La non contestation des griefs en droit français de la concurrence : Bilan et perspectives d'un outil pionnier
30 Apr 2008-pp 93-100
TL;DR: The procedure de non contestation des griefs, introduced en droit francais de la concurrence en 2001, est un instrument cle de la panoplie d'outils d'intervention a la disposition du Conseil de la…
Abstract: La procedure de non contestation des griefs, introduite en droit francais de la concurrence en 2001, est un instrument cle de la panoplie d'outils d'intervention a la disposition du Conseil de la…
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors considered the interaction between public and private enforcement of the competition rules, and in particular the implications for private actions of alternative enforcement procedures, i.e. leniency programs, commitments and settlement procedures.
Abstract: I took the distance learning Postgraduate Diploma and MA at King’s College London during the academic years 2007/2009.
My dissertation considered the interaction between public and private enforcement of the competition rules, and in particular the implications for private actions of alternative enforcement procedures – i.e. leniency programmes, commitments and settlement procedures.
In the drafting of what would become Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages actions, this issue raised complex policy problems: the European Commission was, in principle, in favour of more private claims for damages, and did not want a system of settlements to render private actions more difficult.
In 2009, this dissertation took part to the debate: it surveyed a range of evidential, procedural and substantive issues, and expressed opinions on how best to reconcile the settlements procedure and the position of claimants in civil litigation.
In the first part, the dissertation analyses the context in which the studied interaction materializes by: underlining the main goals and characteristics of the three alternative enforcement procedures; emphasizing briefly the main goals and current issues of damages actions; presenting the key recommendations of the Commission White Paper; and assessing the tension between alternative enforcement procedures and .
In the second part, the dissertation analyses and assesses the solutions offered by the Commission White Paper to find a balance between alternative enforcement procedures and private enforcement by: identifying the theoretical and practical obstacles to damages actions that alternative enforcement procedures imply; and assessing, in relation with alternative enforcement procedures, the solutions identified in the Commission White Paper. The proposed solutions were often insufficient to remove obstacles to the development of damages actions
This research was presented and discussed with DG COMP and to university professors.
Member States needed to implement Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages actions in their legal systems by 27 December 2016.
In 2017, the impact of alternative enforcement procedures on damages actions is still being discussed and I have been asked to publish this dissertation to help feeding the reflexion of competition law specialists. I would be delighted if such was the case.
6 citations
01 Mar 2010
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose an etude de droit economique of ces contrats de structuration and de restructuration du capital dans la regulation du droit de la concurrence.
Abstract: Dans le cadre concurrentiel devenu mondial, concentration et organisation de l’economie resultent on ne peut plus clairement de deux facteurs : le jeu combine des strategies des acteurs prives et publics mais aussi les moyens proposes par le systeme juridique pour les accompagner et/ou les encadrer. Les procedures negociees illustrent la notion proposee par certains de contrat economique, en l’espece, de contrat de souverainete, outils de regulation de la concurrence. Ce texte propose une etude de droit economique de ces contrats de structuration et de restructuration du capital dans la regulation du droit de la concurrence. Les analyses conduisent a s’interesser, au-dela des strictes obligations juridiques traditionnelles et detaillees souscrites par les entreprises, a l’equilibre general de l’accord, au but economique qu’il poursuit. Il s’agit, en effet, d’une convention globale formant un tout coherent en depit des dispositions diverses qu’elle peut contenir, ce qui explique en grande partie son regime juridique. En echange d’engagements pour rendre l’operation ou les comportements compatibles avec une concurrence praticable, autorites publiques et juges negocient dans ces contrats leur souverainete. Meme si la menace de sanction pese toujours, contre une certaine indulgence, les entreprises s’engagent a respecter l’ordre public concurrentiel. On assiste ainsi substantiellement a une organisation conjointe et concertee de la concentration et du pouvoir economique, sous la houlette des fameuses Autorites administratives independantes, sous controle du juge. La souplesse caracteristique des engagements des entreprises s’accompagne correlativement d’une vigilance dans le suivi des contrats economiques en droit de la concurrence. Le facteur temps est essentiel en droit economique. Dans les procedures negociees, les autorites de concurrence ont donc pris l’habitude de faire appel a des mandataires (trustees) pour suivre non seulement les engagements comportementaux mais aussi structurels qui, plus simples a executer a priori, soulevent eux aussi de serieuses difficultes, comme en temoignent des affaires recentes. L’efficacite et l’efficience des engagements tiennent sans doute a ce qui est a l’origine du contrat : la confiance et la reciprocite.
