many different evaluation strategies. This chapter examines the impacts of active labor market policies, such as job training, job search assistance, and job subsidies, and the methods used to evaluate their effectiveness. Previous evaluations of policies in OECD countries indicate that these programs usually have at best a modest impact on participants’ labor market prospects. But at the same time, they also indicate that there is considerable heterogeneity in the impact of these programs. For some groups, a compelling case can be made that these policies generate high rates of return, while for other groups these policies have had no impact and may have been harmful. Our discussion of the methods used to evaluate these policies has more general interest. We believe that the same issues arise generally in the social sciences and are no easier to address elsewhere. As a result, a major focus of this chapter is on the methodological lessons learned from evaluating these programs. One of the most important of these lessons is that there is no inherent method of choice for conducting program evaluations. The choice between experimental and non-experimental methods or among alternative econometric estimators should be guided by the underlying economic models, the available data, and the questions being addressed. Too much emphasis has been placed on formulating alternative econometric methods for correcting for selection bias and too little given to the quality of the underlying data. Although it is expensive, obtaining better data is the only way to solve the evaluation problem in a convincing way. However, better data are not synonymous with social experiments. © 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
3,352 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for general training they receive is proposed, where the current employer has superior information about the worker's ability relative to other firms, which gives the employer an ex post monopsony power over the worker which encourages the firm to provide training.
Abstract: This paper offers and tests a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for general training they receive. The crucial ingredient in our model is that the current employer has superior information about the worker's ability relative to other firms. This informational advantage gives the employer an ex post monopsony power over the worker which encourages the firm to provide training. We show that the model can lead to multiple equilibria. In one equilibrium quits are endogenously high, and as a result employers have limited monopsony power and are willing to supply only little training, while in another equilibrium quits are low and training high. We also derive predictions from our model not shared by other explanations of firm sponsored training. Using microdata from Germany, we show that the predictions of the specific human capital model are rejected, while our model receives support from the data.
1,109 citations
TL;DR: In the human capital model with perfect labor markets, firms never invest in general skills and all cost of general training are borne by workers as mentioned in this paper. But when lobor market frictions compress the structure of the labor market, the costs of general skills are increased.
Abstract: In the human capital model with perfect labor markets, firms never invest in general skills and all cost of general training are borne by workers. When lobor market frictions compress the structure...
1,021 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a competency-based view of careers, derived from competencybased models of employer firms, is proposed. And the implications for boundaryless careers are explored by reference to changing organizational, occupational and industry community contexts.
Abstract: This paper proposes a competency-based view of careers, derived from competency-based models of employer firms. The implications for boundaryless careers are explored by reference to changing organizational, occupational and industry community contexts. All of these contexts are seen as likely to promote boundaryless career behaviors. Future research possibilities for each of three career competencies, and for interdependence among the competencies, are briefly examined.
1,006 citations
Cites background from "Job Mobility and the Careers of You..."
...workers typically experience 10 employers over their adult lives (Topel and Ward, 1992)....
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TL;DR: The authors survey non-competitive theories of training and draw some tentative policy conclusions from these models, and discuss a variety of evidence which support the predictions of noncompetitive theories, and they draw a tentative policy conclusion.
Abstract: In this paper, we survey non-competitive theories of training. With competitive labor markets, firms never pay for investments in general training, whereas when labor markets are imperfect, firm-sponsored training arises as an equilibrium phenomenon. We discuss a variety of evidence which support the predictions of non-competitive theories, and we draw some tentative policy conclusions from these models.
931 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that consumers lack full information about the prices of goods, but their information is probably poorer about the quality variation of products simply because the latter information is more difficult to obtain.
Abstract: Consumers are continually making choices among products, the consequences of which they are but dimly aware. Not only do consumers lack full information about the prices of goods, but their information is probably even poorer about the quality variation of products simply because the latter information is more difficult to obtain. One can, for example, readily determine the price of a television set; it is more difficult to determine its performance characteristics under various conditions or its expected need for repairs. This article contends that limitations of consumer information about quality have profound effects upon the market structure of consumer goods. In particular, monopoly power for a consumer good will be greater if consumers know about the quality of only a few brands of that good. This is a significant departure from the literature. Economists have long been interested in the determinants of monopoly power, but studies have always concentrated on the production function or market-size variables. I try to show that consumer behavior is also relevant to the determination of monopoly power in consumer industries. Location theory has also ignored the consumer's lack of information. Since many trips to a store are, in part, quests for information, the location of retail stores can be profoundly affected by consumer efforts to acquire information. I shall also try to show that advertising and inventory policy are affected by consumer ignorance about quality differences among brands. All of these impacts of consumer ignorance have remained unexplored because economists have not developed a systematic analysis of consumer quests for information about quality differences. Information about quality differs from information about price because the former is usually more expensive to buy than the latter. Indeed this is one reason we expect the variance in the utility of quality facing a consumer to be greater than the variance in the utility of price. This difference in the price of information can lead to fundamentally
5,548 citations
TL;DR: Turnover is generated by the existence of a nondegenerate distribution of the worker's productivity across different jobs as discussed by the authors, caused by the assumed variation in the quality of the employee-employer match.
Abstract: A long-run equilibrium theory of turnover is presented and is shown to explain the important regularities that have been observed by empirical investigators. A worker's productivity in a particular job is not known ex ante and becomes known more precisely as the worker's job tenure increases. Turnover is generated by the existence of a nondegenerate distribution of the worker's productivity across different. The nondegeneracy is caused by the assumed variation in the quality of the worker-employer match.
3,238 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the joint maximum likelihood estimator of the structural parameters is not consistent as the number of groups increases, with a fixed number of observations per group, and a conditional likelihood function is maximized, conditional on sufficient statistics for the incidental parameters.
Abstract: In data with a group structure, incidental parameters are included to control for missing variables. Applications include longitudinal data and sibling data. In general, the joint maximum likelihood estimator of the structural parameters is not consistent as the number of groups increases, with a fixed number of observations per group. Instead a conditional likelihood function is maximized, conditional on sufficient statistics for the incidental parameters. In the logit case, a standard conditional logit program can be used. Another solution is a random effects model, in which the distribution of the incidental parameters may depend upon the exogenous variables.
2,338 citations
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1,142 citations