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Journal ArticleDOI

Law without the State: Legal Attributes and the Coordination of Decentralized Collective Punishment

11 Feb 2013-Journal of Law and Courts (University of Chicago PressChicago, IL)-Vol. 1, Iss: 1, pp 3-34
Topics: Empirical legal studies (65%), Philosophy of law (64%), Private law (63%), Legal profession (63%), Public law (63%)

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Citations
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ComponentDOI
01 Jan 2011
Abstract: This case study is about a services coalition in a developing country that provides a viable solution to developing the services sector in a country. The focus of the case study is Barbados, a very small island (166 square miles) in the Caribbean with a population of 280,000 people. Services constitute 84 per cent of the island’s GDP. Services also constitute two-thirds of the world’s economy and form the fastest growing component of world trade.

57 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Abstract: Many social scientists rely on the rule of law in their accounts of political or economic development. Many however simply equate law with a stable government capable of enforcing the rules generated by a political authority. As two decades of largely failed efforts to build the rule of law in poor and transition countries and continuing struggles to build international legal order demonstrate, we still do not understand how legal order is produced, especially in places where it does not already exist. We here canvas literature in the social sciences to identify the themes and gaps in the existing accounts. We conclude that this literature has failed to produce a microfoundational account of the phenomenon of legal order. We then discuss our recent effort to develop the missing microfoundations of legal order to provide a better framework for future work on the rule of law.

49 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Abstract: Many social scientists rely on the rule of law in their accounts of political or economic development. Many, however, simply equate law with a stable government capable of enforcing the rules generated by a political authority. As two decades of largely failed efforts to build the rule of law in poor and transition countries and continuing struggles to build international legal order demonstrate, we still do not understand how legal order is produced, especially in places where it does not already exist. We here canvas literature in the social sciences to identify the themes and gaps in the existing accounts. We conclude that this literature has failed to produce a microfoundational account of the phenomenon of legal order. We then discuss our recent effort to develop the missing microfoundations of legal order to provide a better framework for future work on the rule of law.

45 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Abstract: In a study that follows in Macaulay's (1963) footsteps, we asked businesses what role formal contract law plays in managing their external relationships. We heard similar answers to the ones Macaulay obtained fifty years ago from smaller companies that described important but non-innovation-oriented external relationships. But we also uncovered an important phenomenon: companies, large and small, that described innovation-oriented external relationships reported making extensive use of formal contracts to plan and manage these relationships. They do not, however, generate these formal contracts in order to secure the benefits of a credible threat of formal contract enforcement. Instead, like Macaulay's original respondents, they largely relied on relational tools such as termination and reputation to induce compliance. In this paper we first present examples of this phenomenon from our interview respondents, and then consider how conventional models of relational contracting can be enriched to take account of a very different role for formal contracting, independent of formal enforcement. In particular, we propose that formal contracting -- meaning the use of formal documents together with the services of an institution of formal contract reasoning -- serves to coordinate beliefs about what constitutes a breach of a highly ambiguous set of obligations. This coordination supports implementation of strategies that induce compliance -- despite the presence of substantial ambiguity ex ante at the time of contracting--with what is fundamentally still a relational contract.

42 citations


Cites methods from "Law without the State: Legal Attrib..."

  • ...Our account can be understood as an application of a more general insight, articulated by Hadfield and Weingast (2012, 2013): the function of law is not solely to provide centralized coercive enforcement of rules but also to coordinate decentralized mechanisms of punishment for rule-violations....

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References
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Book
01 Jan 1993

14,668 citations


Book ChapterDOI
Abstract: List of Abbreviations Volume 1 Preface to the 1978 Re-issue Preface Introduction Part One: Conceptual Exposition I. Basic Sociological Terms II. Sociological Categories of Economic Action III. The Types of Legitimate Domination IV. Status Groups and Classes Part Two: The Economy and the Arena of Normative and De Facto Powers I. The Economy and Social Norms II. The Economic Relationships of Organized Groups III. Household, Neighborhood and Kin Group IV. Household, Enterprise and Oikos V. Ethnic Groups VI. Religious Groups (The Sociology of Religion) VII. The Market: Its Impersonality and Ethic (Fragment) Volume 2 VII. Economy and Law (The Sociology of Law) IX. Political Communities X. Domination and Legitimacy XI. Bureaucracy XII. Patriarchalism and Patrimonialism XIII. Feudalism, Standestaat and Patrimonialism XIV. Charisma and Its Transformation XV. Political and Hierocratic Domination XVI. The City (Non-Legitimate Domination) Appendices Index

6,025 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
10 Jan 2002-Nature
Abstract: Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.

4,016 citations


Book
01 Jan 1961
Abstract: Introduction 1. Persistent Questions 2. Laws, Commands, and Orders 3. The Variety of Laws 4. Sovereign and Subject 5. Law as the Union of Primary and Secondary Rules 6. The Foundations of a Legal System 7. Formalism and Rule-Scepticism 8. Justice and Morality 9. Laws and Morals 10. International Law Postscript

3,927 citations


Posted Content
TL;DR: It is shown experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation, and that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punished.
Abstract: Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the sel®sh motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation ¯ourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.

3,813 citations


"Law without the State: Legal Attrib..." refers background in this paper

  • ...Fehr and Gachter ð2002Þ show that people in laboratory settings are frequently willing to engage in such conduct; Henrich et al. ð2006Þ demonstrate this for several populations around the world....

    [...]