Kooky objects revisited
01 Jan 2008-
TL;DR: In this article, an investigation of the conception of accidental com- pounds (or ''kooky objects'' as Gareth Matthews has called them) is presented, and an implicit role for kooky objects in such metaphysical contexts as the Categories and Metaphysics is proposed.
Abstract: This is an investigation of Aristotle's conception of accidental com- pounds (or ''kooky objects,'' as Gareth Matthews has called them)Fentities such as the pale man and the musical man. I begin with Matthews's pioneering work into kooky objects, and argue that they are not so far removed from our ordinary thinking as is commonly supposed. I go on to assess their utility in solving some familiar puzzles involving substitutivity in epistemic contexts, and compare the kooky object approach to more modern approaches involving the notion of referential opacity. I conclude by proposing that Aristotle provides an implicit role for kooky objects in such metaphysical contexts as the Categories and Metaphysics.
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that Baker's view cannot account for personal identity problems of a synchronic or diachronic nature, and that it cannot accommodate the Christian claim of eschatological bodily resurrection.
Abstract: I don’t think Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view can account for personal identity problems of a synchronic or diachronic nature. As such, it cannot accommodate the Christian’s claim of eschatological bodily resurrection-a principle reason for which she gives this account. In light of this, I press objections against her constitution view in the following ways: First, I critique an analogy she draws between Aristotle’s “accidental sameness” and constitution. Second, I address three problems for Baker’s constitution view [‘Constitution Problems’ (CP)], each more problematic than the next: CP1: Her definition of constitution lacks explanatory power; CP2: If there is a plausible definition of constitution, constitution implies either too many persons or no human persons at all; CP3: Constitution yields no essential distinction between human and divine persons. If my argument(s) go through, her constitution view has neither an explanation for diachronic personal identity nor personal identity through resurrection.
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110 citations
TL;DR: The problem of material constitution arises whenever it appears that an object a and an object b share all of the same parts and yet are essentially related to their parts in different ways.
Abstract: In this paper, I present an Aristotelian solution to the problem of material constitution. The problem of material constitution arises whenever it appears that an object a and an object b share all of the same parts and yet are essentially related to their parts in different ways. (A familiar example: A lump of bronze constitutes a statue of Athena. The lump and the statue share all of the same parts, but it appears that the lump can, whereas the statue cannot, survive radical rearrangements of those parts.) I argue that if we are prepared to follow Aristotle in making a distinction between numerical sameness and identity, we can solve the problem of material constitution without recourse to co-location or contingent identity and without repudiating any of the familiar objects of common sense (such as lumps and statues) or denying that these objects have the essential properties we ordinarily think that they have.
46 citations
TL;DR: The thesis that Aristotle's predecessors had already formulated problems similar to the temporal puzzles so generated is demonstrated, and that the three most prominent reactions to Qume’s puzzles were also anticipated by certain ancient Greek philosophers.
Abstract: In Section II it is shown that some of the Quinean objections to modal logic found in [ 151 can be transferred to the notions used to describe and account for temporal change.’ The remainder of the paper is devoted to a demonstration of the thesis that Aristotle’s predecessors had already formulated problems similar to the temporal puzzles so generated, and that the three most prominent reactions to Qume’s puzzles were also anticipated by certain ancient Greek philosophers. Furthermore, Aristotle’s own reaction as manifested in his analysis of the elements of change in Physics A7 can be seen to involve concepts which easily lend themselves to the kind of semantical analysis which has recently enhanced our understanding of modality. Let us begin, then, by getting clear on just what problems I have in mind.
42 citations