Law without the State: Legal Attributes and the Coordination of Decentralized Collective Punishment
11 Feb 2013-Journal of Law and Courts (University of Chicago PressChicago, IL)-Vol. 1, Iss: 1, pp 3-34
Abstract: Most social scientists take for granted that law is defined by the presence of a centralized authority capable of exacting coercive penalties for violations of legal rules. Moreover, the existing approach to analyzing law in economics and positive political theory works with a very thin concept of law that does not account for the distinctive attributes of legal order as compared with other forms of social order. Drawing on a model developed elsewhere, we reinterpret key case studies to demonstrate how a theoretically informed approach illuminates questions about the emergence, stability, and function of law in supporting economic and democratic growth.
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TL;DR: In this article, a case study about a services coalition in a developing country that provides a viable solution to developing the services sector in a country is presented. The focus of the case study is Barbados, a very small island (166 square miles) in the Caribbean with a population of 280,000 people.
Abstract: This case study is about a services coalition in a developing country that provides a viable solution to developing the services sector in a country. The focus of the case study is Barbados, a very small island (166 square miles) in the Caribbean with a population of 280,000 people. Services constitute 84 per cent of the island’s GDP. Services also constitute two-thirds of the world’s economy and form the fastest growing component of world trade.
57 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors canvas literature in the social sciences to identify the themes and gaps in the existing accounts and conclude that this literature has failed to produce a microfoundational account of the phenomenon of legal order.
Abstract: Many social scientists rely on the rule of law in their accounts of political or economic development. Many however simply equate law with a stable government capable of enforcing the rules generated by a political authority. As two decades of largely failed efforts to build the rule of law in poor and transition countries and continuing struggles to build international legal order demonstrate, we still do not understand how legal order is produced, especially in places where it does not already exist. We here canvas literature in the social sciences to identify the themes and gaps in the existing accounts. We conclude that this literature has failed to produce a microfoundational account of the phenomenon of legal order. We then discuss our recent effort to develop the missing microfoundations of legal order to provide a better framework for future work on the rule of law.
49 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors canvas literature in the social sciences to identify the themes and gaps in the existing accounts and conclude that this literature has failed to produce a microfoundational account of the phenomenon of legal order.
Abstract: Many social scientists rely on the rule of law in their accounts of political or economic development. Many, however, simply equate law with a stable government capable of enforcing the rules generated by a political authority. As two decades of largely failed efforts to build the rule of law in poor and transition countries and continuing struggles to build international legal order demonstrate, we still do not understand how legal order is produced, especially in places where it does not already exist. We here canvas literature in the social sciences to identify the themes and gaps in the existing accounts. We conclude that this literature has failed to produce a microfoundational account of the phenomenon of legal order. We then discuss our recent effort to develop the missing microfoundations of legal order to provide a better framework for future work on the rule of law.
45 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated the role of formal contract law in managing external relationships and found that large and small companies that described innovation-oriented external relationships reported extensive use of formal contracts to plan and manage these relationships.
Abstract: In a study that follows in Macaulay's (1963) footsteps, we asked businesses what role formal contract law plays in managing their external relationships. We heard similar answers to the ones Macaulay obtained fifty years ago from smaller companies that described important but non-innovation-oriented external relationships. But we also uncovered an important phenomenon: companies, large and small, that described innovation-oriented external relationships reported making extensive use of formal contracts to plan and manage these relationships. They do not, however, generate these formal contracts in order to secure the benefits of a credible threat of formal contract enforcement. Instead, like Macaulay's original respondents, they largely relied on relational tools such as termination and reputation to induce compliance. In this paper we first present examples of this phenomenon from our interview respondents, and then consider how conventional models of relational contracting can be enriched to take account of a very different role for formal contracting, independent of formal enforcement. In particular, we propose that formal contracting -- meaning the use of formal documents together with the services of an institution of formal contract reasoning -- serves to coordinate beliefs about what constitutes a breach of a highly ambiguous set of obligations. This coordination supports implementation of strategies that induce compliance -- despite the presence of substantial ambiguity ex ante at the time of contracting--with what is fundamentally still a relational contract.
42 citations
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References
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the economy and the Arena of Normative and De Facto Powers in the context of social norms and economic action in the social sciences, and propose several categories of economic action.
Abstract: List of Abbreviations Volume 1 Preface to the 1978 Re-issue Preface Introduction Part One: Conceptual Exposition I. Basic Sociological Terms II. Sociological Categories of Economic Action III. The Types of Legitimate Domination IV. Status Groups and Classes Part Two: The Economy and the Arena of Normative and De Facto Powers I. The Economy and Social Norms II. The Economic Relationships of Organized Groups III. Household, Neighborhood and Kin Group IV. Household, Enterprise and Oikos V. Ethnic Groups VI. Religious Groups (The Sociology of Religion) VII. The Market: Its Impersonality and Ethic (Fragment) Volume 2 VII. Economy and Law (The Sociology of Law) IX. Political Communities X. Domination and Legitimacy XI. Bureaucracy XII. Patriarchalism and Patrimonialism XIII. Feudalism, Standestaat and Patrimonialism XIV. Charisma and Its Transformation XV. Political and Hierocratic Domination XVI. The City (Non-Legitimate Domination) Appendices Index
6,025 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment and that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishments are possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out.
Abstract: Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
4,016 citations
Book•
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01 Jan 1961
TL;DR: The Foundations of a Legal System as mentioned in this paper is an example of a legal system based on formalism and rule-scepticism, and it can be seen as a union of primary and secondary rules.
Abstract: Introduction 1. Persistent Questions 2. Laws, Commands, and Orders 3. The Variety of Laws 4. Sovereign and Subject 5. Law as the Union of Primary and Secondary Rules 6. The Foundations of a Legal System 7. Formalism and Rule-Scepticism 8. Justice and Morality 9. Laws and Morals 10. International Law Postscript
3,927 citations
Posted Content•
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TL;DR: It is shown experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation, and that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punished.
Abstract: Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the sel®sh motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation ¯ourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
3,813 citations
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