4 citations
References
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors considered the interaction between public and private enforcement of the competition rules, and in particular the implications for private actions of alternative enforcement procedures, i.e. leniency programs, commitments and settlement procedures.
Abstract: I took the distance learning Postgraduate Diploma and MA at King’s College London during the academic years 2007/2009.
My dissertation considered the interaction between public and private enforcement of the competition rules, and in particular the implications for private actions of alternative enforcement procedures – i.e. leniency programmes, commitments and settlement procedures.
In the drafting of what would become Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages actions, this issue raised complex policy problems: the European Commission was, in principle, in favour of more private claims for damages, and did not want a system of settlements to render private actions more difficult.
In 2009, this dissertation took part to the debate: it surveyed a range of evidential, procedural and substantive issues, and expressed opinions on how best to reconcile the settlements procedure and the position of claimants in civil litigation.
In the first part, the dissertation analyses the context in which the studied interaction materializes by: underlining the main goals and characteristics of the three alternative enforcement procedures; emphasizing briefly the main goals and current issues of damages actions; presenting the key recommendations of the Commission White Paper; and assessing the tension between alternative enforcement procedures and .
In the second part, the dissertation analyses and assesses the solutions offered by the Commission White Paper to find a balance between alternative enforcement procedures and private enforcement by: identifying the theoretical and practical obstacles to damages actions that alternative enforcement procedures imply; and assessing, in relation with alternative enforcement procedures, the solutions identified in the Commission White Paper. The proposed solutions were often insufficient to remove obstacles to the development of damages actions
This research was presented and discussed with DG COMP and to university professors.
Member States needed to implement Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages actions in their legal systems by 27 December 2016.
In 2017, the impact of alternative enforcement procedures on damages actions is still being discussed and I have been asked to publish this dissertation to help feeding the reflexion of competition law specialists. I would be delighted if such was the case.
6 citations
01 Mar 2010
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose an etude de droit economique of ces contrats de structuration and de restructuration du capital dans la regulation du droit de la concurrence.
Abstract: Dans le cadre concurrentiel devenu mondial, concentration et organisation de l’economie resultent on ne peut plus clairement de deux facteurs : le jeu combine des strategies des acteurs prives et publics mais aussi les moyens proposes par le systeme juridique pour les accompagner et/ou les encadrer. Les procedures negociees illustrent la notion proposee par certains de contrat economique, en l’espece, de contrat de souverainete, outils de regulation de la concurrence. Ce texte propose une etude de droit economique de ces contrats de structuration et de restructuration du capital dans la regulation du droit de la concurrence. Les analyses conduisent a s’interesser, au-dela des strictes obligations juridiques traditionnelles et detaillees souscrites par les entreprises, a l’equilibre general de l’accord, au but economique qu’il poursuit. Il s’agit, en effet, d’une convention globale formant un tout coherent en depit des dispositions diverses qu’elle peut contenir, ce qui explique en grande partie son regime juridique. En echange d’engagements pour rendre l’operation ou les comportements compatibles avec une concurrence praticable, autorites publiques et juges negocient dans ces contrats leur souverainete. Meme si la menace de sanction pese toujours, contre une certaine indulgence, les entreprises s’engagent a respecter l’ordre public concurrentiel. On assiste ainsi substantiellement a une organisation conjointe et concertee de la concentration et du pouvoir economique, sous la houlette des fameuses Autorites administratives independantes, sous controle du juge. La souplesse caracteristique des engagements des entreprises s’accompagne correlativement d’une vigilance dans le suivi des contrats economiques en droit de la concurrence. Le facteur temps est essentiel en droit economique. Dans les procedures negociees, les autorites de concurrence ont donc pris l’habitude de faire appel a des mandataires (trustees) pour suivre non seulement les engagements comportementaux mais aussi structurels qui, plus simples a executer a priori, soulevent eux aussi de serieuses difficultes, comme en temoignent des affaires recentes. L’efficacite et l’efficience des engagements tiennent sans doute a ce qui est a l’origine du contrat : la confiance et la reciprocite.
4 citations